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ABSTRACT 
 
The rise of the corporation is one of the most transformative events in the history of United 
States, including the agricultural economy. Seeking to understand how these private businesses 
influence American foodways, my research examines the emergence of agribusiness in the 
period after 1945. These private entities manipulated the physical and metaphysical landscape of 
agriculture to sell not just their products, but also to remake rural America in a way that suited 
their needs. Agribusinesses wanted to make themselves, their products, and their specific vision 
of production and consumption, indispensable to the agricultural system. They intended to 
expand their hold on the food and fiber economy and their actions directly reflected this end-
goal. They attempted to do this by fundamentally altering the way people, both the public at 
large and farmers, viewed and understood agriculture. By manipulating conceptions of 
agriculture, agribusinesses created a new ethos that centralized their place in the political 
economy of agriculture, celebrated technological determinism and high modernism, modified 
agricultural values to fit their own perceived ideal, and simplified many rural identities to fit a 
single idea. This fusion created an inherently contradictory image of agriculture, where the 
material reality, a capital-intensive and technical system controlled by corporate forces, differed 
greatly from America’s idyllic perception of farming and farmers. These fluctuating conceptions 
allowed agribusiness to construct an agricultural system that wholly dependent on large 
companies for preservation and operational success. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Let us imagine, somewhere in south-central Iowa, in the early spring of 1942, a litter of 
pigs was born. The farm itself was average sized, around 165 acres, and diversified. It primarily 
grew hybrid corn, but also alfalfa, legumes, and a large vegetable garden. Dairy cows, a flock of 
chickens, and hogs rounded out the outfit. Cloistered in a cozy wooden barn, the litter of nine 
piglets matured for a few weeks, waiting out the last moments of winter. Finally, with the 
retreating winds releasing their icy grip on the landscape, the pig family moved out to pasture. 
Over the next six months, the piglets grew fat on legumes, roots, nuts, alfalfa, milk skimmed 
from the farm’s small dairy, and even scraps from the dinner table. Throughout the long spring 
and summer, the fattening hogs watched the farm family ready their fields. Maybe using a new 
tractor or still hitching up their horses to a steel plow, the family would cultivate their fields. The 
whole family would be involved, with the sowing and reaping requiring many hands to maintain 
the crops’ integrity, fertility, and pest control. No doubt the piglets would see the family engaged 
in all sorts of different hand labor. Daily tasks including feeding the farm animals in the 
morning, maintaining the fields, milking the dairy herd, and gathering eggs. The busiest time 
though happened in mid-summer. After the fall harvest, the pigs might join the farm’s small herd 
of cows to graze the corn fields, allowing the homestead to recoup some of their crop losses and 
fertilize its fields at the same time.  
Eventually though, by the end of fall, the once small litter would have grown into their 
adult size. With flat broad arched backs and tail heads counter-sunk, these swine fit the desired 
particulars for the lard-type of hog, stubby and round with layers of fat encircling muscle. Now 
ready for market, the farm family would drive the hogs out of the pasture, passing the harvested 
fields of hybrid corn, soy beans, alfalfa, hay and other grains, moving beyond the small dairy 
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barn, the flock of chickens and the large garden, before loading them into a truck, perhaps owned 
and operated by a friendly neighbor. After deciding to keep one or two hogs for their own uses, 
the farmer would transport the rest to the local stock market or sale ring. It was there that 
representatives from packing plants and meat lockers would bid on the hogs. 
Maybe then, finding these particular hogs to his liking, a representative from Rath 
Packing Company would buy the hogs and send them to the company plant in Waterloo, Iowa. 
Built a year earlier in 1941, the plant was largest single unit meat packing facility in the country, 
where 4,500 union employees slaughtered more than two million animals a year. After arriving 
via truck from the south, the hogs would be slowly moved through a “disassembly line.” After 
being killed, scalded in hot water, bristles removed (and kept for brushes), and skinned, factory 
workers (members of the United Packinghouse Workers of America) would split the hogs 
vertically from snout to tail, removing the head, organ meat, and lard for use in shortening, 
fertilizer, animal feeds, casings, and pharmaceuticals. Workers then relocated the carcasses to a 
chiller room before they traveled to the cutting department on a conveyer belt. It was here that 
the most skilled workers would further dismember the carcasses at a series of stations, before 
finally separating them into the three different sections (shoulders, middling, and hams). While 
much of the carcass would eventually make its way to the sausage, canning, and curing 
departments, the first and most important cut on the body happened to be Rath’s signature 
product, the ham. Removing the rest of the skin and fat, a skilled worker, one who had worked 
his way up the packing ladder, would then trim down the piece to meet the company’s exacting 
standards. Depending on the type of product, the ham could then move to the smoke house, 
curing department, a salt bath, or canning processors. Some hams though, were transferred to the 
fresh pork division, where they would be chilled again and wrapped for travel.  
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Finally, these products would be packed in refrigerated train units and shipped across the 
Midwest. Once arriving at their destination in Milwaukee, the workers unloaded the hams and 
transported them by cold trucks to area grocers and large-scale butcher shops. Once at a grocery 
store, the ham would rest for a short time, nestled between competitors such as Swift, Armour, 
Wilson, and Cudahy, all gleaming under the lights of the display cases. At last, a woman would 
choose that particular ham, pay the butcher, and transport it to its final use. Sometime later, 
maybe that very night, the woman would take it from the refrigerator or ice box and prepare it 
for a family meal. Though not as fancy as a chicken dinner or beef tenderloin, the ham would 
make a suitable meal for the household. Anticipating the long preparatory process, the housewife 
rolled up her sleeves and got down to work. 
Let us imagine that the unknown woman was not the only customer investigating the ham 
in the grocery store that day. There was an older man as well, thin and unwell, leaning against 
the glass to get a better look at the chops. He was not there to buy, but instead to survey the 
competition. As a local butcher from the area, Edward Schuster was not all that impressed by the 
uniform cuts of the Waterloo-based company. Maybe he even sneered at the lack of 
craftsmanship, uniqueness, and the unknown quality of the ingredients. Schuster and Sons prided 
itself on the use local products, buying its pork and beef from area farmers, local hunters for 
venison, and housing its own chicken coop for the occasional chicken meal. For more than thirty 
years, the Menomonee Falls butcher provided the area favorites, including homemade sausage 
and prepared fowl. So, perhaps he left the store with a new found faith and confidence in the 
future of his shop. Given the superior quality of his product, my great grandfather may have 
believed that nothing would change. 
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 This imagined story illustrates one of the most startling developments in the modern era, 
the food chain.1 With a clear linear focus, from animal to slaughter, processor to customer, the 
food and fiber industry of the early 1940s was one of national proportions and clearly defined 
tasks. The system created a factory-like timetable of commodity transportation. A web of 
bureaucrats, policy-makers, and industry technocrats worked together to sustain the food 
requirements for a country at war. Coming out of a two decade-long rut, the federal promise of 
price parity for agricultural goods jumpstarted the agricultural economy.2 Prosperity led farmers 
to invest in new mechanical technologies. The interwar period’s improvements to transportation 
allowed the red meat chain to handle the amplified volume of commodity movement. Increased 
demands for foodstuffs (especially meat) yielded high profits to processors and retailers alike. 
But even this agricultural chain, with its big processors and mechanization, still faced a society 
that had yet to fully adapt to a segmented and industrial system.  
                                                          
1 Defining modernity presents many problems for any academic discussion. Beyond its various uses in other fields 
of study (including literature, art, and critical theory), definitions of modernity often change depending on time and 
place. Therefore I am using modernity in two different capacities, both as my understanding and how my academic 
subjects understood the term. I am defining modernity in terms of Chinese historian Mark Elvin’s definition of the 
modern; that modernity is the ability to create power and that power is the capacity to change the structure of 
systems. This contains three elementary components that are interdependent; “Power over other human beings, 
whether states, groups or individuals, according to the level of the system under consideration. (2) Practical power 
over nature in terms of the capacity for economic production. (3) Intellectual power over nature in the form of the 
capacity for prediction, and more generally - of an accurate and compactly expressed understanding.” Mark Elvin, 
"A Working Definition of ‘Modernity’?" Past & Present, no. 113 (1986): 209-13. 
In terms of how many of my subjects (that is, employees, agricultural experts, and other individuals attached to 
agribusiness) understood modernity, they comprehended modernity through the lens of postwar nationalistic claims 
of American exceptionalism and belief in an evolutionary march towards an industrial ideal in agriculture. For more 
information, see Deborah Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War 
America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003); Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: 
American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2000); Dorothy Ross, "American Modernities, Past and Present." The American Historical Review, 
116, no. 3 (2011): 702-14. 
2 Douglas Hurt, Problems of Plenty: The American Farmer in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 
97-104. 
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Despite the efforts of experts, policy-makers, scientists, technocrats, and industry-
capitalists, systems of agriculture and food in the early part of the 1940s were still profoundly 
localized, communal, and, in many ways, non-industrial. Many people continued to provide 
some part of their family’s food. Canning, curing, and other food preservation remained yearly 
events that conserved the family’s supplies. There were very few supermarkets that offered a 
one-stop-shop for a family’s grocery needs. Convenience and quick meals had yet to fully 
become part of the marketplace. Meal preparation continued to be one of the most important and 
time-consuming tasks for women, one that reflected the limits of the technology available to 
most Americans. For farms and their families, community and self-sufficiency remained critical 
features of everyday life. Many of the technological innovations (including large scale 
mechanization, chemicals, and an emphasis on specialization) of the previous half century had 
yet to be fully adopted by families that had learned to “do without.”3 So while the outside of the 
food system appeared highly commercial and capitalistic, the fact remained that much of 
agricultural production and food consumption failed to live up to these expectations. But despite 
my grandfather’s proclamation, much would change in the coming decades with the emergence 
of one economic juggernaut, agribusiness. 
The rise of the corporation is one of the most transformative events in the history of 
America’s economy, including the agricultural industry. Growing alongside a developing web of 
expertise and the modern state, agribusinesses caused not just deep structural changes to 
America’s physical reality, but also to the way people perceived the world around them. After 
the Second World War, the development of agribusinesses exploded with unprecedented 
ferocity. Aided by postwar circumstances, including technological and scientific advancements, 
                                                          
3 Mary Neth, Preserving the Family Farm: Women, Community, and the Foundations of Agribusiness in the 
Midwest, 1900-1940 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 9-10 and 203-204. 
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federal policy changes, and rural depopulation, many companies saw their operations grow 
enormously. Sales numbers spiked, even as more than ten million Americans left farming all 
together. And with the growing intimacy between private business and public institutions like the 
United States Department of Agriculture and the land-grant system, the food and fiber industry 
was ripe for corporate expansion.  
Of course, agribusiness existed long before its concentrated growth in the middle decades 
of the twentieth century. Initially coined in 1957 by a former USDA bureaucrat, John Davis 
defined agribusiness as, “the sum of all operations involved in the manufacture and distribution 
of farm supplies; production operations on the farm; and the storage, processing, and distribution 
of farm commodities and items made from them.”4 He wanted the term to embody the intense 
changes the food system was undertaking, especially in terms of the control and direction. Davis 
saw a new relationship between business and agriculture, one that integrated corporatization into 
nearly every aspect of the food chain.5 In many way though, Davis was simply giving a name to 
a conception that had long existed. Agribusiness had been institutional force in agriculture for 
decades and its roots can be found in the modernization of American society itself. 
As a term, agribusiness was and is fraught with a multitude of definitions that can 
befuddle even the keenest of observers. It can describe a system of agriculture that relies on 
commercialism and industrialization or the ideological philosophy that supports the structure. 
Agribusiness has been connected to the web of agricultural professionals and the emergence of 
industrial-food complex on a global scale. In higher education, agribusiness has become a 
                                                          
4 John H. Davis and Ray A. Goldberg, A Concept of Agribusiness (Boston: Harvard University Graduate School of 
Business Administration, 1957), 2. 
5 Alan E. Fusonie, "John H. Davis: Architect of the Agribusiness Concept Revisited," Agricultural History 69, no. 2 
(1995): 326-48; Shane Hamilton. “Agribusiness, The Family Farm, And The Politics Of Technological Determinism 
In The Post-World War II United States,” Technology & Culture July 2014 (2014): 560-590. 
7 
 
 
sought-after degree, with various sub-disciplines in marketing, technology, and communication. 
Politically, agribusiness represents an amalgamation of powerful industries, all looking to 
continue their influence on federal policy and regulation. As a conception then, agribusiness 
represents many different yet related entities. It is recognized as a system, a mentality, a degree 
in higher education, a powerful lobbying force, interweaving technocratic and capitalistic 
institutions, and a buzzword to sell books and engage the readers. Yet buried under all of these 
different descriptions is the core of what agribusiness actual is: private business engaged in the 
food chain. All of these explanations refer to, in some way or another, these agricultural 
companies, corporate entities that contribute to agricultural production and wider consumption. 
These companies are the backbone of the nation’s modern agricultural system.  
There are many different viewpoints on the development of modern agriculture. 
Historians have often tried to determine who exactly steered its growth. Some have pointed to 
federal policymakers, scientific experts, and their influence over farm prices and production. 
Others have commented on the agency of farmers and how their choices shaped modern farming. 
Still other historians have traced the powerful dialogue between reformers and institutions and 
how this created a new philosophy to remake rural life.6 While these all works have added 
immeasurably to our understanding of change in agriculture, many failed to address the corporate 
force driving the transformation in the first place.  
                                                          
6 Though this is no way covers all the important works that discuss the development of agriculture in the twentieth 
century, several books that overview this topic include Gilbert Fite, American Farmers: The New Minority 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981); David B. Danbom, Born in the Country: A History of Rural 
America (2nd ed. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006); Douglas R. Hurt Problems of Plenty. Scholars 
who explored topics of agrarianism and intellectual development include Deborah Fitzgerald, Every Farm a 
Factory; Gabriel Rosenberg, The 4-H Harvest: Sexuality and the State in Rural America (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania, 2016); Alan Marcus, Agricultural Science and the Quest for Legitimacy: Farmers, Agricultural 
Colleges and Experiment Stations, 1870-1890 (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1985). J.L. Anderson, 
Industrializing the Corn Belt: Agriculture, Technology, and Environment, 1945-1972 (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 2009). 
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In fact, only a small number of scholars have even remotely discussed agribusiness, a 
group equally if not more important than farmers in molding the narrative of America's food and 
fiber industry. Of these works, most scholars have chosen to focus on the adaptation of the rural 
community to this growing pressure in a specific region, or through the lens of a commodity. 
Both Mary Neth’s Preserving the Family Farm and Joe Anderson’s Industrializing the Corn Belt 
discussed ways rural people in the Midwest accepted, resisted, and adapted to outside influences. 
Jenny Barker Devine’s On Behalf of the Family Farm specifically detailed how rural women 
navigated the postwar food chain and used their own femininity to challenge male power. Others, 
like Tore Olsson’s article “Peeling Back the Layers,” chronicled the corporate expansion of a 
single commodity, Vidalia onions, into a global food business. Scholarship on California 
agriculture, including Benny J. Andrés’ Power and Control in the Imperial Valley, also 
demonstrate the influence of agribusiness. Finally, Shane Hamilton’s Trucking Country and 
“Agribusiness, the Family Farm, and the Politics of Technological Determinism in the Post–
World War II United States,” both analyzed the connections between postwar politics, ideology, 
and the rise of agribusiness in the rural context. His article on the nature of the postwar farm 
policy debate and its influence on American conceptions of agriculture was especially important 
to recognizing the intersection between politics, economics, and culture.7 For the most part, 
scholars have dealt with the consequences of expanding agribusiness domination. However, very 
few have examined how and why agribusiness was able to attain this control in the first place. 
                                                          
7 Neth, Preserving the Family Farm; J.L.  Anderson, Industrializing the Corn Belt; Jenny Barker-Devine On Behalf 
of the Family Farm: Iowa Farm Women’s Activism since 1945 (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2013); Tore 
Olsson, “Peeling Back the Layers: Vidalia Onions and the Making of a Global Agribusiness,” Enterprise & Society, 
13, no. 4 (2012), 832-861; Benny J. Andrés’ Power and Control in the Imperial Valley: Nature, Agribusiness, and 
Workers on the California Borderland, 1900-1940 (College Station; Texas A&M University Press, 2015); Shane 
Hamilton, Trucking Country: The Road to American’s Wal-Mart Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2008); Hamilton, “Agribusiness, the Family Farm, and the Politics of Technological Determinism in the Post–World 
War II United States,” Technology & Culture, 55, no. 13 (2014): 560-590. 
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None of these scholars have looked explicitly at private companies: their beliefs, desires, 
and the deliberate actions they took. For all of their influence, agribusinesses as private 
establishments remain remarkably hidden from view. They are referred and alluded to, but very 
rarely actually studied. In fact, other than scholar Wayne Broehl’s work on Cargill and John 
Deere, no scholar has analyzed specific companies and their contributions to our understanding 
of the modern food system.8  How can scholars comprehend these larger changes without 
examining one of its primary influencers? Frequently, it was these entities that were the driving 
force behind the transformation of the food chain. What did companies want and how did they 
seek to achieve it? What mentality drove their actions? What problems did they encounter and 
how did they attempt to solve them? What did these agribusinesses want their customers to 
believe and how did they engage with them? In order to truly comprehend these changes, 
historians must discuss the companies that helped enact them. 
Moreover, while several scholars have examined the physical changes to the food and 
fiber industry, almost none have studied the changes to the perception of food production and 
consumption. After the Second World War, American conceptions of agriculture and the people 
connected to it became simplified. Very few historians have alluded to the reduction of farming 
identity into a conception as simple as mom and apple pie. Historians have yet to examine the 
process of how farmers shifted culturally from producers to consumers in post-war America. 
Finally and most importantly, historians have not addressed the disconnection between the 
American public’s view of farming and the reality of contemporary agriculture. Simply put, most 
Americans have little conception of the scope, development, and inherent contradictions within 
their food system. By ignoring the power and scope of agribusiness to inform and manipulate 
                                                          
8 Wayne Broehl, Cargill: Trading the World’s Grain (Hanover NH.: Dartmouth College Press, 1992).   
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conceptions of agriculture, scholars have not fully deciphered the invisible giant lurking in 
America’s countryside. To better understand the influence of agribusiness, it is critical to study 
how companies attempted to transmit their message to the American masses. 
With these gaps in mind, my research examines one of the most transformative changes 
of the twentieth century, the emergence of agribusiness in the period after 1945. These private 
entities manipulated the physical and metaphysical landscape of agrarianism to sell not just their 
products, but also to remake rural America in a way that suited their needs. Agribusinesses 
wanted to essentialize themselves, their products, and their specific vision of production and 
consumption, to the agricultural system. They intended to expand their hold on the food and fiber 
economy and their actions directly reflected this end-goal. They attempted to do this by 
fundamentally altering the way people, both the public at large and farmers, viewed and 
understood agriculture. By manipulating conceptions of agriculture, agribusinesses created a new 
ethos that centralized their place in the political economy of agriculture, celebrated technological 
determinism and high modernism, modified agricultural values to fit their own perceived ideal, 
and simplified many rural identities to fit a single idea. This fusion created an inherently 
contradictory image of agriculture, where the material reality (a capital-intensive and technical 
system controlled by corporate forces) differed greatly from America’s abstract perception (an 
idyllic vision of farming and farmers). These fluctuating conceptions allowed agribusiness to 
construct an agricultural system that wholly depended on large companies for functionality and 
sustainability.  
Foremost, this dissertation will be an institutional history of agribusiness in the 1950s and 
60s. It will be written from the perceptive of these companies and how they created and then 
attempted to market their ethos to customers, both farmers and food consumers. This dissertation 
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will not cover the response from customers themselves, whether not they wholeheartedly 
accepted these notions, rejected them, or fell somewhere in between. While this is an extremely 
important topic in its own right and adds an essential component to the overall narrative of 
modern agriculture, the work required to adequately cover this topic is simply too much at this 
time. This work is about the first part of the story. But the dissertation will still offer some 
glimpses into customer reaction. It will attempt to describe how customer reaction forced these 
agribusinesses to change their image, policy, and market strategy. This work will also examine 
how some consumers utilized these embedded systems of consumption for their own benefit. 
These revisions of agriculture deeply altered rural identity and community bonds. One 
outcome of this push was the consolidation of many different types and forms of agricultural 
identity to a single, simplified version favored by business interests and their allies. The 
recreation of the farmer as a broad scale consumer, competitor, and businessman limited the very 
type of person who could possibly be conceived of as a farmer. Agribusinesses and their rhetoric 
ideologically separated non-white, non-male, small-scale, and a whole host of other Americans 
from agriculture. Agribusiness also profoundly changed the ways individual farmers and their 
communities viewed competition, cooperation, and communal systems. By excluding struggling 
farmers from local exchange networks and viewing them as inefficient rivals, agribusinesses 
believed that their customers would embrace a new modern system of agriculture. Depopulation 
trends only helped to multiply this perception, as farmers saw more and more of their kind leave 
agriculture. Instead of understanding community as a proximity, a physical space made up of 
flesh and blood individuals, agricultural companies wanted farmers to expand their construction 
to include non-corporeal entities like agribusiness. To achieve this, businesses sought to integrate 
themselves within these established bonds of rural spaces.  
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This work looks at a critical period of development in the relationship between 
agriculture, corporatization, and the political economy.9 It seeks to understand the influence of 
corporations on labor and performance in food production and consumption. The postwar period 
witnessed a shocking number of changes to the food chain. State policy encouraged a “get big or 
get out” mentality in agriculture. Scientific and technological advancements increased 
agricultural efficiency and production. The growth of supermarket chains reconstructed the 
environmental landscape of retail sales and consumerism. The postwar emphasis on middle class 
values levelled customer expectations and consumption patterns. And, of course, the explosion 
of agribusinesses produced a new level of corporatization never seen before in the food and fiber 
system. These changes, even when embraced, were no doubt unnerving for many Americans. 
Aware that this new food chain was problematic and difficult to market, agribusinesses 
deliberately crafted a nostalgic vision of agriculture that was much more palatable to the public 
at large. This “American Way of Farming” sold agribusiness’ products (and the system that 
produced them) by shrouding itself in talismans and symbols of an older agricultural network. 
By hiding the reality of a capitalistic food and fiber system, agribusinesses attempted to control 
how the public perceived the industry. These companies are some of the most powerful in the 
modern food industry and their rhetoric deeply affected perceptions of both urban and rural 
spaces, hallmarks of identity, and community interactions. My discussion of the development of 
agribusiness seeks to answer a number of understudied questions about America’s relationship 
with institutionalized foodways, including how the public conceives of and justifies its food and 
fiber system. 
                                                          
9 As with any term that has many different things at many different times, finding a precise definition to “political 
economy” can be quite fraught. In terms of this work, political economy refers to the intersection between power 
and resources. It discusses the connections between political development and economic processes and ultimately 
how this junction influences social and cultural institutions. 
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With this in mind, I have chosen five different companies that show the diversity and 
range of agribusiness in the postwar era. Each one of these companies represented an important 
link in the food chain, from input businesses to output food processors. They also were respected 
leaders in their fields, archetypes that exemplified their specific industry. International Harvester 
and Pioneer Hi-Bred, both primarily agricultural corporations with roots in early twentieth 
century, continued their business growth by providing valuable input products to farmers. 
Monsanto, a chemical giant, entered into the agricultural industry with the expansion of 
fertilizers after the Second World War. Rath Packing Company and Perdue Chicken epitomized 
the powerful meat packers, a sub-industry with feet in direct processing and retailing. Each 
represents an opportunity to examine the patterns of development from different points-of-view.   
Of course, this work will also be discussing other corporations, including direct 
competitors, but these five companies make up the bulk of the researched material.10 Not only do 
they showcase the scope of agribusiness’ power, but also a range of experiences and operations. 
Some had long been a part of the agricultural industry, while others were entering for the first 
time. Many companies sought to expand their product line beyond agriculture. Conversely, 
several were content to remain within the boundaries of food and fiber. Certain companies 
struggled in the postwar period, facing increased competition or stagnant demand. For most 
though, the postwar era was an economic boom time, allowing them to expand their operations 
and explore new revenue streams. Despite their differences, agribusiness employees held 
remarkably similar beliefs and they acted in remarkably similar ways. Whether successful or not, 
                                                          
10 It is important to note that all of these companies, though some were more curated than others, held records open 
to researchers. This is relatively rare, as many corporations are hostile to outside researchers. Therefore, their 
openness was one of the major reasons they were chosen for this work. Outside of Perdue Chicken (now known as 
Perdue Farms), all of these corporations have either “died” or been sold off to other firms involved in Big 
Agriculture. It was the relocation of direct control or “death” that allowed company records to be transmitted to 
academic archives.   
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all companies sought to expand their hold on the larger industry. They served a wide range of 
customers and regions, eventually paving the way for agribusiness to become the global 
institution it is today. But perhaps most importantly, all of these corporations espoused similar 
principles to other agribusinesses, including the adoption of large-scale, cash-based, industrial 
agricultural production and top-down, national-scope, corporate-driven consumption.  Each 
company was a strong participant in its respected field and thus represents a “typical” example of 
that sub-industry, making it ideal to use as a lens to examine the larger industry’s influence.  
From the selection of Rath, Perdue, Pioneer, Monsanto, and International Harvester, we can find 
and draw parallels in the organizational makeup, history, mentality, and practice of 
agribusinesses. 
 In order to fully understand corporate America’s vision of the food and fiber industry, it 
is important to examine the different beliefs and methods they used to manipulate their 
customers and the public at large. My chapters will explore different aspects of the food chain, 
from agricultural production to retail and processing elements. The first three chapters cover the 
various ways corporations manipulated aspects of time, postwar experiences, and identity. The 
first chapter will explore how agribusinesses conceived of the past and present. Believing in a 
technological-determinist vision of history, these companies sought to present themselves as 
critical components of progress, essentially replacing human agency with corporate ingenuity. 
The first part of this marketing strategy depended on reverence for the past. Beyond their own 
company origin stories, all of these companies romanticized the position of farmers in America 
history and their own place within that narrative. They argued that national and global issues of 
the postwar era required new behavior standards within agricultural operations. Maintaining that 
farmers needed to adopt new models of labor and gender (paradigms that directly benefited 
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agribusiness), agribusinesses blended mythology and reality to essentialize their place in 
agriculture. 
 The second and third chapters explore how agribusinesses manipulated rural identity to 
suit their needs. The second chapter will examine how agribusinesses attempted to invigorate 
mass consumerism in rural spaces. Emphasizing the need for farmers to become consumers, 
agribusinesses desired their customers to see their products (and by extension, the companies) as 
necessary tools to a functional and prosperous countryside. With this focus in mind, the third 
chapter discusses competition, community, and farming as a business rather than a lifestyle. This 
chapter observes the ways agribusinesses advocated for increased competition between farmers, 
trying to reshape perceptions of community and who, and who did not, deserve to be a 
continuing part of the agricultural industry. For rural communities, agribusinesses profoundly 
changed the ways individual farmers viewed competition, cooperation, and communal systems 
of exchange. By attempting to manipulate identity, agribusinesses sought to solidify their place 
within rural America while dismissing fears of depopulation and struggling farmers. 
Chapters four and five explore the relationship between high modernism, the cult of 
convenience, and agribusinesses. Chapter four discusses how agribusiness used science and 
technology as a philosophical justification of their control and as a marketing tool. Scientific 
growth and increased technological adoption also reinforced corporate understandings of their 
role within the wider industry. Bolstered by greater sales numbers and product innovation, these 
corporations alleged that they and their technocrats held to key greater agricultural success. 
Agribusinesses resolutely believed in not just the possibility of biological control, but also that 
nature itself could and should be mastered by humans. These businesses assumed that they could 
create a perfectly imagined environment, one that could be organized and operated much like a 
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factory. With these beliefs in mind, agribusinesses further commodified agricultural knowledge, 
underpinning the necessity of their continued presence.  
On the other end of the cold chain, the fifth chapter discusses the wider transformation of 
the food retail industry after the Second World War. Just as agribusinesses involved in 
commodity production looked to solidify their place through the promise of biological control, so 
too would corporations connected to food retail (including processors, packers, supermarket 
chains, appliance manufacturers, and others), utilize a similar conception to ensure their growing 
top-down regulation and corporate management of this industry. For food retailers though, this 
promotion centered on their assurance of convenience, a conception they transmitted to 
customers through advertisements, marketing ploys, and other public relations efforts. This cult 
of convenience promised accessibility, ease, and variety without losing quality assurance. By 
proving that large businesses could bring this convenience to customers, agribusinesses looked to 
remake the retail landscape and further insinuate corporatization into America’s grocery stores 
and pantries. 
Finally, my last chapter will bring together these various topics to identify 
agribusinesses’ role in encouraging America’s contradictory vision of modern rurality and food 
production. Understanding that changes to the food and fiber system were dramatic and not 
altogether easy to market, these corporations deliberately crafted a nostalgic and romanticized 
view of agriculture to hide their growing power and control over an increasingly industrial and 
capitalistic food and fiber system. Utilizing powerful messages that emphasized rural imagery, 
family, and nostalgia, agribusinesses across the spectrum reassured an American public that the 
food system combined the wholesome nature they desired with the modern convenience and 
speed life now demanded. 
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We cannot hope to understand why and how the American food system operates without 
examining its historical elements. The postwar era was a period of great transition for many 
aspects of American society and the agricultural network was no different. The emergence of 
agribusiness created the context for many of the expectations we have today about the production 
and consumption of food and fiber. The ability to manipulate conceptions, to fundamentally 
change how people thought about farming and farmers, in turn entrenched agribusiness’ place 
within agriculture. Consolidation of these ideas helped engineer one of the most profound 
conceptual changes to America’s relationship with food. Aided by postwar circumstances, the 
average American became more willing to accept big business as an organic part of their 
lifestyle. It was a change that would have profound effects everyone far beyond the countryside. 
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CHAPTER TWO: “SO GOD MADE A FARMER:” HISTORY AND TIME IN 
AGRIBUSINESS NARRATIVES 
 
“God said, "I need somebody strong enough to clear trees and heave bails, yet gentle enough to 
tame lambs and wean pigs and tend the pink-combed pullets, who will stop his mower for an 
hour to splint the broken leg of a meadow lark." 
 
“It had to be somebody who’d plow deep and straight and not cut corners; somebody to seed, 
weed, feed, breed and rake and disc and plow and plant and tie the fleece and strain the milk and 
replenish the self-feeder and finish a hard week’s work with a five-mile drive to church; 
somebody who would bale a family together with the soft strong bonds of sharing, who would 
laugh, and then sigh, and then reply, with smiling eyes, when his son says that he wants to spend 
his life ‘doing what dad does.’" 
 
“So God made a farmer.” 
 
 In 1978, radio personality and future presidential Medal of Freedom winner Paul Harvey 
ended his speech for the Future Farmers of America with those words. An emotional tribute to 
farmers, Harvey’s words symbolized a prominent theme in American cultural history. Farmers, 
the first majority and last minority, hold a unique place in the country’s collective memory. 
Though sometimes despised and ridiculed as ignorant, more often than not, the nation’s farmers 
have been held up as the ideal Americans. They seem to represent so many of the qualities 
venerated by American society: independence, virtue, work ethic, and democratic leadership. 
Harvey’s speech exalted these traits, alluding to the notion that farmers were not just 
“caretakers” of the land, but of the country as a whole. His speech, though heartfelt, fell in to 
obscurity after the convention. 
 Fast forward to February 13, 2013, and the speech was reintroduced to the public in a 
most unusual fashion. Harvey’s voice again reached millions of viewers, this time in the form of 
a Chevrolet Ram truck Superbowl commercial. Featuring still pictures of tough looking farmers, 
fields, and of course, trucks, “so God made a farmer” once again entered the American 
consciousness. The Huffington Post called the ad poignant, Slate insisted it was the most striking 
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ad that night.11 Craig Hill, president of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, said the commercial 
left him teary eyed.12 But what was striking about Chrysler’s ad was not the emotional message, 
but rather how perfectly it encapsulated both America’s love affair with farming and the 
corporatization of these conceptions. 
 By creating such a commercial, Chrysler projected several impressions as actual facts. 
First, the company decided who exactly fit into their characterization of “farmer.” The 
advertisement featured an overwhelming number of white men, with rough-jawed, hat-wearing 
cowboys outnumbering women eighteen to five and non-white actors nineteen to three. Within 
the two minute clip, the commercial contained four religious scenes, five examples of heavy 
machinery, five skillfully plowed fields, and one blatantly obvious American flag floating in the 
breeze. From an analytical standpoint, it was easy to assume that Chrysler’s farmers were white 
men who were also religious, in possession of complex farm equipment, and toiled on many 
acres of rich soil. It was a characterization that many in America no doubt shared. 
 The second marketing coup the commercial accomplished was the association between 
farming and corporations. Ram trucks haul hay and animals. Case tractors, combines, and other 
equipment shell corn, plow fields, and sustain crops.13 These large machines symbolize the 
profession itself. It would be a small leap in logic to assume that without this equipment, farmers 
would be unable to perform their daily tasks. Companies, then, became a completely necessary 
                                                          
11 “God Made A Farmer’ Super Bowl Ad: Paul Harvey Speech In Chrysler’s Ram Truck Commercial,” Huffington 
Post, February 4, 2013, accessed online (February 2, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/god-made-
a-farmer-super-bowl_n_2615081.html; David Haglund, “The Best Superbowl Ad So Far Was Based on a Youtube 
Video,” Slate, February 3, 2013, assessed online (February 2, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2013/02/03/god_made_a_farmer_paul_harvey_speech_goes_from_youtube_t
o_super_bowl_ad.html.  
12 Dan Piller, “What Actual Farmers Thought of Chrysler’s “So God Made a Farmer” Superbowl Ad,” USA Today, 
February 5, 2013, accessed online (February 2, 2017), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2013/02/04/chrysler-farmer-ad-resonates/1891603/.  
13 Today, both Case IH and Chrysler are owned by CNH Industrial, a large capital goods company based in the 
Netherlands.   
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institution to agriculture, their importance to the industry seemingly both innate and undeniable. 
It was a remarkable feat of marketing. Yet, this advertisement was not nearly as unique or 
innovative as it seems. The truth is that companies involved in agriculture have been playing on 
conceptions of farming and their own place in them for decades. 
 This chapter will explore how agribusinesses employed new interpretations of past, 
present, and future to both essentialize themselves to the agricultural process and introduce new 
standards to the rural community. An indispensable part of agribusiness' marketing strategy was 
their creation of a technologically-deterministic construction of time. Using their own origin 
stories, the past became a simple line of progress in which “special” businessmen helped create a 
better world for humanity. In turn, these corporate entities applied this reconstructed notion of 
time to current reality. In order to solve issues of depopulation, world hunger, and the fight 
against communism, agribusinesses argued that changes needed to be made in the postwar 
agricultural world. By adopting new standards of gendered labor, agricultural knowledge, and 
specialization, companies contended that farmers could then achieve a golden future that lacked 
the problems of the past but still had the virtues of yesteryear. 
The composition of rural life and historic memory played a critical role in how 
agribusiness reconstituted its own place within the story of the agricultural past. By developing a 
mythology around their own foundation, companies sought to sell themselves as an essential part 
of agricultural progress. In line with a strong belief in technological determinism (an idea which 
will be explored later), these private businesses made the important choice to place their own 
origins within a deliberate moment of (what they claimed was) world-changing innovation, a 
leap in scientific and technological development.14 Through the lens of their founders, companies 
                                                          
14 I am using the term technological determinism to describe a conceptual theory that human progress is driven by 
technological innovation and that this follows a predictable and inevitable path of advancement. For scholarship that 
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could claim agency and a natural predisposition for problem solving. They, and more subtly their 
products, would be associated with advancement. And even if companies could not definitively 
point to a single moment of invention, they could still claim a uniqueness in preparation, 
technique, or character. They succeeded because progress demanded it. This intersection 
between past, progress, and private enterprise was an important pillar in creating origin myths 
and also recreating temporal understandings of the past, the present, and the future. 
For the most part, the origin myths of these agribusinesses followed a simple formula. A 
single man, possessing the necessary skills and virtues, created a business empire that solved 
problems and ultimately made the world a better place. One of the hallmarks of agribusinesses 
and their origins was the importance of a single character, a plucky protagonist whose own grit 
and determination helped him succeed where other men would fail. These men embodied the 
masculine traits that agribusiness hoped to impress upon farmers, including business acumen, 
efficiency, and support of industrial ideals. Moreover, the myths were equally vital to reinforcing 
the importance of private business to solving societal dilemmas. They showcased how 
capitalistic development was a natural sign of progress. Competition pushed businesses to solve 
major agricultural problems that plagued the world.  
Out of all agricultural industries, the companies involved in farm equipment were the 
most devoted to the worship of the past and their place in it. This was partly because of the 
lengthy history of agricultural machinery. Unlike many of the major technological changes to 
farming, machinery had its start in the mid-nineteenth century, with companies selling reapers, 
binders, steel plows, and other equipment. International Harvester traced its origins all the way 
                                                          
explores this theory in history, see, Merritt Roe Smith, “Technological Determinism in American Culture,” In Does 
Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, edited by Merrit Roe Smith and Leo 
Marx, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 1-37. 
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back to 1831. Its major competitor, John Deere, identified its founding just nine years later. But 
even more than their origin dates, farm equipment manufacturers used historic memory to 
reaffirm their own reputations as innovators or “makers” of history. John Deere maintained that 
its founder unlocked America’s full potential when he (and he alone) arrived on the Illinois 
prairie. Before then, the rich soils stymied all tools, waiting for the right man with the 
“combination of brains, skills, and inventiveness, and persistence to convert them into the most 
abundant horn of plenty the world has ever known.”15 Then, like destiny, Deere unlocked the 
magic of the prairie and allowed for the creation of a prosperous American heartland. By tracing 
its foundation back to this moment, the company hid its own self-interest behind of a banal 
display of human advancement and benefit. The corporation claimed it should be, “truly 
measured only by its contribution to the welfare and progress of the people.”16    
Not to be outdone by their main rival, International Harvester wove a competing tale of 
triumph and valor. The hero of their story was a bearded Virginian named Cyrus McCormick. 
Despite many failures and skeptics, McCormick eventually prevailed with the invention of the 
mechanical reaper. Leaning on the same principles as John Deere, International Harvester argued 
that, “probably no single invention has done more to change the conditions of life in the civilized 
world.”17 Again, this highlighted the importance of private enterprise in “making” history. By 
downplaying the agency of other people or institutions, International Harvester reinforced the 
notion that historical change was the province of special men and in turn the companies they 
founded. Companies created progress, much like a point moving ever forward on a self-
                                                          
15 John Deere, “Makers of Plenty: John Deere…the Man and the Company,” 1962, 6-7, Box 551, File 08816, 
International Harvester Central File, Mss 6Z, Wisconsin Historical Archives and Museum Collections, Wisconsin 
Historical Society Library, Madison, Wisconsin. Hereafter known as International Harvester Central File. 
16 Ibid, 10. 
17 International Harvester, “Welcome to Harvester: Sales operations,” 1957, 29, Box 324, File 16498, International 
Harvester Central File. 
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determined line, and the masses (including farmers) then consumed these advancements. Like 
John Deere, International Harvester wanted customers to see them as a force of betterment. The 
corporation even used this association to claim protection over American wellbeing. In the face 
of growing Cold War tensions, the company published a pamphlet declaring that it existed to 
help maintain America’s strength. Not only did Harvester assist in food production, but its 
scientific and technological expertise stood ready to meet the country’s future needs. Even when 
the corporation made sacrifices, it had but, “one thought—the strength and preservation of free 
America must be served first!”18 The relationship between company enterprise and American 
improvement was an important link in agribusiness’ historic memory. 
It was an association International Harvester guarded jealously, especially when other 
competitors threatened the company’s place in the market. In 1942, Ford Motor Company 
attempted to use wartime regulations to cut its competitors out of the farm equipment market all 
together. Appealing to the War Production Board, Ford argued that the production of a single 
tractor type (made by Ford of course) would allow for greater concentration on more pertinent 
war machines and increase the return of scrap metal for the war effort.19 Understandably, 
International Harvester was none too pleased at this recommendation. Howling about waste, 
unfairness, and inefficiency, the company took its complaints to anyone who would listen. Not 
only did the company point out Ford tractors’ lack of versatility, but they also appealed to the 
possibility of regression and harm to America’s future goals. The proposal, they claimed, did not 
take into account Harvester’s own campaign (for which they had received no revenue) to collect 
                                                          
18 “International Harvester, Men, Food and Machines” 1950, 1-3, Box 524, File 4532, International Harvester 
Central File. 
19 Letter to Leon Henderson from J.L. McCaffrey, August 31, 1942, Box 551, File 1931, International Harvester 
Central File. 
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scrap metal, which had resulted in over one million tons of scrap for the war effort.20 Even more 
perilous was the certainty that this single tractor program would “jeopardize the Food for 
Freedoms.”21 Finally, joined by other implement dealers, International Harvester presented a list 
of counterarguments in Washington, D.C. Their primary argument against the proposal centered 
on the idea that the production of a single tractor type would waste valuable resources and limit 
operating efficiency. Instead, Harvester and the other manufacturers noted that a modern 
agricultural operation needed many different kinds of tractors to fulfill different tasks.22 And 
though Ford’s proposal was ultimately rejected by the government, its mere suggestion 
represented a serious threat to the metaphysical claims of International Harvester. Obviously the 
loss of wartime equipment sales would hurt, but the ideological implications were equally 
problematic. International Harvester claimed domain over agricultural innovation and progress. 
If they and their products could easily be replaced by a single Ford tractor, how important could 
the company be to the agricultural sector? 
Outside of the farm equipment companies, the next industry most devoted to its own 
convoluted mythology was the seed corn companies. The development of hybrid seed was a long 
and multifaceted tale, featuring the combined efforts of both academics and businessmen.23 For 
individual seed corn companies, the myth-making formula remained mostly intact. An 
individual, with great talent, developed hybrids to help his fellow farmers. Funk Brothers Seed 
Company marked its beginning with Eugene Funk in 1901. Pfister Seed denoted its creation with 
                                                          
20 Letter to Lessing J. Rosenwald from J.L. McCaffrey, September 11, 1942, Box 551, File 1931, International 
Harvester Central File. 
21 Letter to Leon Henderson from J.L. McCaffrey, August 31, 1942, Box 551, File 1931, International Harvester 
Central File. 
22 Farm Machinery Manufacturers, “An analysis of the proposal to build only light tractors,” November 5, 1942, 
Box 551, File 1931, International Harvester Central File. 
23 Deborah Fitzgerald, The Business of Breeding: Hybrid Corn in Illinois, 1890-1940 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1990), 1-10. 
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Lester Pfister in 1925. Even DeKalb, a joint association between local businessmen, farmers, and 
academics, held up individual heroes to honor. Yet, perhaps no person in the seed corn industry 
remained more venerated than Henry A. Wallace.  
One of Iowa’s favorite sons, Wallace had an immeasurable impact on the industry. Long 
before he sold off his shares and became a world-famous politician, Wallace’s experimentation 
with plant breeding led to the founding of Pioneer Hi-Bred in 1926. Like the protagonists of 
other origin tales, Pioneer highlighted Wallace’s innovation but also the conspiratorial forces that 
attempted to hold back progress. Company legend testified that Iowa’s open pollinated seed 
producers attempted to bar Wallace’s hybrids from the state’s official yield test. Meeting like 
villains in the night, the producers argued, “this new-fangled corn was not practical because the 
farmer could not save his seed.”24 Luckily, Wallace’s innovation caught the eye of several allies 
and Pioneer became the first seed company solely devoted to the research and production of 
hybrid corn. It was little wonder that Henry’s brother James, who would led the company after 
Henry’s departure to Washington, remembered that his brother’s early concern was simply 
getting farmers to try hybrids. For he knew that hybrids, “would enable farmers all through the 
Corn Belt to profit from this exciting development.”25 Again, businessmen became the holders of 
innovation. Resistance to their ideas and products held back natural progress, while acceptance 
could bring greater profits for both farmers and businesses alike.26  
                                                          
24 Pioneer, “A History of Pioneer’s First Ten Years,” undated, 15, Box 1, File 32, Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc., 
MS 542, Special Collections Department, Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 
Hereafter known as Pioneer International. 
25 James Wallace, “Message from President James Wallace on New Trademark,” Pioneer Kernels, March-April 
1964,  6-7, Box 9, File 51, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. Eastern Division Records, MS 541, Special 
Collections Department, Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. Hereafter known as 
Pioneer Eastern Division Records. 
26 It is important to note that I am using “businessmen” in a distinctively gendered manner. While many women 
were deeply involved in business decisions and production, dominant cultural attitudes dismissed their contributions 
and limited acknowledgement of their roles. As such, the realm of “business” was seen as specifically masculine. 
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Businesses in the meat industry also used origin myths to both redesign their place in 
American society and to separate themselves from competitors. Meat as a commodity bears a 
unique set of marketing opportunities and limitations. It is intrinsically tied to slaughter, its very 
creation entwined with death. As one advertising executive warned a meat producer, one must 
never imply that the company must kill to bring the product to the consumer.27 The process of 
preparation, slaughter, preservation, and the dissemination of meat was a massive investment of 
manpower and coordination. Moreover, because of its very nature, meat production deals with 
unique health risks. Meat packers face dangerous working conditions and the consumption of 
spoiled meat can result in sickness and death. No wonder customers in the later nineteenth and 
early twentieth century demanded more regulation and transparency. Yet, despite many of the 
problems inherent to the industry, meat production and consumption have become an essential 
component of American society. In fact, even as more Americans moved away from rural areas 
and presumably the slaughter of their own meat, meat consumption rose annually. By 1960, 
Americans consumed more than two hundred pounds of meat per person per year.28 Due to this 
strange mixture, corporations involved in meat production needed customers to remove 
themselves, ideologically, emotionally, and physically, from the production process altogether. 
As scholar Susanne Freidberg noted, nineteenth century Chicago meatpackers, “convinced 
consumers, not only that fresh beef could come from far away, but also that their main 
relationship to meat--and indeed, to all once-living foods-- was as consumers."29 
                                                          
27 Letter to Franklin Perdue from Eliot Finkles, October 29, 1970, 4-5, Box 36, File 408, Perdue Farms Inc. Records, 
Edward H. Nabb Research Center for Delmarva History and Culture, Salisbury University, Salisbury, Maryland. 
Hereafter known as Perdue Chicken Records.  
28 Roger Horowitz, Putting Meat On the American Table: Taste, Technology, Transformation (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2006), 1-17. 
29 Susanne Freidberg, Fresh: A Perishable History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 65. 
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In turn, corporations could then display their enterprise as the only producer of healthful 
and wholesome meat. Their innovations represented progress away from the major problems of 
the past, their actions provided continuous safe access to this commodity. Company origin 
stories, using a similar myth-making formula, helped solidify this theme in the eyes of 
customers. Hormel claimed that its founder, George A. Hormel, demanded excellence from the 
very beginning. Consequently, “for over three quarters of a century, the heritage of the Hormel 
Company has been based upon strict adherence to quality.”30 Rath Packing Company asserted a 
similar position, maintaining that early company leadership allowed them to become one of the 
pioneers in the industry.31  
Perdue Chicken was especially good at drawing connections between historic memory 
and their own company contributions to the larger industry. When nominating their founder (and 
father of the then current president) Arthur Perdue to the American Poultry Historical Society’s 
Hall of Fame, the company played up his importance as a chicken industry visionary. Despite 
starting from humble roots, Arthur Perdue’s integrity and sound management allowed him to 
transform a flock of fifty white leghorns into “one of the world’s largest integrated poultry 
producing companies.”32 One supporter attributed the growth in consumer confidence in chicken 
to Arthur’s company’s work. The supporter noted the overall importance of the company’s 
founder, writing, “The story he symbolizes, and the story his company tells to the customer, is 
one in which all of us can be proud because it constantly reminds the marketplace of the 
                                                          
30 Hormel, “Hormel Product Lines,” 1971-1972, 10, Series 1, File 43, Box 1, Rath Packing Company Records, MS 
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goodness of our products.”33 Each one of these corporations drew the line between private 
business and historical innovation, between the problems of the past and solutions offered by 
corporations. They placed themselves as the holders and producers of new knowledge and 
ingenuity, which led to the production of a clean and wholesome product. 
Even a company that lacked historical agricultural background sought to create a 
comparable legend. Though today it is one of the most visible agricultural corporations, 
Monsanto only turned to agriculture forty years after its inception. But this did not stop the 
company from deifying its founder or touting its own importance to American society. Company 
literature painted an ideal image of founder John Francis Queeny, chronicling his rise to success 
through an unwillingness to admit defeat. Due to his determination, Monsanto’s, “character was 
permanently shaped by his unwavering insistence on supplying honest goods at a fair price.”34 
This infusion ultimately instilled the company with the need to help answer many questions 
about the human condition. Monsanto even aided in the triumph of America itself, using “its 
pioneering progress in both human relations and productive efficiency,” to make the country the 
most successful nation in world history.35  
Unlike other agribusinesses in the postwar period though, Monsanto lacked the 
agricultural pedigree to play on. They could not specifically point to historic agricultural 
innovation or flaunt their long history of aiding rural communities. Instead, the company altered 
the myth-making formula to fit its own needs. Queeny and the company’s importance remained, 
but the development of Monsanto’s agricultural division received a new and improved storyline. 
                                                          
33 Letter to E.M. Funk from H.D. Weber, circa 1974, Box 69, File 778, Perdue Chicken Records. 
34 Hubert Kay, “Monsanto and the American Idea: First Draft,” June 1958,  P-1, Series 6, Box 1, File 4, Monsanto 
Company Records, University Archives, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri. Hereafter Known 
as Monsanto Collection. 
35 Ibid, P-1. 
29 
 
 
Corporate scientists of the 1940s, now the secondary heroes of this plotline, helped win the war 
while solving major agricultural issues. DDT killed disease-spreading bugs on the battlefield and 
then destroyed them on the farm. The company argued that they stood on the frontline in the 
battle against famine and hunger. Corporate chemicals aided “the American farmer in his 
redoubled efforts to allay the famine which threatens one-fourth of the world's population."36 
Monsanto’s modern mythmaking even highlighted the formula’s focus on resolve after failure. 
When the corporation’s soil conditioner failed on the open market (which they attributed to over-
exuberant expectations by customers), Monsanto reaffirmed its commitment to agricultural 
progress by adding personnel, constructing new testing grounds, and eventually creating their 
own Agricultural Division.37  
Ultimately, the creation of mythology represented corporate attempts to reconstitute 
historical reality. Changing the past helped companies sell a new version of the future. It was a 
tactic that had worked well for other private businesses. As historian Mike Wallace showed, 
Disney was especially good at using the past to further corporate goals.38 The fact that so many 
agribusinesses made such a concerted effort to reinterpret the past (that is, deliberately pointing 
out their products as the most important innovation in human progress) demonstrated the power 
of historic memory. History itself became a marketing tool, another way to validate corporate 
sway over agriculture. Through this interpretation of the past, companies could then imply that 
historical change was a simple product of technological-determinism, a natural avenue of human 
advancement. Within corporate interpretations, problems of the past (from insects to famine) 
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continuously plagued humankind until the appearance of a special individual and later his 
company. These companies “solved” the problem through the use of science and technology, 
which could really only be used by large institutions possessing the capabilities and expertise. 
Disney used this tactic to imply that capitalism would lead consumers towards a golden future. 
Agribusinesses constructed new historical memories to make their corporations essential to the 
story of the past, present, and future. 
Problems of the Postwar World 
 
But while these companies used historical analysis to reorient their place in the story of 
the past, they also harnessed the environmental and political reality of the postwar period to 
induce modifications to America’s agricultural system. They did this by showcasing the need for 
the agricultural system to change to meet these new and pressing needs. In fact, a key component 
of agribusiness’ manipulation of time was to spark this transformation. Corporations desired 
changes in agriculture. They wanted farmers to adopt more industrial, capitalistic methods of 
agriculture because they would then need corporate inclusion to function. So, along with their 
emphasis on corporate involvement in past agricultural progress, companies also accentuated 
how current problems required change. These issues, they claimed, were new and unprecedented, 
truly global in scope. Therefore, these problems required deep structural alterations to the 
agricultural industry. They argued that farmers needed to alter their techniques to deal with the 
growing problems of radical political ideology, world famine, and population growth. And of 
course, agribusinesses would be there to lead to charge, using their expertise to solve the 
problems that plagued humanity. 
The context of the Cold War proved to be a most helpful ally in this quest. Fear of 
communism crept into many aspects of American society, including food politics. Policy-makers 
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in Washington began to view food, more specifically lack thereof, as a recipe for communist 
insurgency. Nations of the “third world” were vulnerable to revolution when faced with a crisis, 
especially famine. Consequently, America needed to ensure proper agricultural development to 
keep these countries from going red. What resulted was a strange intertwining of federal policy, 
technocratic diplomacy, and capitalism. American experts disagreed on the kind of aid they 
should offer. Some preferred sending agricultural specialists, others believed in creating 
specialized breeding projects. A few even believed in direct food programs.39 Increased 
production at home would therefore both aid countries facing food crises and create future 
markets for American goods. Trying to reassure any reluctant participants, Senator George 
McGovern argued that these programs were as much about humanitarian efforts as they were 
about creating international markets for US processed foods.40 Whatever its form, “food aid” 
became an ideological weapon for agribusinesses desiring changes to the food and fiber industry. 
One local farm club was so giddy at the prospect, they sent Frank Perdue a letter emphasizing 
how this new food policy would help, “all fields of agriculture such as machinery, fertilizer, 
processing, transportation as well as the farmers themselves.”41 By emphasizing the problems of 
the developing world, companies could then present themselves, their expertise, their products, 
and their vision of agriculture as the solution. 
Anxiety over communism affected not just political sentiments but also many cultural 
standards. Private companies, as stewards of free enterprise, were both the frontline soldiers in 
the war against the left and propagandists for the benefits of capitalism. Agribusinesses were 
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especially keen on exploiting the threat of a global communist takeover. Monsanto produced a 
number of industrial films, for internal and external use, meant to warn Americans against leftist 
encroachments. Crossroads for America showed the timeline for possible communist destruction 
of US democracy. Going Places emphasized the need for the profit motive in economic 
development. In one particularly revealing case, the film Backfire chronicled a debate between a 
high school student and her father about the nature of the economy.42 After arguing against free 
enterprise, the father realized (in a dramatic climax) that he had accidently picked up on the 
“planted phrases of the Communist Party.”43 This desire to battle communist forces eventually 
flowered into the company-sponsored TV series Conquest, a science-themed show intended to 
spark interest in scientific progress. Presented on CBS and donated to a select number of schools, 
the show encouraged more young people to enter the field of science and thus, “keep the country 
in the race for scientific supremacy.”44 After all, any deviation could result in the Soviet Union 
holding the advantage. 
It was this interlocking of science, the power of private enterprise, and Cold War 
ideology that agribusinesses used on farm communities to advocate for agricultural changes. 
Rath created a demonstration swine farm in part to show farmers how to keep “fine meat for the 
American table.”45 International Harvester claimed that greater use of its tractors would protect 
American free enterprise and national security.46 John Deere later echoed this, claiming that 
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more of their machines sold because protein had become a social necessity rather than a luxury.47 
Monsanto clearly argued that the key to greater production was the application of scientific 
knowledge to farming.48 Science, harnessed by these large corporations, created products that 
would help farmers defend America against the forces of communist destruction.  
But it was not enough for these companies to aid farmers in this quest; they also had to 
show why communism was a poor choice for agricultural advancement. To do this, companies 
often compared American agriculture to Soviet collectivization. Among Frank Perdue’s research 
papers, one untitled essay claimed that only capitalism could create an agricultural system that 
produced high standards of living. Communist planners, on the other hand, worked against 
human nature itself, taking the profit motive away from their farmers. Laughing in the face of 
catastrophic famines, the unknown author gloated that the Russians or Red Chinese would love 
to have the American “problem of what to do with food surpluses.”49 Pioneer’s Roswell Garst, 
though more measured in his take, also argued that Russian agriculture failed in comparison to 
the rapid advancements of America’s farms. Garst believed that Soviet lack of production could 
be attributed to a basic deficiency in mechanization or chemical use. American farms, he noted, 
needed only thirteen percent of population to produce enough food (and more) to feed the 
country. Russia, on the other hand, required seventy percent because of its inferior organization 
and lack of scientific improvements. Hopefully, he concluded, they would finally realize how 
costly aggression could be. Only when they put aside their “inferiority complex” would world 
peace and agricultural prosperity be possible.50  
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Another prominent trope exploited by agribusiness was the specter of global famine. This 
well-travelled bogeyman had its origins long before the postwar manipulations of private 
businesses. Progressive reformers in the early twentieth century worried that America’s 
countryside would not be up to the task of feeding its growing population. Agricultural experts in 
other nations, including the Russian Empire and later Soviet Union, emphasized this fear to drive 
home the need for scientific and technological reforms. Two devastating world wars seemed to 
only deepen the need for increased production by American farmers. Still, this idea received new 
life with the geo-politics of the Cold War and the very real famines taking place across the 
globe.51 Taking advantage of these material crises, agribusinesses exploited these events to sell 
their products and agricultural system as real solutions to an overpopulated and increasingly 
underfed world. According to these businesses, both a booming world population and the 
possibility of communist infiltration drove an urgent need for greater American agricultural 
production. As Monsanto’s annual 1962 review remarked, “As the world's population increases, 
the problems of feeding it grow more urgent. With much of the human race already 
undernourished, man must make his farms more productive and his food processing and 
preserving more efficient.”52 C. Robert Myers, president of the Myers Sherman Company (a 
grain processing manufacturer) and member of the Food for Peace council, argued that the world 
faced enormous levels of hunger and malnutrition.53 Roswell Garst sent a letter to his salesmen 
claiming that the world troubles came more from the, “savagery that comes from hunger than to 
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any other cause.”54 Peace, John Deere declared, only came through the production of plenty.55 Of 
course, the possible increase in agricultural production corresponded nicely with consumption of 
more agricultural inputs. 
To meet this need, companies argued that American farmers needed to adopt new 
techniques and new products that would in turn feed the world’s growing population. In many 
ways the chemical industry, though somewhat new to the field of agricultural research and 
application, had the most to gain. One pamphlet published by the Manufacturing Chemists 
Association claimed that chemistry could remove hunger from the world, that “famine and 
misery can be drastically reduced if we can continue to increase acreage yields.”56 Firman Bear, 
a world-renowned soil expert, wrote, “The fertilizer industry represents the most important 
advance ever made towards providing plenty of food for the peoples of earth.” Later, he 
concluded that, “Without their use, the problem of adequately meeting the food needs of the 
world's 2 billion people is essentially insolvable.”57 Fertilizer, herbicide, insecticide, and other 
chemical compounds became indispensable for feeding the world’s teeming masses.  
Monsanto quickly latched on to this idea, deploying it as a justification for new farming 
practices, which including an increased dependence on their product line. Santobane, the product 
name for Monsanto’s DDT, became a soldier in the war against hunger, “helping the American 
farmer in his redoubled efforts to allay the famine.”58 The power of science, created by corporate 
chemists and then wielded by farmers, could reduce world hunger. All along, Monsanto 
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presented itself and its products as key contributors to this battle. One Monsanto advertisement 
argued that “why should they [insects] feast while millions hunger?” Farmers no longer had to 
“stand by” as insects devoured food that could feed the world’s masses.59 Weeds, too, could be 
destroyed. No longer, Monsanto articulated, would the “green death” steal food or profits from 
mankind.60  
Eventually, the company began to expand its message beyond America’s own borders. In 
1966, they invited delegates from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Committee’s Rice 
Commission to a demonstration on herbicide application without “highly sophisticated 
equipment,” the assumption being that the herbicide could help feed countries that lacked the 
basics of agricultural industrialization.61 Just a year earlier, the company boasted of how the 
opening of a Monsanto Agricultural Center in Guatemala would boost area farm productivity 
through its supply of fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides, and feed supplements. The business’s 
annual report maintained, “As populations continue to swell, farm chemicals seem destined to 
play a mounting role in heading off famine.”62 It was a message that only grew more prominent 
with the green revolution hitting its stride in the seventies and eighties. More recently, Monsanto 
and other Big Ag corporations continued to push this message as a sales tactic. As Monsanto’s 
website declared in 1998, “Guess Who's Coming to Dinner? 10 billion by 2030.” The company 
proclaimed limited agricultural technology would not produce the yield needed to feed the 
burgeoning population. Ten years later, the company (along with others) rebranded fear over 
famine as “food security.” Issuing a commitment to help double yields by 2030, the chemical 
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giant argued that access to their improved seeds and guided agronomic practices were key 
elements to achieving this goal. No wonder they claimed to pursue “solutions to help our 
growing world.”63 
But this chemical corporation was hardly the only company to use this “feed the world” 
tactic to sell its products to farmers and policy-makers alike. Pioneer Hi-bred often employed 
global population growth and “world hunger” to sell their hybrids in an over saturated 
commodity market. It justified Pioneer’s support to end the American Soil Bank program and 
acreage restrictions, claiming the company believed world hunger to be a major problem that 
more hybrid corn could solve.64 In 1958, with an agricultural recession taking a toll on 
commodity prices, Pioneer’s Roswell Garst reassured farmers not to worry about surpluses, 
pointing to growing world population as insurance against poor food prices.65 Just four years 
later, Garst again assured his salesmen that America’s food excess, once the bane of the 
agricultural industry, was actually a blessing in disguise. Without overproduction, Roswell 
argued, America would be unable to feed itself and the rest of the world after 1980.66  
By focusing on world hunger, Pioneer and other companies could then readjust the story 
of surpluses, changing them from a major agricultural problem to a public benefit. Even as 
farmers were increasingly squeezed by rising capital costs and falling food prices, surpluses 
became a vague strawman for increased production and therefore greater consumption of 
agricultural inputs. As one Pioneer company article claimed, “We don't have an over-supply of 
agricultural commodities such as corn, wheat, cotton, and milk…no, we've got a distribution 
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problem that needs to be improved to meet the needs of our time. With half the people of the 
world going to bed with empty stomachs, this becomes a statement of fact!”67 In the simplest of 
terms, agribusinesses argued that the world needed more food, so farmers needed to keep up 
their production by adopting the techniques and products espoused by these companies. To meet 
these world needs, they would have to become the farmers agribusinesses always intended them 
to be: efficient, business-like, and above all, consumers.  
Surpluses, along with other pesky and persistent agricultural issues, became just another 
opportunity to be exploited by agribusinesses looking to essentialize their place in farming. After 
all, farmers in the postwar period faced a number of different challenges. While the Second 
World War had been a major boon to farmers throughout the country, price supports on food 
commodities soon disappeared. This led to fluctuating prices and rather slow growth of farm 
income. Rural depopulation, a worry since the early twentieth century, suddenly became a more 
pressing issue. Between 1936 and 1959, an estimated 19 million people left farming. This 
decline continued between 1950 and 1980, as the farm population fell from 23 to 5.6 million. 
The deteriorating labor force and inconsistent commodity prices, combined with climbing 
operating costs, drove many away from agriculture all together.68 With this context in mind, 
agribusinesses urged farmers to see private companies as purveyors of necessary expertise to 
solve these population issues. 
 These businesses were certainly not the only force to argue that postwar agricultural 
reality required changes to farming. Everyone from editors of large agricultural newspapers to 
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USDA officials and land-grant academics warned that the market mandated changes. Farmers 
would have to adapt or be forced out of agriculture. For the editors of Successful Farming, one of 
the largest and most wide read of the agricultural journals, that was not necessarily a bad thing. 
They reasoned that the small farmers who left meant that, “commercial farmers will have more 
of the market for themselves. The proverbial pie can be cut into fewer but bigger pieces.”69 
Others believed that the price squeeze itself was an important instrument of necessary economic 
culling. Paul Johnson, the editorial director of Prairie Farmer, reasoned that the price squeeze 
had actually done farmers a great deal of good, forcing them to increase their productivity, adopt 
new technology, and make agriculture more of a business and less of a lifestyle.70 Academics 
like John A. Hopkins, professor of agricultural economics, agreed. He maintained that the 
number of farms was declining because “traditional agriculture” failed to orient itself towards the 
new market.71 Seth Shaw, a retailer for Safeway Foods, echoed this opinion, stating that farmers 
who failed to integrate could not complete with their larger and more efficient neighbors.72 
Perhaps the reality of the situation was best summed up by the president of the Delmarva Poultry 
Industry, A.E. Bailey. He noted that the farming industry required adjustments and that, “anyone 
who refuses to change with it will be out of business or go broke.”73 
Like the fight against communist forces and the need to feed the world, companies 
reasoned that the postwar agricultural landscape required massive changes in the way farmers 
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operated. Rural depopulation and growing urban population needs required more yield with less 
labor. Therefore, they billed agribusiness and their products as labor saving, profit-making 
rescuers for besieged farming communities. Perdue Chicken pledged that their contract growing 
and hatching programs would allow many “good” farmers to remain in agriculture. The company 
claimed that their expertise and knowledge actually helped with local farm management 
problems. It was a critical advantage that most independent poultry producers lacked access to 
and thus failed to produce quality products.74 Monsanto avowed that both their products and 
expert knowledge would help farmers improve their methods and profit margins. The company 
even created a new position in 1965 specifically to advise farmers on how to properly use their 
evolving product line.75 Pioneer boasted that the company’s record sales showcased the 
superiority of their hybrids, claiming that farmers in 1963, “who planted Pioneer have just had 
greater profit and greater pleasure.”76 Implement companies like International Harvester were 
especially keen on demonstrating the labor saving power of their machines. Harvester’s Farmall 
Cub, which first appeared late in the Second World War, flaunted its power of mechanization for 
all farms large and small. They even claimed that the Cub would stop the, “tendencies towards 
putting the nation's agricultural lands in fewer hands, by giving increased competitive strength to 
farmers working in smaller-size farm units.”77 Agribusinesses wanted farmers to see their 
products as basic components of operating a farm in the postwar era. The agricultural market had 
changed, they maintained. Now, farmers needed to change with it or suffer the consequences. 
Expertise and Labor 
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But what exactly were these new standards that agribusinesses wanted farmers to adopt? 
Some were rather obvious. All companies strived to increase their sales numbers. So, anything 
that involved greater consumption of input goods (chemicals, seeds, machines, etc.) was a win-
win for agribusinesses. Yet companies did not just push for farmers to buy their products, but for 
deep structural alterations to agriculture. They did not want customers simply to buy their 
products, but to fundamentally change their methods to better fit a system that benefited large 
corporations. They sought the greater capitalization of agriculture. This meant a movement away 
from diversification, a greater emphasis on production and yields, more acres, the 
commodification of agricultural expertise, and more defined labor and gender standards.  
A push to increase production across the board was perhaps the most obvious change 
advocated by agribusiness. Despite persistent issues surrounding overproduction, agricultural 
companies insisted that farmers deliver greater and greater yields and livestock numbers. 
Whether for profit, global altruism, the fight against communism, or simply survival, 
agribusinesses affirmed that increased production was a necessary measure for farmers to take. 
As Monsanto observed, “The need is apparent: farmer must produce more per acre and more per 
man hour to meet the ever-increasing demands of today's economy.”78 Roswell Garst of Pioneer 
proclaimed that, “from now on the U.S.A. needs to produce 4,000,000,000 bushels of corn as an 
average and that we have only done it once in history!”79  
Of course, the reason behind agribusinesses’ support of increased production had a lot to 
do with their own private benefit. In order to increase production, farmers had to rely on the 
products of agribusinesses. Chemical fertilizers restored soil fecundity while herbicides and 
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insecticides destroyed yield-stealing weeds and pests. Mechanized equipment allowed greater 
row standardization and precision. New implements permitted farmers to plant and harvest more 
quickly. Specialized hybrids, including corn, alfalfa, cotton, and other plants, returned greater 
yields. This was especially true of hybrid corn. Because of their biological nature, hybrid seeds 
had to be purchased every year. In the end, increased production relied heavily on the input 
products of agribusiness. Thus, farmers had to rely on these companies as well. 
For meat producing companies like Perdue, Hormel, and Rath, increased production had 
more to do with the desire for more product at a cheaper price. Frank Perdue told his Delmarva 
customers at the company’s yearly barbeque that increased broiler production would keep the 
company in business (and the industry away from southern competitors) for years to come.80 
Two academics from the Harvard School of Business concurred with this idea, noting that new 
efficiencies in production gave the broiler industry greater price appeal than previous years.81 
However, sometimes production could not keep up with demand. Herbert Frank, the president of 
the Washington Beef Company, expressed his frustration to Frank Perdue. He bemoaned the lack 
of production, “Our only problem has been that we have a tiger by the tail. We have not been 
able to get sufficient product to fill our demand.”82 Rath Packing Company specifically suffered 
from a volatile pork production market. One Rath executive acknowledged that the company’s 
emphasis on pork products limited the company’s possible revenue, forcing them to put all their 
eggs in one proverbial basket. This made them vulnerable to hog shortages, which in turn would 
force the company to operate at a loss.83 Earle Ludgin & Company, a firm hired in 1965 to 
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revamp Rath’s marketing strategies, recognized that the company’s irregular growth was in part 
due to problematic hog production.84 It was hardly surprising then that the company supported 4-
H and FFA projects, Iowa State University feeding trials, and other potentially production 
enhancing programs for farmers. The company desperately needed more consistent production to 
continue their operation.  
The movement away from farm diversification towards specialization was another labor 
change that agribusinesses tried to impress upon farmers.85 This took on many forms, from 
emphasizing specific crop selection to limiting breeds of livestock. For meat packers, particularly 
pork, the adoption of new breeding and feeding methods on farms were critical for their own 
market viability. Changing consumer demand in the postwar age forced many processors to 
adopt new standards. Demand for plumper and whiter (or golden) chicken breasts drove Perdue 
and others to adopt new criteria of breeding, feeding, and evisceration.86 The growing American 
appetite for beef encouraged packers to insist on feed additives and steroids in cattle. But out of 
all meat packers, pork especially needed their farmers to change their approaches to hog 
production.  
Pork, once the most popular meat in America, suffered from waning consumer demand. 
After the Second World War, more and more buyers desired lean rather than fatty meat. This, 
coupled with the lingering association between pork, disease, and low class status (as well as the 
loss of lard as a critical secondary industry), damaged the industry. Facing a crisis, pork 
processers needed to make changes throughout the production and consumption process. 
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Collaborating with land grants and the extension service, various pork producers launched a 
widespread educational campaign aimed at both housewives and farmers. Agricultural scientists 
introduced new techniques for discerning the hog’s fat and meat content. Home economists and 
food columnists encouraged new cooking methods and recipes, hoping to reeducate housewives 
on more appetizing ways to cook pork. When targeting farmers, agribusinesses and their allies 
looked to transform the basic biology of hogs, attempting to add more muscle without increasing 
fat content.87  
The conversion of hogs from lard to meat-type represented a clear labor change that 
agribusinesses and their allies desired from farmers. In order to drive home this need for change, 
companies utilized the possibility of increased profit margins as an attractive gambit to entice 
hog farmers. Better prices were especially appealing given the growing overhead (antibiotics, 
feed additives, and building costs) of confinement farming, a system that became standard 
practice in the postwar period. Companies like Rath and Hormel often offered premiums to 
farmers who produced hogs with more weight for desirable cuts in the haunches and stomach.88 
The hope was that these meat-type hogs would help keep pork as an essential part of the 
American diet and, in turn, help packers would stay in business.  
Yet, even as companies desired farmers to alter their hog farming practices, they also 
made it clear that only through the acceptance of agribusinesses’ own expertise and advice could 
these larger changes actually occur. Hormel claimed that its support for “forward-looking” 
programs served the farmer by helping him produce a better product.89 Rath Packing sent 
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company livestock experts directly to farmers to “help solve their livestock management and 
marketing problems.” They also created a company swine farm (a tactic similar to those of 
hybrid seed companies) to demonstrate the exact modern and scientific standards they wanted 
their producers to use.90 It was crucial that these packers reconstituted who possessed the agency 
of change, the spirit of innovation. They certainly exploited their relationship with land grant 
colleges, extension services, and trade organizations to display their own professional authority. 
Rath namedropped Iowa State University when discussing scientific breeding, Hormel crowed 
about their sponsorship of the National Barrow and Midwest Steer Shows.91 And though tension 
between corporations and public institution sometimes showed, more often corporations formed 
an integral part of the web of expertise. 
Ultimately, the support for changes in agricultural practices fell under another important 
theme of agribusiness’ new vision of agriculture: the restructuring of expertise and authority 
away from the farm and farmer and towards the firms themselves. They marketed that it was 
corporations, not producers, which understood what was needed for a modern agricultural system 
to work. This was a careful line that many others had attempted to walk before, with some 
successes and many failures.92 Yet these agricultural firms had a different goal than earlier 
reformers and academics who wanted to reform rural communities. Rural depopulation was not a 
primary source of anxiety for these firms. Nor did they, for the most part, worry about issues of 
overproduction or falling farm income. For agribusinesses, gaining acceptance of their authority 
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was the key to essentializing large corporations to the agricultural system. By defining a new 
space of expert knowledge owned specifically by corporations, agribusinesses helped create a 
barrier of seemingly critical information to which most farmers did not have access. Therefore, 
in order to reach this web of expertise and keep the farm competitive, farmers needed to accept 
the help (and authority) of these firms. Agribusinesses then played the role of the gatekeeper and 
teacher of necessary agricultural knowledge. 
This corporate commodification of agricultural information was a vital part 
agribusinesses’ marketing plan. In order for corporations to make themselves indispensable, they 
needed to train America’s farmers about how to properly farm in a modern, industrial system that 
best fit corporate desires, a system that used corporate products and information. In many ways, 
the path had already been laid out for businesses. New fields of study like agricultural 
engineering and management had helped professionalize knowledge.93 Government agencies like 
extension and experiment stations moved authority from farmers to government agents, from the 
field to the lab. Land grant schools informed farmers of new experiments and techniques that 
would change their work. Agricultural businesses of the early twentieth century had helped 
formulate the industrial ideal in the country.94 But for the first time, agribusinesses took a leading 
role as a holder of knowledge and a gatekeeper.  
In fact, even a practice as simple as tinkering could be interpreted as a threat to corporate 
control and expertise. It was not just the fear that farmers would possibly damage their expensive 
tractors by repairing their own machine that motivated agribusinesses. The real corporate issue 
with tinkering, fixing, and otherwise interfering with these implements was that it helped 
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separate the farming operation from the companies themselves, making their continued service 
and advice essentially unnecessary. Farmers who fixed their own machines did not need 
companies, which flew in the face of everything the businesses wanted. No wonder International 
Harvester warned their customers against meddling with their own equipment. One promotional 
postcard argued that a faulty carburetor could ruin efficiency and “tinkering only makes it 
worse.”95 Another remarked that tractor service was a job for a specialist and not to “let anyone 
tamper with it except the trained.”96 By trained, the company meant corporate sanctioned and 
controlled employees. It was another attempt by corporations to regulate activities that were once 
considered secondary farm labor. “Tinkering” became obsolete in favor of company provided 
service. 
One of the elements of this commodification and reorientation of knowledge was the role 
agricultural companies’ basic development and research played in solving the agricultural 
problems of the day. Agribusinesses were quick to display the benefits of their own internal 
research to America’s agricultural sector. John Deere boasted that its years of exhaustive 
research had given the farmer more work capacity, efficiency, comfort, and convenience.97 Not 
to be outdone, its rival International Harvester claimed that each of their implements was, “the 
result of inspired inventive genius and endless research,” reflecting the American creed of 
efficiency.98 The company even went as far as to assert that its research and production stood not 
just as a bulwark of agricultural progress, but also the “traditional American way” of free 
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enterprise and national security!99 Monsanto would also build on the connection between 
capitalism, national defense, and food production. In one 1946 article in the company magazine, 
Monsanto bragged that its products would solve major environmental issues for America’s 
farmers, including fertilization, crop disease, and insect damage. The corporation especially 
touted DDT, arguing that its ability as an insecticide was nothing short of miracle.100 Monsanto 
routinely demonstrated its robust research acumen to farmers, so much so that it became one of 
the pillars of their marketing strategy. As Edmund Greene, a company marketing administrator, 
once remarked, “marketing means simply finding a farmer’s commercial problems and trying to 
find a solution for them in chemicals.”101 Of course, the point of this strategy and the reasons for 
the whole representation of research prowess was ultimately to get farmers to change their labor 
patterns.  
Perhaps no example showcased this more than Pioneer’s attempt to halt the production of 
hay in favor of hybrid corn. Leading the charge were Roswell and David Garst, the colorful 
father and son owners of Garst and Thomas Seed (a division of Pioneer) and part of one of the 
most famous farming families in America. The Garsts were especially relentless acolytes of 
scientific agriculture. Their own farm in Coon Rapids, Iowa doubled as a demonstration plot for 
new technologies, new practices, and, of course, hybrid seed.102 Given their monetary stake and 
desire to reform agricultural practices, the custom of haying was a particular irritation to the pair. 
As early as 1954, Roswell declared that he could feed his fifteen thousand head of cattle with just 
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corn cobs and molasses, making the hay rotation obsolete.103 Ten years later, David wrote in an 
article on feed grain farming, “Today the use of hay is unnecessary. The cobs and stover can be 
balanced better and cheaper with commercially available supplements—to make a superior 
feed.”104 
However, despite their lengthy marketing battle, it seemed that many farmers were 
unwilling to quit the practice all together. In response to David’s article (which he sent out to all 
subdivisions of the company), Eastern Division’s general manager Robert Woods commended 
him for his attempt to change labor patterns in the face of continued resistance.  
In spite of all of your facts, figures and experience, which definitely show that 
there are cheaper feeds by far than hay, there's still a whale of a lot of farmers that 
evidently want to make hay. It's hard to understand why they are reluctant to 
change that practice when many farmers today are making rapid changes in their 
past practices.105  
Back in Iowa, Roswell lamented the fact that more farmers did not use corn cobs as feed, as he 
argued it was cheaper and easier to maintain than hay or alfalfa. He bemoaned the lack of 
education by land-grants and extension, then urged his dealers to “be a service to our customers, 
and to the farmers of your community, by telling them how they can get by with no hay at all.”106 
Whether it was due to pressure by seed corn companies or other factors, hay production (along 
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with other diverse crops) continued to fall throughout the forties, fifties, and sixties.107 This led 
to the elimination of horses and cows on many farms. 
Despite gradual changes to crop production, one of the reasons why farmers might have 
been so reluctant to change their rotation was due to the place of haying in their historical 
memory as farmers and as men. Hay, mainly because of its fodder properties, was a mainstay in 
farms across America. Like threshing (though not nearly as labor-extensive), haying was a 
communal activity that required several hands to move it from the field to the barn. Even with 
the introduction of new technologies that saved time and labor, farmers could still use the crop to 
identify with the masculine past. As Roswell himself recognized, “you fellows are “haying next 
summer—and you’ll want to hay—your grandfather hayed—your father hayed—and it’s a good 
established custom.”108 Haying, like a generational farmstead, was a critical tie between current 
reality and the mythical past. Regardless of the changes in technology, a farmer still practiced 
something that his ancestors did, therefore reinforcing his own status as a male and as a steward 
of the land. Unsurprisingly, there was resistance to giving up this practice. Giving up haying 
asked farmers to substitute a proven crop with an unknown future. For farmers, abandoning 
haying was a removal of one connection to the virtuous past. Roswell even acknowledged that he 
was trying to “disturb” his fellow farmers, getting them use their own initiative. To aid in this 
endeavor, Roswell dangled a carrot of middle class leisure. While others would be haying, 
Roswell claimed that he would be fishing.109 This allusion, made so casually, was a common 
tactic among agribusinesses hoping to entice changes. It softened the ideological blow of 
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abandoning past practices by showcasing benefits of adopting new operations: enjoying the 
leisure time of the burgeoning middle class.110 
Gender: A Realm of Limits 
 
Out of all of the changes that agribusinesses attempted to impress upon farming 
communities, a reorientation of gender expectations and roles may have been the most profound. 
As scholars of have shown, gender roles and expectations in the rural context were much more 
fluid than in most urban spaces. Women performed any and all tasks necessary to insure the 
homestead’s success. Men sometimes took on “feminine” roles of cooking, cleaning, baking, and 
sewing. Ultimately, survival trumped all cultural standards, no matter how unpleasant or 
unseemly. Likewise, community bonds often gave rural women a greater social power that many 
of their urban sisters lacked. Kinship networks, so critical the individual farmstead’s success, 
often depended on the connections between women.111  
However, the postwar period exhibited a number of changes to the gendered features of 
rural life. Like with other tasks, outside forces had long attempted to reshape how rural men and 
women interacted and performed their gendered identity. Progressive reformers involved in the 
Country Life and eugenics movements attempted a radical reconstruction of rural gender in the 
early twentieth century. Reflecting the hetero-normativity of urban spaces, these reformers 
campaigned against “country vices” of homosexuality, gender ambiguity, and other rural non-
conformist measures.112 Other organizations, like 4-H, FFA and the Farm Bureaus, became 
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important apparatuses to “modernize” the countryside, including rural gender and sexual 
politics.113 Even governmental entities created to “help” rural peoples were much more interested 
in realigning gendered expectations and duties to reflect a society based on an industrial 
economy. The Extension Service, officially formalized with the Smith-Lever Act of 1914, 
advocated that farm families adopt the middle class, consumerist lifestyle. This change, viewed 
as relieving farm women from their excess burden of labor (and therefore making it more likely 
they would stay on the farm), actually removed much of their interpersonal community power.114 
Agribusiness, too, attempted to reshape rural gender conceptions after the Second World 
War. Like other institutions before them, they wanted to create a more standardized vision of 
rural America, more in line with the postwar emphasis on traditional domestic roles. In this 
understanding, women would be relegated to the household. Agribusinesses sought to 
deemphasize women’s previous fluidity in farm duties, especially when it came to production of 
agricultural commodities. Men too would see basic conceptions of rural masculinity manipulated 
by these private companies. Responsibilities that had once been the province of their mothers 
and grandmothers were now presented as both a masculine and capitalistic endeavor. 
Agribusinesses played on fears of masculine failure, especially the possibility of losing the farm, 
to attract men to these new industries. All of these inducements were, in part, to retrain the farm 
family toward a middle class, consumption-based ideology, one that benefitted agricultural 
industries. Yet, these companies also advocated for gender change in order to realign the overall 
identity of what it meant to be a farmer. 
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It is important to know that there was a key difference between the way farm women 
viewed their work and these manipulations promoted by businesses. Most farm women, despite 
their obvious agricultural labor, did not consider themselves to be farmers. Instead, these women 
considered themselves to be “helpers.” Agribusiness used the same word, but for a different 
purpose. Farm women saw their role as helper as an essential part of the agricultural lifestyle, 
with the realm of their labor expanding or shrinking to fill whatever the farm demanded. Being a 
helper could mean driving a tractor, negotiating on behalf of the farm, or keeping the family’s 
accounts balanced. Fluidity of role defined their existence. The ability to adapt to whatever 
situation, whether it was doing laundry, slaughtering a pig, milking a cow, or walking a field, 
was an essential and very real part of farming.115 Conversely, agribusinesses viewed the role of 
the farm wife helper in much simpler terms. Their realm was the household and their duties 
centered wholly on the domestic sphere. Defined almost purely in opposition to male work, 
agribusinesses conceived of female labor as largely secondary and unimportant. These entities 
ignored the fluidity of female roles because it contradicted their larger goals.   
One of the more overt attempts to manipulate gender roles came with the postwar 
development of the chicken industry. The egg and chicken markets had long been the province of 
rural women. Just one of many of the diverse tasks these women took on, egg and chicken 
money play a key role in helping the farm stay afloat during tough times. By diversifying their 
income, chickens historically helped farm women put food on the table, engage in community 
trade, and even stave off a foreclosure.116 It was also an important part of local exchange, 
balancing networks of labor between different farmsteads. While historian Mary Neth 
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acknowledged that rural men controlled cash and land, women achieved economic power 
through informal exchange networks. She wrote, “Women’s exchanges were as crucial to the 
system of small family farms as was specialized commodity production.”117 Chickens, like dairy 
products and garden vegetables, helped create a “social security” for area farms. Diversification 
was a cushion against market downturns. And even as other farm commodities left the traditional 
female labor sphere (like dairy), chickens remained one of the central points of female farm labor 
long into the twentieth century.118 
 This was partly because of the nature of American eating habits and meat production. 
Whereas the pork and beef market industrialized in the Gilded Age, chickens resisted such 
efforts. To some extent, this was due to egg production. Many farmers who attempted to 
industrialize chickens focused on egg laying rather than meat-type production. As such, chicken 
as a meat source remained mostly limited to “spring” cockerels (young males slaughtered in their 
first year) and old hens that had outlived their egg laying capabilities. Chickens, therefore, were a 
luxury item rather than a food staple. It was not until the 1930s and 1940s that chickens moved 
away from female hands.119 Like other commodities, once it became clear there was money to be 
made, rural men began to take over the field. In the end, the Second World War was the catalyst 
for the larger changes to the chicken industry. More and more Americans developed a taste for 
the white meat. Moreover, for the first time, technological advancements in breeding and 
processing caught up with the demand. Aware of the new market, firms quickly moved to 
vertically integrate the industry. 
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 But just because there was money to be made did not mean that rural gender expectations 
immediately realigned themselves to fit these new developments. Out of all of the farm 
commodities, the chicken industry was most boisterous in its own defense of the trade’s 
masculinity. After all, how do you get men to buy into an occupation that was once the realm of 
their mothers and sisters? How do you make the chicken coop as respectable as the field or barn? 
The key was to separate current masculine chicken labor from the feminine handling of chickens 
in the past. 
 Such tactics naturally fit into agribusinesses’ temporal recreation of the past, present, and 
future. In the past, women handled chickens. This was because the business was small, inferior, 
and largely inefficient. But now, with the natural advancement of time (in terms of 
technological-determinism), the industry had taken steps to progress. It was men, with their 
natural inclination towards science and business, who moved the industry from the neighbor’s 
backyard to a million dollar industry. Even the broiler industry’s own lore both established a 
female presence, yet quickly diminished it to a mere placeholder, a token of the past. According 
to industry sponsors in Delmarva (one of America’s poultry capitals), the first person to enter 
into modern chicken farming was a Mrs. Wilmer Steele of Ocean View, Delaware. Steele, never 
actually referred to by her given name of Claire, accidently ordered five hundred young broilers 
in 1923, unintentionally starting the region’s broiler industry. 
 Steele’s story was well trod ground for Delmarva’s poultry companies and their allies. It 
played a critical role in helping to juxtapose the past’s “feminine” chicken labor from the modern 
masculine occupation they claimed by the forties and fifties. Industrial histories, from company 
speeches to festivals pamphlets, all emphasized that Steele’s story was simply a lucky trick of 
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history, a completely unintentional action.120 This contrasted neatly with the cultivated image of 
the current industry. Companies and trade groups, controlled by men, claimed a purposeful 
movement towards improvement, a deliberate and scientific quest for a better bird. Referencing 
the famous “Chicken Of Tomorrow” contest of 1948, Paul Philips admired how far Delmarva’s 
chicken production had come, “We now have the rapid maturing, highly efficient, well-meated, 
and white-feathered crosses that far out-perform even the greatest expectations of a few years 
ago."121 And the march toward progress was fundamentally a masculine endeavor, often driven 
by competition between men. Edmund H. Fallon, general manager of the Grange League 
Federation, presented such an argument during the 56th annual convention of American Feed 
Manufacturers in 1964. He claimed that real competition did not take place between companies 
or products, but rather, “between men who direct, manage, and operate the businesses.”122 The 
only successful companies then were those that employed men who frequently sought 
improvement. Those, both businesses and men, who were not willing to continually grow were 
doomed to fail.123 Fallon very well may have been foreshadowing his own company’s future, as 
little more than a month later the GLF merged with two others, eventually emerging as the farm 
retailer Agway.124 
 Another key to affirming the masculinity of “chicken men” was to emphasize the role of 
science and technology within the industry, from the broiler house to the butcher’s block. 
Agribusinesses across the board often invoked conceptions of scientific development to sell their 
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ideology. But for those involved in the poultry business, science became a tool to again denigrate 
out past female labor while also adding to a sense of masculine professionalization and expertise. 
The recurring Delmarva Chicken Festival held several gender-specific events. The fair relegated 
women to the Miss Delmarva Queen contest or cooking contest, while male scientists, dealers, 
and businessmen dealt with promotion and research development.125 Perdue Chicken was 
especially quick to point out its scientific prowess to farmers and consumers alike.  In its 
advertisements to New York City housewives, Perdue claimed its pampered chicks were 
“scientifically grown” for the best quality.126 Another company letter to meat markets claimed 
that Perdue had the “most extensive research program constantly improving our quality.”127 
 When aimed at farms, the scientific nature of the Perdue’s advertisements changed to 
focus more on farm profit and autonomy, ultimately accentuating the desire to keep the farmer 
(always male) on his land. Out of all of the hallmarks of rural manhood, perhaps no aspect held 
greater sway than that of land ownership. One Ford Motor short titled “the American Farmer” 
symbolized this viewpoint. Featuring a real life family (the Blazeys of upstate New York), the 
industrial film showed the deep connection between family, identity, and place: “The way Mr. 
Brazey feels about his farm goes deeper than profit or loss. The farm was as much a part of him 
as his head or his heart. You couldn’t take it away without killing him.”128 The land was an 
essential part of a farmer’s self-worth and heritage. Possession therefore signaled virtue, 
independence, and control over dependents, all keys to an age-old Jeffersonian ideology 
celebrated as uniquely rural.  
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Perdue exploited these ideals to sell their contract farming as a masculine, ultimately self-
sufficient profession. One radio commercial asked interested farmers, “if the idea of being able 
to spend more time at home and being your own boss sounds interesting."129 In a TV 
commercial, Frank Perdue insisted that with a few acres and a few hours, men could easily own 
their own broiler house.130 All of Perdue’s advertisements underscored the masculine traits of 
contract farming, a production system that seemed to subvert its gendered expectations. Other 
companies also stressed the ability of rural men to provide for their families through chicken 
farming. When seed houses like Pioneer and DeKalb entered the chicken market, they 
specifically highlighted how farmers could continue to earn a good living and brighten their 
farm’s future all at the same time. Pioneer’s Hy-Liner “Expand” pamphlet perhaps put it the most 
bluntly of all, outright stating their unit was not “a pin money operation,” a jab often used to 
devalue female work131 This, of course, was a deliberate declaration of masculine prowess, a 
fundamental disconnection between women’s and men’s labor. Male labor was about providing 
on a large scale for his family. Conversely, it argued that women had used chickens to 
supplement inessential consumption. It was this deliberate separation of the past and present, 
profit margins, and gendered labor that proved to be a critical theme for agribusiness involved in 
poultry.  
These tactics of separation were not just about changing the dynamics of chicken 
farming’s gendered expectations, but also emphasizing how farmers could continue to be men in 
an increasingly hostile and depressed farm market. The price squeeze of the postwar period put a 
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new strain on this Jeffersonian ideal in rural America. Some men, pushed out of farming, entered 
into new professions like trucking.132 Some looked to diversify their income by becoming seed 
dealers or entering contracted chicken farming. Others invested heavily in new equipment. When 
International Harvester advertised their new corn planter model, they emphasized how the 
McCormick 444, “makes you the boss at planting time.”133 Human conquest and subjugation of 
nature was a prominent theme in general in agricultural marketing, but this aimed specifically at 
fantasies of masculine power. By buying the planter, men could “become the boss,” a superior 
being capable of controlling his environment. And while businesses involved in poultry and 
other industries underscored the difference between past female labor and current masculine 
work, they also focused on the disparity between successful men and failed men (or men that 
kept the farm or lost it). Men who lost their farm therefore also lost the most important hallmarks 
of their masculinity.  
Companies emphasized that success only came from men with determination, efficiency, 
and a will to adapt to a changing economy. Pioneer argued that while their poultry production 
units would not save a marginal farm, they could “offer a good farmer an opportunity to keep 
pace with the rest of the economy.”134 Frank Perdue maintained that many poultry producers’ 
refusal to take risks or overall poor management led them to failure.135 Men who lost their farm 
consequently did so because they lacked these inherent masculine traits. It was a view shared not 
just between agribusinesses but academics and trade groups as well. John A. Hopkins, a 
professor of Agricultural Economics and author whose work Frank Perdue used as research for 
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his speeches, argued that modern farmers must now operate in in the larger capital economy and 
that poor management would be punished severely. The president of the Delmarva Poultry 
Industry, A.E. Bailey, remarked that broilers are, “a fast moving business and demands changes 
and anyone who refuses to change with it will be out of business or broke.” 
Of course, the fundamental point of this stance was that by joining Perdue’s contract 
team, buying Hy-Line equipment, or adopting other forms of modernization, a stressed farm and 
its steward could join the fast track to success. Pioneer noted that their chicken units did not 
require extra land or labor to increase profits.136 Frank Perdue claimed that his company’s 
experience and oversight made it easier for his farmers to succeed. In fact, it was Perdue’s own 
contract hatching program that enabled, “more of our good farmers to remain on the farm.”137 
The connection between success, consumption, and masculinity was a key element in the 
ultimate goal of agribusinesses: to make themselves absolutely indispensable to postwar 
agriculture. By introducing new standards of masculinity, poultry agribusinesses redesigned a 
cultural landscape to better fit their own desires. Such corporations then held the key to retaining 
masculinity itself, through consumption of their necessary products and expertise.   
But the chicken industry was not alone in its desire to change both rural masculinities and 
femininities. Other agribusinesses also pushed for a transformation in female roles, specifically 
the movement of women away from labor fluidity and towards middle class expectations of 
homemakers. Some of this was less a matter of overt desire to modify than a consequence of the 
introduction of new cultural practices. In an internal report on the possible markets for different 
machinery, International Harvester concluded that their mechanized sugar beet harvester could 
change labor roles on the family farm. The harvester would remove farm wives and children 
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from the “dirty and distasteful” secondary labor of the beet production.138 Another advertisement 
boasted that McCormick forage feeders could make cattle feeding a “one-man operation.”139 The 
implication was that not only would these machines speed efficiency, but that would effectively 
replace farm laborers, many of whom were women and children. 
Other businesses were much more overt about their desire to take women out of the field 
(and the community) and into the home. Garst and Thomas Corn Company, a subdivision of 
Pioneer Hybrid, made it clear that women had little role in the business of selling hybrids. In a 
1963 sales letter to their dealers, Garst asserted that their next open house was a serious business 
meeting and therefore dealers should not bring their wives.140 The request may seem odd, after 
all, industrial capitalism had long separated the worlds of male and female labor. But in rural 
communities, women actually played a very important role in local commerce. Their connections 
to others, familial and otherwise, allowed small farms and their communities to survive.141 The 
company was well aware of this influence. Not only did Pioneer sometimes contract female 
dealers, but women were often the first people to take over a contract when a male dealer was 
injured, indisposed, or died. When the company’s district sales manager for Northern Indiana, 
Lloyd Storms, passed away unexpectedly in 1960, his wife assumed responsibility for sales for 
the rest of the season.142 At a summer sales meetings (a part company party, part information 
seminar), Pioneer noted, “Every salesman and his wife should have been present to gain the 
knowledge about Pioneer varieties and other first hand information about selling.”143 
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But the company was always careful to erect a wall between serious male “business” and 
female “helping.” Rural women, no matter how gifted or influential, were always portrayed as 
secondary to their male relations. This notion was enforced in various forms of Pioneer literature, 
including company’s monthly journal Pioneer Kernels (a one-stop-shop for company news, 
agricultural advice, and salesmen’s gossip). The June 1954 issue featured the story of a “typical” 
successful salesman in Wiley Kirk, an older gentleman whose involvement in farm improvement 
associations helped him succeed in seed selling. Pictured along with a Kirk was his devoted wife, 
an unnamed figure who “assisted” her husband in his sales.144 The images of nameless, 
seemingly interchangeable, women often appeared in relation to their named male relatives. 
Even young boys received the recognition of identification, whereas their mothers did not.145 
When Monsanto profiled five “progressive” farmers, they highlighted family ties (marriage, 
children, and pertinent sibling relations) but only named the adult male relatives who co-farmed. 
In fact, the lone instance of female identification came in a picture caption. Facing away from the 
camera (while her husband stood forward), Monsanto attached Della Hohenstein to her husband 
Elmer, the primary subject of both the picture and article.146 Like in everything else, women 
were the secondary consideration, their identification only counting when connected to a male 
relative. It was an important gendered distinction. Men, even at a very young age, assumed the 
primary status as actors. Males engaged in serious commerce. On the other hand, female labor 
was a contribution to the male action. Men worked; women aided.147 
                                                          
144 Pioneer, “The Wiley Kirk Story,” Pioneer Kernels, June 1954, 12, Box 2, File 26, Pioneer Eastern Division 
Records. 
145 Ibid, 7-8. 
146 Monsanto, “Are These the “New” Farmers?: Sketches of five outstanding corn growers help answer the 
question,” Monsanto Magazine 48, no. 2 (March 1968): 18-22, Series 8, Box 12, Monsanto Collection.  
147 Deborah Fink, Open Country, Iowa, 19-22. 
63 
 
 
If the seed corn trade held any ambiguities about the gendered nature of its labor, 
mechanization, another continuing development of postwar agriculture, did not. Mechanization, 
in both trade and actual use, was assumed to be at the center of male identity. Companies like 
International Harvester, John Deere, Ford, Allis-Chambers, and others had long associated 
machine use with male labor, standardization, efficiency, and success. In reality, however, 
machine operation on the farmstead was not nearly so clear-cut. Historians like Katherine 
Jellison, Robert Kline, and Trevor Pinch have all showcased the fluid nature of technology in the 
rural context. Jellison specifically emphasized how farm women utilized technology (assumed to 
be the realm of masculine expertise) to retain their role as producers well into the 1960s.148 But 
this did not stop companies from emphasizing the masculinity of machine labor. As with the 
separation between male and female poultry labor, companies attempted to showcase the 
distinction between men and women using tractors. Advertisements almost always showcased 
male users, indicating that machine use was the realm of men. Even when advertisements 
featured women, the corporation utilized their presence to highlight the assumed difference 
between male and female roles. In one particularly blatant example, International Harvester 
managed to separate the labor of men and women riding the same tractor in the same 
advertisement! On one hand, a company booklet argued that their tractors allowed part-time male 
farmers a chance to continue to provide for their families. This advertisement showcased a 
smiling farmer with his nameless wife and children, implying that the Farmall Cub allowed the 
family to enjoy the profits of father’s labors. Conversely, just a few pages later, the booklet 
featured the tractor’s use by a professional female nurse and part-time farmer. Instead of 
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indicating the profit or enjoyment she gained by owning this piece of equipment, the company 
used her presence to showcase how easy the Farmall Cub was to use.149 The implication was that 
the tractor was so uncomplicated, even a woman could operate it successfully. Once again, 
companies denigrated female labor, even when it was the same, as secondary to that of men.  
The notion of female “helping” was at the heart of agribusinesses’ realignment of gender 
assumptions. Looking to standardize labor expectations and norms in an industrial system, these 
companies needed rural gender to shed its fluidity and realign with norms of an urban white 
middle class. Simply put, they need farmwomen to act like housewives and only housewives, 
relegating them to the household. Company advertisements, salesmen letters, pamphlets, and 
other publications pushed rural women to act more and more like their urban counterparts. 
Middle class values of consumption and separate spheres became normalized in literature even 
as rural women continued to work outside the home both in the field and in off-farm jobs. 
Agribusinesses wanted rural families to assume the same roles and expectations built on rigid 
conceptual notions of gendered labor. Men worked outside the home. Women existed in the 
domestic realm. This fit into widely held notions of “normal” behavior in the postwar period. But 
why would a company that sold hybrids or tractors care about idealizing the farm family unit?  
This restructuring echoed one of the most important goals of corporate agriculture, to 
shift dependence from local exchanges networks (neighbors, community, and of course, wives 
and children) to corporate institutions: their products, their employees, and their expertise. By 
imposing a simplified expectation of middle class, gendered spheres, companies deprived 
exchange communities of their most necessary component, women. Key links that not only 
connected farm communities’ together, farm women also provided much of the basic labor, 
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knowledge, and provisions to keep a farm functional. But gendered spheres culled these 
important roles, eliminating women from local positions that empowered them and ultimately led 
to a breakdown in community exchanges. 
Removing capable women from local networks, or simply getting men to ignore feminine 
roles, allowed companies to fill the void. Displacement created new opportunities for private 
business to “solve” the problems of agriculture: labor shortages, rising operating costs, increased 
need for production, and the expectation of middle-class consumption. Farm families that bought 
into these values would ultimately be more pliant to other company suggestions, more willing to 
act with instead of against the company, and ultimately identify with corporate values and 
expectations. Acceptance of industrial capitalism was the most important issue of this gendered 
realignment. Rural fluidity in gender was just a casualty.   
While real life consequences varied, these changes fit neatly in the final piece of 
agribusinesses’ temporal realignment; a golden vision of the future. By playing on the 
conception of “natural” progress, agribusinesses promoted an idealized view of America’s 
agricultural future. Within this venerated image, many of the problems of the past and present 
would be solved. Breakthroughs by large corporate entities would enable the elimination of 
issues large and small, from famines to soil fertility to proper family behavior. If farm families 
accepted these changes, they too would share in their benefits. In the promotion of its new 
hydrostatic drive, International Harvester claimed that agricultural technology companies had 
produced a new era of agriculture. The company waxed poetically that, “Agricultural technology 
has eliminated this age-old problem. Today, American agriculture and light industrial user have 
the answer with Hydrostatic All Speed Drive.”150 Their new product was the “future” of the 
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farm. The Manufacturing Chemist Association insisted that farmers could soon look ahead to a 
time when cheap chemicals would defend their crops and make their lives easier.151 Rath 
Packing commented that their pioneering standard of meat processing allowed families 
throughout the nation to enjoy healthy canned food.152 A happy future was the key component of 
this business tactic, the lynchpin in the technological determinism of corporate time. It was the 
ultimate carrot on a stick, a vague yet enticing goal that agricultural companies could wave in the 
faces of reluctant farmer. No wonder Frank Perdue wanted company artwork to feature “progress 
in action: past, present, and [my emphasis] future.”153 
Of course, in order for people to reach the promise of this future, farmers needed to 
consume these corporate breakthroughs, thereby completing the process of progress. It was an 
objective that many had tried before. The pre-war period witnessed an amalgamation of different 
individuals and groups attempting to fundamentally change rural communities and agricultural 
methods. Sometimes they had been successful. Other times, these reformers had failed. For 
agribusinesses after the Second World War, bringing this future to bear hinged on farmers 
adopting the necessary materials and techniques. In order to achieve this, companies needed to 
change the way farmers fundamentally thought about themselves. To fully embrace the 
industrial, capitalistic system, farmers needed to be molded to fit the systems. Farmers would 
become businessmen. Women developed into middle class housewives. Producers shaped into 
consumers. Communal labor networks transformed into a competitive marketplace. And for 
agribusinesses, this change was an argument of when, not if. 
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CHAPTER THREE: FROM PRODUCER TO CONSUMER: CONSUMERISM IN THE 
RURAL CONTEXT 
 
 Somewhere in the American heartland, sometime in the 1950s, a farmer received a soil 
district “farmer of the year” award. The winner, Tom Gordon, thanked many people in his 
acceptance speech, but ultimately gave his teenage son Ralph true credit for the award. 
According to Tom, it was his son’s persistent belief in soil conservation and willingness to try 
new practices that pushed the farm into a record year. By using soil surveys and crop rotation 
plans, created by a local soil conservative specialist, the farm had reached a new level of 
efficiency and profit. Touched by his father’s statement, young Ralph promised the crowd, “We 
were a little slow getting started, but we’ve seen what can be done in one year’s time. You can 
be sure we’ll stay with it and do everything recommended.”154 
This farm family’s heartwarming tale of successful modernization was depicted in a 
series of films by John Deere. Invented by the implement dealer’s marketing department, this 
fictional farm family and their story represented the characteristics desired by the implement 
dealer. The Gordons showed what could happen when farmers placed their trust in agricultural 
experts and adopted approved practices. Their faith was rewarded with not just awards and 
praise, but also real profit. Perhaps even more importantly, along with expert advice, the 
Gordons’ success was made possible by John Deere implements. Tractors, disk tillers, plows, 
seeders, and other products made it possible for the family to improve their land. Even if it did 
take a little prodding from his unnamed wife (“you’ve just found excuses time after time, and the 
                                                          
154 John Deere, “John Deere Presents: Farmer of the Year,” John Deere Days Industrial Film, directed by Ray H. 
Reid (St. Paul, MN: Ray Reid Film Industries, circa 1949-1952), assessed online (February 13, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sh8ywesl_8w. 
68 
 
 
silliest one I’ve heard is the one that your father and your grandfather made a living off this farm 
and you’re not going to change things”), Tom Gordon found success in adaptation. 
Yet, more than just showing the benefits of accepting expertise, this promotional film 
illustrated a middle class idealism in postwar farm life. The Gordons were a perfect aspirational 
family for rural Americans. Tom was a graduate of the state’s college and a well-respected (and 
well-moneyed) individual. His son Ralph was a member of the local FFA and soil conservation 
society, interested in new techniques and technologies. Mrs. Gordon, no first name given, was a 
homemaker who worked inside the household. The family had a nice house, car, telephone, 
electricity, and all the material trappings of comfortable living. They seemed to consume as 
much as they produced and had ample time to enjoy an evening’s leisure. Despite living in the 
countryside, the Gordons were the quintessential postwar family, with all the same values and 
characteristics as their urban cousins. 
As American society became more time-oriented in the twentieth century, products that 
claimed to save time and labor became more attractive to the potential customer. This desire was 
intimately connected with the growth of the middle class as a dominant form of cultural and 
ideological identification. Though its roots are vague and singular characteristics difficult to 
address, the emergence of the middle class as the dominant faction of America’s social order had 
a profound effect on cultural values and conceptions of normality. New social patterns and a 
changing American landscape also reflected the purposeful celebration of middle class values, as 
historian Elaine Tyler May wrote that, “American leaders promoted the American way of life as 
the triumph of capitalism, allegedly available to all who believed in its values. This way life was 
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characterized by affluence, located in suburbia, and epitomized by white middle class nuclear 
families.”155  
Compounding the problem of definition was the issue of perception versus material 
reality in an entity that was constantly evolving. In this sense, the gradual rise of the middle class 
as America’s hegemonic cultural group was much more about ideological consensus than “real” 
quantifiable data.156 In fact, studies showed that many people identified as middle class even as 
their income, profession, family size, capital-investment, and other elemental life structures 
failed to adhere to its inescapable qualities. Even these definite qualities tend to be more 
guidelines than hard and fast rules. With an acknowledgement of its complex nature and the 
various theories involved, I am defining the middle class by its ideological hallmarks rather than 
material reality. Therefore, the elements of the middle class concentrate on expectations of 
material consumerism, strict divide between work and leisure time, public and private sphere, 
access to educational opportunities, greater economic security, and home ownership. Peter 
Stearns attempted to offer a more precise way of defining this problematic term by asking 
scholars to blend social science and history. But even he was quick to point out the need to view 
the middle class as a heuristic device that defied simple formulas or patterns. For as Stearns 
exasperatingly noted, “We’re dealing with a peculiar beast and quite possibly with several 
beasts.” Or, in short, it’s complicated.157  
Perhaps the key to understanding the American middle class and its effect on American 
society in the postwar period is not to focus on quantifiable labels but rather cultural identifiers 
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made possible by a corporate-led consumer economy. In terms of consumption after World War 
Two, the American middle class contained several important characteristics that set it apart from 
the working class. This consisted of the access to hard cash as an exchange component, 
disposable income, an emphasis on individual choice as an important purchasing factor, and a 
focus on leisure. As Lizabeth Cohen’s article “Encountering Mass Culture at the Grassroots” 
showed, working class urbanites in the 1920s and even the 30s often negotiated between 
standardized mass culture and local community traditions, leading to distinct patterns of 
consumption.158 While most working class families lacked the economic capacity to buy with 
cash or venture to new chain stores far away from their city neighborhoods, corporate retailers 
increasingly endorsed middle class Americans as their ideal target audience. Spurred on by the 
possibility of homogenization in mass culture, corporate leaders believed that training 
consumption patterns was the key to unlocking success in the marketplace.159 This intensified in 
the postwar period, as both fears of creeping communism and an alliance between business and 
the federal government encouraged all Americans to view prosperity through the lens of 
consumption. Though reality made it difficult for many to participate in this consumers’ 
republic, businesses continued to uphold middle class ideals as a blueprint for success.160 As 
such, middle class identity was not so much a material reality for Americas, but an ideology of 
culture and consumption, literally bought and sold. 
It was an identity that agribusinesses believed was the key to their larger economic goals. 
Agribusinesses desired greater sales numbers, but most notably, wanted to continue their 
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infiltration of the agricultural industry. One of the methods to achieving this goal was to 
reconfigure the way farmers viewed themselves. The expectation was that if rural families saw 
themselves as part of the middle class (with its values of consumerism, leisure, and defined 
gender and racial normativity) farmers would become a more pliant and dependent customer 
base. 
Many of the expectations of the urban-facing middle class were attractive to all 
corporations, but especially to agribusinesses. All of these traits could be exploited to increase 
dependence on agribusiness products and expertise. Consumerism was obviously beneficial to 
companies, as agribusinesses wanted farmers to see themselves as consumers. In fact, this value 
system was predicated on the notion that in order to produce, one first needed to consume. This 
extended beyond the barnyard to encompass the household and family’s overall lifestyle. The 
middle class emphasis on more material goods and an expectation of leisure time required more 
profit and time-saving labor from the farmstead, a possibility promised by the consumption of 
agricultural products. At the same time, farmers that took up an urban middle class identity also 
faced new restrictions on the labor of family members, namely women and children. Therefore, 
labor and time-saving agricultural products were not simply a luxury for middle class farm 
families, but a complete necessity into order to function. Ultimately, agribusinesses used identity 
to shape consumer impulses and lay a fertile ground for the consumption of their products and 
wider acceptance of their institutional beliefs. 
Consumerism and Community in the Historic Countryside 
 The history of farmers, capitalism, and consumerism is a complex mixture of economic 
pressure and social traditions battling it out on a local level. The rural political economy has been 
changing since markets began connecting people beyond the small confines of their 
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communities. Historians may have argued about it for nearly as long. But with the dust settling in 
the 2000s, it became clear to most historians that the tried and true, “it’s complicated,” was the 
best answer for an unclear and intricate question. Farmers were consumers, of course, but also 
producers. Agrarian people employed new technology, but tended to do so on their own terms. 
They acted and reacted to consumerism and new material in many different ways throughout 
American history.161  
There are significant distinctions in this relationship when discussing rural people. While 
scholars tend to disagree on when rural people began to enter into a new relationship with capital 
(with a predisposition to declare their area of study the definitive moment of transformation), 
most emphasize the place of community within these choices. Farming communities survived on 
communal exchanges of labor and goods, even as centralizing market forces and new scientific 
developments changed the agricultural process. Hence materialism in the rural context often 
vacillated between individual and community needs depending on the situation, with farmers 
participating in the wider mass market but also maintaining reciprocal local connections well 
into the twentieth century. In fact, many agricultural organizations formed in part to protect 
farmers’ consumer interests, seeking a stronger joint voice among the market players.162  
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Perhaps the most important factor in farm based consumption was the survival strategy of 
making do and “doing without.” Described by Mary Neth in her ground breaking Preserving the 
Family Farm, this approach accentuated diverse, communal labor as a source of economic 
strength. Making do saved money through joint labor of the family and local community. Other 
times, farm families simply did without, ignoring perceived modern necessities (like indoor 
plumbing, electricity, or material goods) in favor of saving capital or investing in less glamorous 
necessities.163 Even when farmers did purchase consumer goods, many did not give up the 
diversity of labor that saved them money in the long run. For farm women especially, their work 
displayed a surprising capacity for adaptation. With much of the farmstead’s consumerism 
directed towards the barn and the field, women often had to diversify their production to create 
other sources of income.164 Women produced and traded their butter and eggs, made their own 
clothing and household supplies, farmed and canned their own fruits and vegetables, and 
engaged in other revenue-creating work. When the environment failed to produce a sizable yield 
or commercial pressures made for hard times, the diversity of labor and the willingness to forgo 
modern conveniences allowed many farm families to stay on their land.165 
Rural unwillingness to jump headlong into the consumer economy was a source of 
frustration for reformers, government workers, and academics alike. Progressive Era reformers 
believed that a lack of modern conveniences was one of the main drivers of rural depopulation. 
Faced with a dull countryside, young people fled for greater pleasure in the city. Ironically, rural 
women’s labor became a basis of intense scrutiny, with government officials and others claiming 
that farm women were overworked drudges who desperately needed modern technology to ease 
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their burden.166 One solution, they argued, was to give farm women a chance to enjoy the same 
labor-saving devices their sisters in the city already had. This proposed mass consumerism would 
both keep more rural people from leaving the farm while also improving the efficiency and 
health of country living. It was crusade that faced a blend of acceptance and reluctance long into 
the mid-century.167 Even after the Second World War, the USDA and professional organizations 
attempted to increase consumerism in the farm household. Industry films created by the 
Extension Service and the Bureau of Human Nutrition and Home Economics showed the innate 
benefits that awaited a rural wife who updated her kitchen. One 1949 film, titled “A Step-Saving 
Kitchen,” promised that a modern, efficient kitchen would make the farmwife’s task of food 
preparation, “so much lighter, the housewife can share her family's enjoyment at mealtime."168 
Even when farmers did enter into the world of mass consumerism, their actual use of the 
products differed in many ways from what manufacturers envisioned. Instead of being passive 
consumers, farm people interacted with commodities in unique ways. As Ronald Kline indicated, 
rural people socially constructed new uses for technologies like the car, the radio, telephones, 
and electricity. This blurred the line between consumers and producers, as rural people adapted 
these products for other uses. Farmers utilized power generated by cars to run everything from 
washing machines to dairy pumps. Telephone party lines allowed rural people to signal for help, 
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play live music, or communicate in different ways.169 Women also adjusted to new technology 
for their own uses. Defying the expectations of outside reformers, farm women embraced 
technology as a way to maintain their intrinsic value to the farmstead. Though men eventually 
took over female-run, money-making poultry, dairy, and garden operations (specifically in the 
postwar period), rural women exploited technology to create the time to enter into new 
production activities. Some women also ran tractors and other farm equipment in the fields. 
Others used cars to leave the farm and find paying jobs.170 By becoming agents of change, rural 
people recrafted consumerism in the countryside to meet their own needs. 
Agribusiness and Consumerism 
Agricultural companies certainly had a stake in rural consumption patterns. Early 
railroads and consolidated livestock groups supported the development of agricultural 
professional organizations because it furthered their own interests. When these public institutions 
sought to “educate” farmers, they mostly promoted the consumption of new products and the 
adaptation of commercial based agriculture. Yet, along with their allies, agribusinesses 
constantly struggled against ingrained rural customs. Many times, especially before the Second 
World War, farmers simply lacked the capital to invest in these commercial products even if they 
wanted to. Later on, farmers continued in the tradition of taking on new technologies and 
adapting them for their own purposes. Much to the dismay of agricultural experts and 
businessmen, farmers made their own decisions about their economic enterprises, including the 
purchase and use of goods and services.171   
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Therefore, one of the first tenets of identity that agribusinesses wished for farmers to 
embrace was a greater focus on consumerism, specifically products that promoted agriculture on 
an industrial scale. Firstly and perhaps most importantly, agribusinesses wanted farmers to see 
themselves as consumers. Obviously, consumerism had not been the first emphasis for most farm 
families pre-1945, despite external and internal attempts to change. Because of diversification 
and the large informal local economy, many farms were fairly self-sufficient. What was more, 
agricultural communities often provided the necessary labor and other requirements for rural life. 
Even if they wanted to buy consumer goods, most farmers lacked the cash reserve to completely 
invest in the material changes advocated by reformers.172 Despite intervention and educational 
outreach done by outside institutions, many farmers failed to update their households with 
modern conveniences or adopt “labor-saving, profit-enriching” products in their farming 
operations. 
For agribusiness, this focus on production, not consumption, was a big problem. The 
whole commercial enterprise was built on consumerism, the understanding that farmers would 
buy these products. Moreover, agribusinesses believed that as farmers consumed more products, 
they would also tacitly buy into the agricultural techniques and methods advocated by these 
companies.173 Given enough exposure, farmers would eventually adopt an industrial, capital-
intensive conception of agriculture, wholly dependent on agribusiness. Therefore, farm families’ 
historic emphasis on economizing or “doing without” was a serious problem. Economizing 
undermined the very foundation of consumer-based agriculture and allowed farmers to continue 
their operations without the need for larger institutions. Agribusinesses bet their economic future 
on becoming essential to the agricultural process. If farm families failed to see consumption as 
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completely necessary, businesses would lack the power to enact other changes they so 
desperately wanted.  
One way agribusinesses emphasized the benefits of a middle class lifestyle was the 
importance placed on consumer goods. Unlike chemical fertilizer or confinement barns, these 
material goods highlighted enjoyment and entertainment. Though they had little to nothing to do 
with economic survival of the farm, they were an equally important point for companies desiring 
greater consumerism. After all, “doing without” implied a level of consumer frugality. This 
contradicted the implicit benefits of materialism. Goods were supposed to make life more 
comfortable for their owners: washers to speed up laundry; television to entertain, new clothing 
to look one’s best, and new cars to show off family wealth. If farmers accepted their new status 
as middle class businessmen and market competitors, companies suggested that they would gain 
all the unspoken benefits of middle class America, including the consumption of material goods. 
Overall, this emphasis was important for selling the middle-class lifestyle to farmers as a 
desirable existence they not only could, but should, attain for their families. 
Many agribusinesses, even though they did not directly profit from these goods, still 
underscored the benefits of material consumerism in the household. One of the tactics these 
businesses used was to reward and entice farmers with merchandise. For Pioneer and Rath 
Packing, this meant dangling material goods in front of their contracted dealers as prizes for high 
sale numbers. Wristwatches, dinnerware, tool sets, radios, furniture, jewelry, and many other 
products were available to dealers who performed well. To fully engage the whole farm in mass 
consumerism, these companies targeted other members of family. In 1964, Pioneer collaborated 
with the Farm Journal to send free aprons and cookbooks to a number of southern farm wives, 
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hoping to entice their husbands to do business with the company.174 That same year, Rath 
Packing Company sent a letter addressed not to their underperforming salesmen, but rather their 
wives. In a bizarre attempt to shame these men to turn in greater sales numbers, Rath told these 
women, “I regret to inform you the ‘Corning Ware’ Christmas presents for you (to be earned by 
your husband) cannot be placed under your tree. I still trust you will ‘handle your husband with 
care.’” They then noted that their salesmen-husbands still had time to earn a reward for 
Christmas.175 It was a method that trusted in the incentive of consumerism, the belief that rural 
families would be motivated by material gain.  
In many ways, these companies were facing a more receptive farming audience. Unlike 
most of their parents and grandparents, more and more farmers embraced the consumerism of 
postwar living. Whether it was because they finally possessed the finances to do so or to survive 
in the competitive marketplace, younger farmers tended to spend more on consumer goods and 
other middle class expenditures than their older colleagues.176 As professor of agricultural 
economics John A. Hopkin noted, "During the first half of this century, about 85 percent of 
farmers' capital investments were supplied from savings out of farm income. Now, however, the 
needs are too great relative to the profit margins. Farm families are no longer content to divert so 
much of their income away from family health, education, dental care, etc. as was the case a 
generation ago."177 The mantra of “doing without,” so critical to economic survival in the past, 
was being replaced by a more consumer-based view of household expenses.178 Many seemed 
unwilling to forgo the consumer’s republic enjoyed by their urban peers. Russell Arndt, a farmer 
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highlighted by a Monsanto publication, argued that today’s new farmers were no longer willing 
to accept simple subsistence farming or living. They were instead more modern, almost 
indistinguishable from their city brethren.179 This included more money spent on consumer 
goods, leisure activities, and domestic conveniences. It also included larger investments in new 
farm technology. The “revolution” of agriculture after 1945 had as much to do with a better rural 
reception as it did actual scientific advancement. 
 Obviously this consumerism was not solely aimed at products in the barnyard or fields, 
but also based on profound changes to socio-economic status and lifestyle expectations. One of 
the most dramatic ideological changes centered on expectations of middle-class status, with all 
the implied benefits of materialism, leisure, and comfort. Although the phrase “family farm” has 
a number of different political and cultural meanings, often depending on the context and who 
has decided to use it, agribusinesses used the term as a symbol of the possible opportunities 
awaiting the postwar farm.180 The modern family farm, they argued, could and should enjoy all 
the benefits of their urban and suburban neighbors, including convenience in the home and in the 
barn. This conveyed a number of different expectations and radically simplified the complex 
nature of agricultural life. It deliberately moved away from the ideology of “doing without” in 
favor of mass consumerism. America’s own relationship with consumerism changed immensely 
during this time, including a move towards consumption for its own sake. An intertwining of 
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politics and business, citizens could believe they were supporting the American economy 
through mindless buying.181 Agribusinesses imagined that farmers could not only have more, but 
should have more. All they needed to do was to adopt the traits that would allow them economic 
access to the middle class. 
Making a New Farmer: Using Race, Class, and Gender to Emphasize Consumption 
Perhaps deliberately, the social realities of who could potentially reap the most economic 
benefits of the postwar boom, (white, economically mobile, and male Americans) also matched 
agribusinesses’ own perception of who was a farmer. To say that American cultural 
interpretations of agriculture have been whitewashed is an understatement. The famous yeoman, 
a conception with prominent social capital throughout American history, was fundamentally 
male and fundamentally white. For agricultural companies in the postwar era, the continued 
emphasis on this singular vision was an easy way to showcase exactly who they believed were 
“farmers.” Advertisements and other company rhetoric repeatedly presented white men as the 
sole proprietors of this identity. That in and of itself was not unique or surprising. But what was 
more distinctive was the combination of white masculinity with other celebrated traits: 
consumerism, belief in expertise, business-like mindset, and competitive spirt. It was here that 
many companies attempted to find an ideal spokesperson, one that represented the epitome of 
modern farming. For some implement companies, their founders (Cyrus McCormick and John 
Deere) served as strong examples of a competitive businessmen/farmer. This was echoed by 
chicken producers Perdue and their rival Tyson, as both imbued their founders with modern 
farming identity. Pioneer used Roswell Garst as an example of a “typical” farmer who made 
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good by adopting a consumer-based, business-minded approach to his land.182 Other times, 
companies eschewed the use of a specific individual. Instead, a faceless, nameless white male 
farmer served as the main symbol of modern farming identity. Thousands of advertisements 
illustrated male farmers, often middle-aged, in close proximity to new products, riding on 
tractors, or performing other agricultural tasks. Sometimes smiling but often stoic, the farmers 
depicted in these advertisements reflected a melding of old time yeomanry with modern 
expectations, a proud steward steeped in modern convenience and profit-motivation. When 
looking at these advertisements, this singular image would suggest that these men alone farmed, 
and farmed alone. 
Obviously, this did not reflect reality. The truth was that, like other aspects of agricultural 
identity, farmers were a diverse group. Because of the need to constantly adapt to local forces, 
their identity reflected the unique environment in which they lived in. Region shaped 
communities. Soil conditions and crop type required unique forms of production. Social forces, 
from war to migration, changed the makeup of rural populations and their relationship to 
agriculture. Although economic pressure (among other issues) constricted America’s farming 
population, they remained a diverse collection of individuals and families. Our current 
monolithic understanding is, in many ways, a product of agribusiness’s intervention in American 
cultural perceptions. 
 People of color have always been involved in agriculture, something that agribusinesses 
themselves, despite their willful silence, were well aware of. Pioneer received solicitation from 
Black farming newspapers, journals, and radios to advertise.183 Playing on company loyalty, 
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Black extension agents in Alabama asked for and received a donation from the seed company.184 
International Harvester, aware of the tension over civil rights in areas of the south, crafted an 
“equal opportunity” program that hoped to both defuse tricky situations and attract more Black 
college-educated workers.185 When it came to their internal agricultural operations, Pioneer often 
utilized people of color. Like many other companies, the company employed Mexican workers 
to detassel their seed fields.186 Even with the tightening of immigrant policy in the 1960s, the 
seed house continued to engage these workers. But Pioneer was not the only company aware of 
racial diversities in agriculture. International Harvester and other equipment dealers were 
particularly sensitive to the trends in the agricultural labor of people of color, predominantly 
because these laborers competed directly with the implements offered by these companies. The 
mechanized cotton picker, potato diggers, corn combines, and other grain implements replaced 
long traditions of hand picking by the local agricultural underclass.187  
Though poor farmers of all races played a critical role in the seasonal work of agriculture, 
Black workers in the south, Mexican laborers in the West (and moving elsewhere), and other 
racial minorities made up a large proportion of these laborers.188 Businesses coveted this work 
because they believed that their products would replace these efforts, making these people’s 
labor essentially obsolete. For example, Monsanto celebrated sugar beet farmers, and in turn 
their own chemical products, for successfully replacing hand labor. The company noted that 
mechanization had been the long term goal for beet agriculture, shifting away from hand labor as 
immigration restrictions against Mexican workers constricted the flow of migrant labor. 
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Monsanto’s chemicals aided this transition, with the company arguing that they were leading the 
way for an efficient future. They celebrated a possible future in which the, “ideal crop would 
never fail, has a ready made market, no waste, and no hand labor [author emphasis].”189 While 
certainly prejudicial against people of color (after all Pioneer’s migrant workers received 15 
cents less than white adult workers and just 5 cents more than white children) these companies 
were certainly aware of racial variances in agriculture.190 It was when this awareness was 
deliberately cast off, in favor of a monolithic interpretation, that the results promoted a vision of 
agriculture that was profoundly whitewashed. 
 In order to drive home the point that farmers were singly white, agribusiness used race to 
reframe the history of American agriculture. As previously discussed, agribusinesses were fond 
of rewriting the past to suit their needs and promote their companies as problem solving saviors. 
One aspect that many played on to support this assertion was to describe indigenous peoples as a 
“primitive other.” This implied that American Indians of the New World lacked the willpower or 
capacity to fully harness the power that America’s soil offered. Despite living on the land for 
thousands of years, it was not until Europeans, specifically those special individuals attached to 
certain companies, arrived that American agriculture could reach its full potential. Pioneer 
conveyed that Native Americans were the first to “discover” corn, with the insinuation that these 
people had no understanding of how to “channel” its production.191 John Deere implied that 
“primitive man,” an explicit allusion to American Indians, could not reach the rich soil he lived 
on, the land itself defying his simple tools and simple mind.192 Rath Packing Company especially 
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employed this stereotypical assertion in its marketing ploys, engaging in mocking portrayals of 
Native Americans to sell their products. One Rath wiener campaign urged children to create their 
own “Indian” jokes.193 Another ad suggested that Rath was the “big chief” of the whole ham 
tribe.194 The company even created a TV spot featuring four stereotypical “Indians” singing 
because, according to consumer research, “kids found Indians exciting and fun.”195 In many 
ways, these attempts played on the prejudicial notion of racial progress, a covert social 
Darwinism. Only once white Americans possessed the land, and were then aided by large 
corporations, could agriculture truly become productive and efficient. By clearly outlining and 
caricaturing the racial other, these companies in turn defined what they believed to be a “real” 
farmer. 
However, race was not the only factor that agribusinesses used to clearly separate who 
was and who was not a farmer. Gender also was a key aspect that divided and simplified farming 
identity. Women, historic producers on all levels of the farming operation, were marginalized. 
As explained in the first chapter, agribusinesses looked to constrict the realm of female labor. 
Despite their awareness of the diversity of female activity, these companies conveyed ideology 
similar to white, middle-class, suburban America. Agribusinesses, in the very few times they 
actually discussed rural women, fully placed them within the realm of home, their activities 
confined to traditional domestic labor. While in reality strong participants in agricultural labor, 
rural women faded into the background in the discourse of these companies. 
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Class, though trickier, was also a source of division in the manipulation of farming 
identity. Because agribusinesses desired farmers to adopt a more middle-class identity, poorer, 
subsistence-based farmsteads were obviously not the target audience of their marketing schemes. 
Smaller farmers were less likely to invest in the more commercial system. But even more than 
that, agribusinesses quickly defined these small producers as unworthy of the title of farmer 
itself. Businesses insinuated that these families would be better off leaving farming all together. 
In turn, the agricultural economy would be healthier without the deadweight of these struggling 
farms. Though there were early efforts to bring these smaller farmers into the fold (including 
introducing them to products that would raise their socio-economic status) most agribusinesses 
(much like the USDA during the New Deal) eventually came to the conclusion that these 
producers lacked the necessary skills, ideology, education, and willingness to adapt to changing 
times. Instead, companies emphasized that “modern” farmers were educated business-minded 
adopters of technology, who operated on a larger, more commercial scale.196 
It was an argument that seemed to be confirmed by rural sociologists in the 1950s. Iowa 
State University’s sociologists George Beal and Joe Bohlen published a small bulletin called 
“How Farm People Accept New Ideas,” which eventually developed into the well-known 
diffusion process theory. In it, they argued that farm communities accepted new ideas in certain 
patterns, with a small minority always innovating first. These innovators and early adopters fit 
into a certain pattern. Beal and Bohen drew connections between this minority and their 
participation in youth clubs like 4-H and FFA, and formal membership in agricultural 
organizations. These men, the sociologists claimed, were highly educated, highly capitalized, and 
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more likely to read extension bulletins.197 On whole, these were farmers who were already or had 
the potential to become middle-class. They valued scientific and technical expertise from larger 
institutions (both public and private) and believed in professionalizing the occupation. The early 
innovator’s propensity for consumerism and desire to increase his capital also marked him as a 
member of this postwar middle class.  
Monsanto was so taken with the theory that they made it an official part of their emerging 
agricultural marketing plan. When discussing how to properly develop and market a new 
product, Monsanto employee J.H. Senger specifically mentioned Beal and Bohlen’s work. He 
remarked that the chemical corporation was aiming for, “businessmen farmers known as early 
adopters. Generally, he is a man who watches the innovator, watches the new products used for 
probably one or two years and then decides this is something that is really good.”198 Several 
traits of the middle class, including consumerism, value of authority, and faith in expertise, were 
defined as desirable assets in agribusinesses’ quest to remake farming identity. 
The purpose of redefining these features was to make corporate manipulation of farmers 
much easier. If rural life was freed of all of its complexity, making patterns of locality legible to 
a centralized office, the ability to peddle an industrial and capital-intensive vision became 
easier.199 By fitting identity neatly into decipherable boxes, the aspects that agribusinesses 
wished to emphasized could now coincide with their own self-created context. Reality, they 
hoped, would begin to reflect their vision of agriculture. Agribusinesses hoped that farmers 
would begin to see themselves as middle class professionals and consumers. They would buy 
                                                          
197 George Beal and Joe Bohlen, “The Diffusion Process,” May, 1957, Special Report No. 18 (Agriculture Extension 
Service, Iowa State College), 56–77. 
198 J.H. Senger, “Case History How a New Product is Marketing,” Selected talks from the seminar on Business 
Opportunities for the Chemist and Chemical Engineer Graduate, June 29 and 30 1965, 22-32, Series 11, Box 2, File 
5, Monsanto Collection. 
199 James Scott, Seeing Like A State, 1-9. 
87 
 
 
into the standards of living that were hallmarks of the urban middle class: an emphasis on leisure 
and recreation, professionalization and respect for expertise, profit-motivation, differentiated 
work and home spaces, and materialism.  
Agribusiness’ efforts to stress this middle-class identity were two-fold. Companies both 
propagandized their own role in helping farmers achieve this new status and offered new chances 
for farmers to enjoy the rewards of a consumerist lifestyle. Looking to attract new contracted 
growers, Perdue Chicken stressed how their farmers enjoyed independence and strong income 
returns (with the implication that this capital should be reinvested in the poultry operation).200 
This was echoed by the company’s close ally, the Delmarva Poultry Industry Inc., which 
pronounced that changes to the industry (led by vertically integrated firms) allowed all citizens 
of the region to enjoy new standards of living.201 Corporations involved in mechanization, 
biotechnology, and chemicals claimed that their products allowed farmers to enjoy more profits 
and the convenience of modern life. In 1945, Harvester noted that its tractors allowed farmers to 
avoid the “back-breaking” labor of yesteryear and enjoy more leisure time.202 That same year, 
Monsanto claimed that its DDT permanently improved the fortunes of the Filipino working class 
by expanding their diet. Four years later, the hybrid seed industry congratulated itself on its 
efforts to help American farmers profit: “Never has the American Farmer had the opportunity to 
benefit more from the work of thousands of Seedsmen. Never in history has the farmer been 
offered such high quality seed! American Agriculture is deeply indebted to you for your years of 
work.”203 
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These companies also promoted middle class identity by clearly delineating between 
“work,” “home,” and “leisure” spaces. Historically, farmsteads have encompassed all aspects of 
life: work, home, and sometimes leisure all rolled into one place. Industrial-capitalism separated 
these facets of human existence, often with gendered consequences. Agribusinesses’ interaction 
with farmers deliberately split these aspects of life, modeling patterns of urban America. Places 
of business became intentionally masculine and professional. They were spaces to buy goods and 
receive professional knowledge from specially trained experts. This was not to say that rural 
communities did not already contain their own gendered spaces of business. LuAnn Jones clearly 
showcased how country stores were often closely guarded places of white masculinity.204 But the 
key difference was that agribusiness wanted to introduce a regulated professionalization 
controlled by large bureaucracies rather than local people. Meetings would be controlled and 
structured after corporate guidelines. Physical spaces would be planned to fit a company-
approved pattern. Even corporate events meant as celebrations, such as company sponsored 
Christmas parties or dinners, demarcated professional seminars (for men) and entertainment (for 
the rest of the family). This separation of “serious business” from other activities fundamentally 
changed the architecture of rural spaces. Moving away from the symmetry of work and life 
patterns, agribusinesses firmly placed farming into a more urban-centered patterns.   
Predictably, many farmers embraced these new scientific and technological products, but 
on their own terms. Farmers who had the capital often adopted new technologies to increase the 
size and scope of their operations. Previously diversified farmsteads became increasingly 
specialized, with many farmers deciding to shift their focus toward specific commodities. This 
was especially true for livestock and dairy producers, as consumer tastes and new advancements 
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pushed for expanded production and more exact standards. Of course, not all farmers were able 
to keep up with the steadily advancing agricultural treadmill. The good times and price supports 
disappeared soon after the end of the war, leading to an economy where surpluses relentlessly 
pulled down market prices. Even with new agricultural policies, food programs, and the 
occasional war to offset falling prices, average income for farmers plummeted from its record 
highs in the forties, leaving farmers with only half of the purchasing power of non-farm 
workers.205 By 1957, the rate of return on farm capital reached its lowest point since 1934.206 
Compounding the problem was the rising operating cost of agriculture itself. Or as one Illinois 
farmer complained, “This machine age keeps a man financially embarrassed these days.”207 To 
meet the cost of agriculture, many farmers needed to increase their production and turned to new 
products and technologies for help. 
New Products and Methods 
Farms in the postwar era became increasingly industrial and dependent on biotechnology 
and mechanization. Many of these technologies had been available since the early part of the 
twentieth century, including tractors and hybrid seeds. However, many farmers failed to wholly 
adopt these advancements because they lacked the money to do so. This, combined with general 
rural apathy or outright resistance toward outside reforms, meant that many of these scientific 
developments were not widely adopted.208 It was not until most farmers increased their 
investment capital that greater proliferation occurred. All facets of farming became increasingly 
mechanized and technical, with tractors, combines, pickers, balers, choppers, and other 
                                                          
205 R. Douglas Hurt, Problems of Plenty: The American Farmer In The Twentieth Century (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee 
Publishing, 2002), 104-115.  
206 US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook: Employment Information 
on Major Occupations For Use In Guidance, Bulletin No. 1215, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1957 Edition), 714-724. 
207 Letter to select farmers from H. Patheal, August 22, 1956, Box 332, File 15656, International Harvester Central 
File. 
208 David Danbom, Resisted Revolution, 3-22 and 75-96. 
90 
 
 
equipment helping farmers expand their operations and save time and labor. The availability of 
electricity allowed for changes to dairy and livestock agriculture. New milking parlors eased the 
operating intensity without losing bulk product. Feedlots, forage choppers, silo unloaders, 
conveyors, and dryers permitted farmers to secure feed for larger herds. Commercial hybrid 
seeds also fundamentally changed agriculture. Corn was the first hybrid, but hardly the last, to be 
adopted by farmers. Selective breeding helped scientists to develop varieties that withstood 
problematic conditions, worked better with mechanized pickers, resisted disease, and produced 
better yields.209  
These modifications within agriculture owed much to the explosion of chemicals for pest 
control, fertilizer, and feed additives. Insecticides and herbicides became popular after World 
War Two. While their application could be problematic (with pests sometimes developing 
resistance or the chemicals negatively affecting other farm products), pesticides of all types 
found a welcome home among large numbers of farmers. Fertilizer also proved to be an essential 
part of the postwar technological revolution. Farmers had long utilized livestock waste and crop 
rotation to revitalize their fields. Chemical fertilizer changed the process at a very basic level. 
With initial gains outweighing costs, farmers rapidly adopted chemicals to get the most out of 
their hybrids. Livestock producers also enjoyed the use of chemicals products. Feed additives 
and antibiotics facilitated the growth of confinement farming and the expansion of herd and flock 
sizes. Growth hormones produced bigger and faster developing cattle, pigs, and chickens, which 
in turn enabled meat packers to generate cheaper cuts of meat for a hungry American public. No 
matter their application, chemicals consumption increased production across the board.210 
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All in all, these changes played nicely into the major marketing projection that 
agribusinesses peddled: that to produce, one must first consume. In order to increase their 
operation size, an essential component of surviving and thriving in this new agricultural age, 
farmers needed to buy the new technological innovations offered by these businesses. 
Mechanization giants like International Harvester, John Deere, Allis-Chalmers, Case, and others 
boasted that their machines offered farmers “yield-boosting” potential. When Harvester sent its 
dealers sales manuals on their new offerings, greater production was often at the center of their 
sales pitch. One noted that farmers needed a combine to harvest as much as they could, avoiding 
preventable losses and creating a more efficient system.211 Another mentioned that a privately 
owned manure spreader improved yields and saved money.212 Even this increase in yield created 
its own cottage industry within the mechanical market, with Harvester claiming that their new 
three point hitch out plowed all others: “As your yields go bigger each year, you have more and 
more trash to plow under.”213 To put a point on it, John Deere’s Director of Sales testified before 
Congress that mechanical equipment was the most important tool in agricultural production.214 
But the implement industry was hardly the only agribusiness to claim that the 
consumption of its products allowed more production and profit from agricultural commodities. 
In fact, many other types of products contended that they also increased production, including 
chemicals, hybrid seeds, new storage facilities, and many others. Monsanto, along with other 
chemical companies like DuPont and Dow, remarked that insecticides, fertilizer, and other 
                                                          
211 International Harvester, “Sales Handbook No. 62: The modern streamlined method of selling,” 5, Box 321, File 
02868, International Harvester Central File.  
212 International Harvester, “Sales Handbook No. 200-H 4-wheel spreader: The modern streamlined method of 
selling,” 3, Box 321, File 02868, International Harvester Central File. 
213 International Harvester, “3-point hitch plows: for 2 to 4-plow tractors with 3 point hitch,” 1963, 1, Box 524, File 
4369, International Harvester Central File.   
214 “Statement of Deere & Company to the Subcommittee on Equipment, Supplies and Manpower of the House 
Agriculture Committee Washington DC,” Presented by A.B. Connell, May 15, 1961, 8-9, Box 550, File 06638, 
International Harvester Central File. 
92 
 
 
chemical components boosted yield sizes, killed unwanted pests, and decreased losses. Hybrid 
seed houses bragged that their individualized formulas would offer farmers the greatest returns 
on their investment. Finally, meat producers also maintained that their operational standards, 
whether through contract work or more specialized product directives, allowed livestock and 
poultry farmers to streamline their production, increasing their numbers and profit. 
One of the keys to this consumerist ideology was how these different products offered by 
different companies played off one another. Hybrid seeds needed chemical fertilizer to reach 
their full potential. Record yield required new machines to harvest such vast quantities. 
Confinement farming necessitated chemical additives and antibiotics as well as greater 
consumption of grain to feed the animals. For example, Pioneer often advocated the heavy use of 
commercial nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus fertilizer within their own advertisements, 
pamphlets, and letters. One Pioneer Kernel article spotlighted the use of different fertilizers, 
arguing that the farmer had entered a new age of chemical farming and that chemical adoption 
was the only way to maintain profit.215 Another Pioneer poster celebrated Indiana farmer A.J. 
Custer’s record yield while also pointedly emphasizing his heavy use of fertilizer.216 The 
company even asked its own seed growers to use pesticides like DDT to produce a better 
product.217 Though the purchase of fertilizer had no direct monetary benefit to the company, 
Pioneer understood that without chemicals, hybrids often failed to attain their yield goals. In 
turn, other companies also advocated the adoption of products other than their own. Monsanto 
crowed about Delmarva’s move toward contract farming and breeding efficiency programs.218 
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International Harvester sold products that supported chemical and confinement farming. These 
were just some of the many connections that created the gradual alliance between various 
agribusinesses across the country.   
At the center of higher production came the implication of higher revenue. With higher 
yields, these corporations argued, came the higher profits that allowed farmers and their families 
to tap into the good life enjoyed by middle class Americans. In fact, profits became a critical 
component to the overall marketing plan of many agribusinesses. Numerous companies 
specifically noted that their products increased the overall profitability of the farm. As Pioneer 
noted in a letter to a vocational agriculture teacher, “After all, this is what the average farmer is 
interested in… which corn variety will make me the most money.”219 But it was not just the 
consumption of agribusiness’ products, but also the highly industrial and capital-intensive system 
that these companies marketed. They argued that it was a system that would create agricultural 
wealth, just as their products enabled the system to operate at a high level. Proper instruction and 
use, as shown by company experts, would ensure farm profits. As such, many corporations 
developed educational outreach that stressed the profit motive. Demonstration farms, like those 
of Rath Packing, Pioneer, and others, showed how farmers could increase their income by 
changing their operation. Others, like Monsanto and International Harvester, hosted free 
seminars and public forums on management techniques for developing profit. Monsanto was so 
concerned about this that the company even established a completely separate position of crop 
technology manager in 1965. Looking to provide an advisory component to their company 
service, this manager would, “carry forward the company's program both to help the farmers 
keep abreast of improved farming methods and to advise them on the most profitable use of 
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Monsanto plant food and pesticide chemicals.”220 Such emphasis was clearly intended to 
showcase the possible rewards that farmers could attain if they bought the products and the 
system that went with it. Profit allowed better homes, more material gain, and greater personal 
wealth.  
When promised rewards of middle-class identity did not materialize, agribusinesses also 
utilized negative advertisements to promote the need for greater agricultural consumerism. 
Specifically, agribusiness targeted fears over losing the farm to stimulate markets for their 
products. It was not a completely irrational fear. As already mentioned, fluctuating commodity 
prices and unstable markets, combined with growing overhead costs, influenced depopulation 
trends in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s. Between 1936 and 1959, nineteen million people left farming, 
which included fifteen percent of operators and nearly twenty-five percent of laborers.221 One 
governmental document projected that between 1955 and 1964, “an estimated 227,000 farm 
operators (those selling as much as $5,000 worth of farm products annually) are expected to 
leave the occupation.” It hypothesized that of the over two million farm boys aged ten through 
nineteen, only a small number would be given the opportunity to own farms.222 Most (but not all) 
farmers faced serious choices about their agricultural future, deciding to specialize and adapt to 
technological changes or face serious consequences that might include the loss of their land. This 
framework allowed for agribusinesses to exploit this anxiety to promote its version of 
agriculture’s future. 
The key was to make those scientific and technological changes not merely profitable or 
attractive, but completely indispensable for any future success. As Tom Smith, Monsanto’s 
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newly appointed general manager of its Agricultural Chemical Division, remarked in 1960, 
“Chemicals are indispensable tools of today's agriculture. They will become increasingly 
important as an expanding population demands quality food in abundance and at a low price 
from the dwindling farm labor force.”223 International Harvester warned that prudent farmers 
constantly looked to improve their land, indicating that tractor power was the solution to keeping 
the farm for generations to come.224 The North Central Weed Control Conference publicized 
that, “Chemicals could have saved 200-300 million bushels of corn in 1947!”225 It was an 
affirmation of the power of consumer-based agriculture. Adopting these products and 
technologies would allow the farm to survive. By doing this, the companies themselves became 
indispensable. 
This message about consumerism played on powerful conceptions of gender identity, 
family responsibility, and the future. A late 1950s advertisement for Monsanto perfectly 
encapsulated how these companies used fear of failure to drum up consumption for their 
products. Featured in the Farm Journal (which the company claimed had a circulation of over 
three million), Monsanto noted their advertisement was, “specially designed for the dual purpose 
of creating a favorable view of Monsanto among farm community and direct promotion of 
Monsanto brand farm products.” The ad featured a man looking out over this farmstead as the 
sun set, dreaming, “I hope my son becomes a farmer.” The ad continued, “There's a special 
reward farming holds for a man; and he'd like his boy to enjoy it when he grows up. It's to serve 
all men and still be your own master. You feel like that when you farm your best.” This quickly 
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established a romanticized view of farming and the family. The male husband and father was 
steward of the land and his family. It was his responsibility to care for both the land and, more 
importantly, the land’s future, which would rest with his son. His purpose was ultimately to pass 
on not just the physical space, but also the ideological benefits associated with agriculture. 
Health, in body, spirit, and environment, was the reward that awaited his descendants. It was his 
job to shepherd that gift. Once establishing these assumptions, Monsanto added the most 
important layer to their marketing ploy. They deliberately played on anxiety about the postwar 
reality of agriculture, that farmers across the nation were experiencing problematic returns. 
Because it was his responsibility, it would be his fault if the farm was to fail. Deciding to leave 
agriculture deprived his son of all of the spiritual benefits that agriculture held. This failure even 
denied his son the chance of full manhood, achieving independence, control, and choice. 226 In a 
way then, this advertised “hope” rested not so much on the son’s future choice to become a 
farmer, but rather the “hope” that his father could sustain the farm long enough to pass it on. 
Luckily, the corporation offered a solution to this potentially disastrous problem. In order 
to make the farm “the best,” and by that they meant viable, Monsanto supplied a range of 
products and advice to ensure this future. The advertisement stated, “Monsanto helps you farm 
your best by…bringing you a wide range of new and better farm chemicals, including herbicide, 
feed additives, wood preservatives, and fertilizer.”227 All of these products were created to help 
farmers save the future. Consumption of these products was the basis of their success and 
ultimately the survival of the farm into the next generation. 
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Monsanto was not the only company to use this tactic and set up consumerism as vital for 
the continuation of rural life. International Harvester noted that even as a modern corporation 
enjoying the success of providing “essential” products, they could never lose sight of serving the 
public good.228 Its rival John Deere also felt that it had a responsibility to help farmers help 
themselves. With the depressing reality of labor shortages and poor prices, farmers’ demand for 
mechanization increased.229 Dr. H.D. Hughes (an Iowa State professor), speaking in front of 
three hundred Cargill hybrid salesmen, told these dealers that they played a vital role in 
improving the farming techniques of their neighbors.230 Garst and Thomas, as part of Pioneer, 
claimed that their hybrids and their dealers served farmers and assisted the community.231 No 
wonder Monsanto later adopted the slogan, “Improving agriculture, improving lives.” 
Overall, the subtext was not about selling physical products, but selling consumerism as a 
basic necessity of agricultural operations. It was not enough to get farmers to buy products or 
accept more household expenses. Farmers had to believe that buying was now a part of farming, 
as important as plowing a field or milking a cow. Or as one Monsanto marketer would note, 
“Asking customer to buy a function rather than a chemical.”232 The function in this case was to 
create consumerism as an essential part of being a farmer. 
Conclusion: Making The New Farmer 
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With its first issue in the 1960s, Successful Farming published an editorial speculating 
about how farming would change in the next ten years. The writer theorized that family farms 
would persist despite the forces of industrialization, incorporation, and vertical integration. 
However, in the face of these changes, farms would grow larger, more commercialized, more 
specialized, and more efficient. In order to stay competitive, farmers would adopt new 
technologies and embrace advanced scientific methods. Above all, farms needed to be thought of 
as a scientific and business endeavor, “Farming is changing from a business of arts and crafts to 
a business of science. This change is only beginning. Much agricultural production in crops and 
livestock still is more dependent upon arts than science. Results are not wholly predictable.” 
Success, the journal implied, was based on predictability, a trait difficult to come by in these 
changing times. But not everything was discouraging, “We are in a period of major change. But 
change is not necessarily bad.”233  
 What was perhaps most interesting about this editorial was not its predictions (which 
mostly came true), but rather its sincere belief that these changes were still to come and not 
already here. Scrolling back through the issue, articles, columns, and advertisements all told a 
different story. Articles and columns emphasized new scientific discoveries and their possible 
applications on the farm. Crop and livestock reports, with their focus on commodity outlooks and 
pricing, provided valuable commercial information for the business-minded farmer. Above all 
though, consumerism lay at the heart of the journal. Advertisements for fertilizer, tractors, 
machinery, breeding stock, hybrids, gasoline, pesticide, and other products peppered every page. 
Not to be neglected, household products and domestic goods appeared throughout, with a 
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specific section offering a consumer guide for the latest in homemaking.234 These products, new 
information, expert advice, and unspoken hopes all signaled an expectation of middle class living 
for their rural readers.  
 Rural people were not the only target of larger institutional emphasis on middle class 
identity in postwar America. Politicians, industry leaders, retailers, and a booming economy all 
encouraged white workers across the lower socio-economic spectrum to enter into a new 
relationship with consumerism, one built on credit and greater household expenditures. As Elaine 
Tyler May noted, much of postwar focus on the normalizing power of the middle class was built 
on the purchase of commodities. May wrote, “Consumerism provided a means for assimilation 
into the American way of life: classless, homogeneous, and family-centered.”235 For rural people, 
this push was hardy a new phenomenon. Many institutions of the past, long before the postwar 
period, attempted to integrate urban middle class values within rural communities. 
 Yet, the efforts of agribusiness to retrain the values and expectations of farmers reached a 
different level of success than many of the attempts in the past. Consumption of not just farm 
products but also household goods soared. Families who could afford to often invested in new 
machinery, equipment, and household upgrades, allowing them to increase their yield potential 
(while also adding to their debt). For those who could not, the choices were often limited: finding 
a different form of income or leaving altogether. The result was a farming population that 
increasingly held middle class values and also was able to meet the standards of this socio-
economic status. 
 Agribusinesses propagandized these expectations because they believed it would further 
their economic interests. Farmers who saw themselves as consumers, as laborers who needed 
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new products to save time and make money, were a much more receptive audience than a 
community that could “make do.” Yet, creating a new type of middle class farmer was not 
simply changing how farmers saw themselves, but how farmer saw members of their local 
community. After all, “making do” was as much about personal sacrifice as it was working 
within local exchange networks. The key, agribusinesses quickly surmised, was to alter the 
standards by which farmers judged each other. Seeing an opportunity to integrate more fully into 
local systems, companies promoted two other elements of urban middle class living, that of 
competition and capitalism within the rural community.  
  
101 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: COMPETITION, COMMUNITY, AND CAPITALISM: IDENTITY 
MANIPULATIONS 
 
In the spring of 1955, a new corn king was crowned. A.J. Custer, a longtime resident of 
DeKalb County, Indiana, boasted a record setting 241 bushels per acre. The contest, verified by 
agronomists from Purdue University, made Custer an instant rural celebrity within the region. It 
was hardly the first time the ambitious farmer had made headlines.236 A mere three years earlier, 
Custer captured his first state yield championship with a smaller yield of 191 bushels per acre. 
Even then, Custer was well known for his determined use of new technologies and soil 
treatment, a mentality that Extension agronomists praised as “good practices.”237 Custer’s 
university-approved methods only intensified after his victory, as he and his five sons eventually 
became symbols of the “modern” way of farming.  
 However, Custer also represented a marketing opportunity for the seed house Pioneer. 
Deep in its own battle with other hybrid companies and state certified growers, Custer was a 
prospect that Pioneer just could not afford to pass up. So the company decided to use the Indiana 
farmer as symbol of the company’s quality, a face for Pioneer in the rural community. They soon 
entered into a business relationship, with Pioneer celebrating him in advertisements and 
newsletters. Custer in turn agreed to set aside five acres of his land as a demonstration farm, 
allowing regional dealers a place to show potential customers the possibilities of Pioneer.238 
Though a series of disagreements sometimes threatened the rapport, Custer and Pioneer 
maintained a working relationship through the 1950s.239 Both partners received something they 
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coveted. Custer collected free seed corn, payments, and recognition, a boon for an ambitious 
farmer. The company gained a much needed symbol, a face to denote exactly what they desired 
out of a farmer-customer. A.J. Custer and his relationship with Pioneer was just one link in the 
chain between changing conceptions of farming identity and the influence of agribusiness.  
 As America entered the postwar period, agribusinesses undertook a concerted effort to 
remake the identity of farmers. These companies desired a model that best fit their own goal: 
making agribusiness an indispensable part of agricultural life. They advocated for changes to 
how farmers thought of themselves, their labor, their community, and their stewardship of the 
land. It was a little more challenging than it sounded. Farmers, on whole, were not easy to define. 
Even the name defied a simple definition.240 On the surface, a farmer looked exactly like AJ 
Custer: a white male head of his household who farmed large plots of specific crops. Of course, 
that suggestion of homogeneity would be nothing but a false image. Farmers, as a definable 
group, are people who produce crops or livestock for various purposes. But more exact 
characteristics are much more difficult to identify. Factors such as environment, cultural values, 
community configuration, and the direction of the political economy (not to mention local 
features) make classification extremely difficult. Why then did agribusinesses make 
identification and promotion of certain traits so important? Ultimately, the reasons rest on issues 
of legibility and the possible benefits to be gained by this manipulation. By propagandizing 
attributes that worked best in their desired system of agriculture, agribusinesses also identified 
what a farmer was solely based on these traits. In doing so, they could codify correct behaviors 
and values that matched their larger quest to infiltrate the rural community. 
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Both Michel Foucault and James Scott have discussed the connections between legibility, 
control, and power. Foucault argued that recent conceptions of punishment, as in the prison 
system, cannot be separated from the modernization of society itself. The need to observe and 
control delinquents is part of a “carceral” grid that also regulates the citizenry.241 In a similar 
vein, Scott maintained that developing states have often attempted to impose standards (weights 
and measures, last names, etc.) on complex societal interactions and local knowledge. These 
governmental entities did so in order to better police their subjects, applying rationalism to 
remake the social order.242 This desire to identify and then control was not just a feature of 
governmental bodies, but also underscored aspects of the modern industrial complex, including 
agribusinesses. Companies involved in agriculture, like all businesses, sought to influence the 
beliefs of their customers and restructure their value systems into one that best suited corporate 
needs. The diffusion of a value system also relates to Antonio Gramsci’s theory of cultural 
hegemony. Articulated by Gramsci and expanded by numerous other scholars, cultural 
hegemony describes how the ruling class uses culture to reinforce and support its continued 
domination of a diverse society.243 Agribusinesses deliberately propagandized the features of 
competition and business acumen because they directly benefited their status within the larger 
industry and rural community. Boosted by political allies and a belief in technological 
determinism, agribusinesses tried to instill their own cultural values within farmers. 
Therefore this third chapter will focus on how and why agribusinesses promoted 
competition and business acumen within the rural community. Like with gender and labor 
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standards, agribusinesses also sought to influence how farmers thought of themselves and their 
relationships within agricultural networks. As the second chapter showed, agribusinesses wanted 
farmers to see themselves as middle class consumers. This coincided with the idea that 
consumption of agribusiness’ products gave farmers a competitive edge. Due to the stress of 
economic fluctuations, agribusinesses also needed to convince farmers that competition within 
the rural community was itself good and necessary. Instead of seeing other farmers as pieces of 
an interconnected community network, agribusinesses encouraged competition between farmers. 
This was done for two reasons. One, farmers would see other farmers as competition and 
therefore hopefully come to depend more on agribusinesses for help and expertise, rather than 
their neighbors. Secondly, new understandings of competition as a necessary and natural part of 
the modern agricultural system would also weaken any growing concerns about rural 
depopulation (one that might extend back to criticism of companies that were directly profiting 
from overproduction). By portraying struggling farmers as inefficient or unambitious, 
agribusiness could continue to push for higher yields without answering questions about 
overproduction and its effect on rural communities. It was proverbial agricultural Darwinism. 
Finally, along with changes to ideas about consumerism and competition, agribusinesses 
also wanted to reconfigure how farmers viewed the agricultural process itself. Instead of 
understanding farming as a lifestyle, agribusiness actively encouraged farmers to regard it as a 
business, one couched in the value system of industrial capitalism. As businessmen, farmers 
would now treat fields and yields with the same expansive eye as factory owners. Values of 
efficiency, standardization, scientific management, and profit would now rule the day. This, in 
turn, would drive even greater acceptance of agribusiness as essential to modern agriculture. 
Competition, Agribusiness, and the Rural Community 
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Competition, of course, was an essential component of capitalism and the fundamental 
interaction point between businesses, including those companies engaged in agriculture. This 
was not always the case with farmers though, which could prove to be a problem for 
agribusinesses and the system they promoted. Localized patterns of exchange did not 
automatically provide a fertile ground for a commercial system that depended first on outside 
entities (both input and output). Instead, agribusinesses wished to change how individual farmers 
and their communities viewed competition and cooperation. These companies encouraged 
farmers to view one another not as necessary pieces of an interconnected network, but rather as 
business competitors. Competition would, they argued, drive deserving and efficient farmers 
towards success while culling the economic deadweight from the marketplace. Mutuality had no 
place in the world of Big Agriculture. 
In order to truly understand why agribusiness promoted new competitive standards 
between their customers, it is critical to first understand the relationship between local economic 
forces in many rural communities. Despite the persisting myth of independence, most farmers in 
America operated within a system of localized community cooperation and informal exchange 
for basic survival. Throughout history, farming itself required large numbers of workers to 
operate effectively. Agricultural labor featured long periods of dormancy, punctuated by short 
bursts of intense seasonal activity. Threshing, harvesting, binding, moving commodities to barns 
or to towns, canning, slaughtering, and many other necessary agricultural tasks required more 
labor than one family could usually provide. In American agriculture, communal support was 
critical for overall community health. 
 This took many forms. The most simple were basic commodity and service exchanges 
between households. One farmstead might provide eggs in exchange for a quilt or milk. A family 
106 
 
 
might offer the labor of one of their children to gain access to a needed piece of equipment. 
Neighbors would pitch in to help raise a barn with the specific understanding that, in turn, they 
would reciprocate when the time came. Harvesting and threshing especially showcased the 
necessary coordination in small communities. Families would rotate labor to help to bring in the 
crops. It was a system that assured not just the wellbeing of individual farms, but a community as 
a whole. Neighborhood obligation meshed well with an organization of family labor that 
emphasized sharing and making do. While farmers utilized cash and capital to engage in long 
distance trade and to procure outside goods, they also continued to employ a system of barter 
long into the twentieth century.244 Though larger economic forces, both national and global, 
definitely affected agriculture, localized community involvement could and certainly did 
mitigate some of these effects. This is not to romanticize older forms of agriculture. Mutuality 
only went so far, especially when social and economic pressures threatened. Gender, racial, 
ethnic, and religious tension could incite violence, drive away community members, and lead to 
endemic poverty. But overall, local exchange was a crucial factor in the survival of agricultural 
communities and one that rural people often deliberately sought out. Small farming towns 
survived in part because of the willingness of residents to work together, formally and 
informally.245 
 The New Deal signaled a new direction in the changing perception of competition and 
cooperation in rural spaces. Influenced by their Mexican neighbors, some New Deal reformers 
sought to radically alter the countryside by confronting ingrained problems of inequality, 
poverty, and environmental decline. Called the “agrarian” New Deal by historian Tore Olsson, 
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he described this ideological strain of reform as, “a host of often dissonant programs that targeted 
culture, environment, poverty, land tenure, and fostering of rural democracy.”246 Aimed 
particularly at the American South, programs like the Farm Security Administration and the 
Resettlement Administration represented a real promise of redistribution of wealth. Unlike its 
Mexican counterpart, however, lack of federal commitment stunted these programs’ wider 
opportunities. Facing vicious opposition by commercial farmers and USDA colleagues, the 
agrarian New Deal failed to live up to its radical promise.247 
On the other hand, while agrarian reformers crusaded against inequality, the agricultural 
New Deal favored larger cultivators and other commercial interests, like agribusiness. Headed by 
the powerful Agricultural Adjustment Administration, these programs sought primarily to lower 
production and boost commodity prices.248 While the emphasis on rural America allowed 
Democrats to build a new rural constituency, it did little to alleviate the problems of the most 
vulnerable farmers, including tenants, sharecroppers, and small farmers. As the depression 
continued, many policy-makers came to believe that this agricultural underclass was the source 
of many problems. Many alleged that these small farmers, who seemed both inefficient and 
ignorant, depressed food prices and drained valuable government aid best left to others willing to 
adopt to large-scale agriculture. Therefore, the best way to relieve economic pressure on 
agriculture was to essentially encourage poor farmers to leave farming all together.249 
 The Second World War proved to be a critical boon for farmers and a federal government 
attempting to negotiate a stable ground between production and price controls. The increased 
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need for foodstuffs almost immediately improved commodity prices and farm incomes across the 
board. The federal government, encouraged by the powerful farm bloc, put policies in place to 
reduce the possibility of a postwar agricultural collapse, a legacy of the consequences of World 
War One. The results were golden years of prosperity for many of the nation’s farmers in the 
1940s. Financially secure for the first time in decades, farmers reinvested their capital back into 
the farm, bought new implements, upgraded their operations, or paid off debts. In the end, 
however, the good times could not last forever. By 1949, the problem of surpluses again reared 
its ugly head and the federal government once again dealt with the problem of plenty. Even the 
Korean War and other conflicts provided only brief reprieves from this continuing agricultural 
dilemma.250 
 Federal policy makers in the postwar era attempted to balance persistent overproduction 
with acceptable commodity prices. It was a difficult situation that plagued farmers, agricultural 
specialists, economists, and bureaucrats in the years following the Second World War. 
Technological and scientific advancements exacerbated surpluses, as farmers adopting new 
technologies produced more and more commodities to secure acceptable prices. They did so in 
part to make up for falling food prices and rising operating costs. In essence, farmers became 
trapped in a price-squeeze on both sides, leading to falling income and greater depopulation. In 
response to these problems, federal policy-makers came to the same conclusion as those late 
depression-era bureaucrats: that small farms were dragging down the agricultural market. 
Whether too small, too uneducated, or simply unwilling to change, policy makers believed that 
these yeomen lacked the ability to adapt to the changing nature of agriculture. Their inefficiency 
sucked valuable resources away from others and their production only added to surplus 
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headaches. Therefore, bureaucrats at the USDA embraced programs and policy, like acreage 
restrictions and lower parity for commodities, which would encourage more small producers to 
leave agriculture. Policy makers eventually looked to lessen government intervention in the 
agricultural economy.251  
Ultimately, the direction of these federal policies fit nicely with agribusinesses’ own 
conception of competition within the rural community. The federal government was interested in 
controlling surpluses though increased efficiency and the winnowing of the farm population. 
Agribusinesses saw competition as the solution to this problem. Agribusinesses, too, accepted 
the notion that small operators hurt the overall farm economy, holding those equipped with the 
right kind of knowledge and skills captive in a stale and worn out system. Understandably these 
corporate entities did not want all farmers to disappear any more than the federal government 
wanted another farm crisis. Poor commodity prices affected farmer income, which then directly 
influenced consumption of company products. Economic downturns could severely hurt sales 
numbers. As A. B. Connell, director of sales for John Deere, remarked, “No one is more 
interested in having agriculture prosper than we are. Our livelihood depends upon it.”252 Instead, 
they desired the removal of those who could not or would not buy their products, or more 
problematically, buy into the highly industrial system of agriculture they were advocating. 
Wealthy farmers, who thought of themselves as middle class businessmen and who shared 
similar conceptions of competition, were excellent examples for the rest of the countryside.  
One of the main pillars of agribusinesses’ vision of modern agriculture rested on the 
reassessment of the role competition played in rural communities, communities to which the 
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companies desperately wanted to belong. Agribusinesses sought to highlight their importance as 
not just a necessary function of economic development but also as a critical aspect of the whole 
agricultural endeavor. Competition, these corporations argued, held intrinsic value for the 
modern farming operation. Like the need to consume new agricultural advancements, 
competition “naturally” propelled farmers to become more successful. It forced them to adopt 
better management, techniques, and technology, which in turn created a more profitable, 
productive, and efficient farms. A more successful farm meant that farm families were able to 
enjoy all the fruits of a middle class lifestyle, including more leisure time and material goods. It 
also proved the quality of the farmer himself, a man who possessed both the virtue of his 
predecessors and the shrewd business mind necessary to modern life. Of course, the implicit 
drawback of economic competition was its negative impact on those who failed to make the 
necessary changes. After all, in order for agriculture to have winners, agribusiness need to create 
losers. 
Yet, agribusiness actually framed this seemingly negative aspect of competition as part of a 
constructive process: removing the inefficient and freeing the market of regulatory forces. Just as 
farmers culled their livestock with undesirable traits, so too did the countryside need to remove 
those unwilling to adapt to the modern operation. The editors of Successful Farming hoped that 
continued pressure would push smaller, inefficient farms out of the market. They argued that 
these farmers pulled down commodity prices, punishing others who had successfully adopted 
efficient management and applied science. In the end then, collaboration between inefficient and 
commercial farms did not make financial sense.253 So instead of supporting struggling farmers, 
companies wanted their customers to see these neighbors as unworthy of continued local 
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cooperation.  Competition, therefore, helped separate the metaphorical wheat from the chaff. 
This separation would create a better marketplace and more successful farming practices, which 
in turn would lead to a more prosperous countryside and nation.  
The celebration of competition was partly because agribusinesses faced heavy competition 
throughout their own development. McCormick Harvesting Machine Company confronted such 
intense economic competition that it eventually merged with four of its competitors in 1902 to 
form International Harvester.254 Vying against John Deere, Allis-Chalmers, Massey-Ferguson, 
and others, International raced to see who could produce more efficient and better varieties of 
implements. Monsanto competed against other large chemical companies, like DuPont and Dow, 
to corner the budding agricultural market for fertilizer and pesticides. Pioneer battled not only 
large rival seed houses like Funk’s, DeKalb, and Pfister, but also small local companies that 
offered specific regional varieties. Because of the nature of seed corn development, these small 
seed companies often had strong ties to state land-grants and experiment stations.255 At times, 
these ties proved to be so strong that they actually prevented other corporations from working 
with agricultural colleges (as with Purdue University) or even selling within a state (Georgia and 
West Virginia). Meat producers faced their own issues when it came to competition within the 
industry. Changes in consumer taste, biotechnology, and retail forced companies to adapt or fail. 
Chicken consumption increased the opportunities for vertically integrated firms to push out 
smaller competition. On the other hand, pork producers had to reinvent the conception of pork as 
a food to stay competitive in an increasingly difficult market.256  
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Competition was, therefore, the fire that helped forge these companies into their postwar 
configuration and often forced companies to change their business methods. For example, the 
growth of wholesale grocery stores (as opposed to specialty shops) forced meat packers to 
change their relationship with these stores. Worried about wholesale buying power, Rath Packing 
created a specific marketing program to help its salesmen grow closer to the retailers.257 The use 
of coupons was another tactic the meat packer came to employ in the postwar era, both to 
introduce its products to new areas and to drum up support for pork. While couponing could be 
expensive, the board of directors figured that housewives liked coupons because they “represent 
real cash savings at the time of purchases,” and would seem like an overall bargain.258 Like Rath, 
Monsanto also changed its business outreach based on competitive factors. Facing falling 
ammonia prices and new market competitors in the mid-1960s, the company decided to open its 
own franchises in rural communities across America. By franchising these “MAC” centers, 
Monsanto looked to bypass middlemen and sell directly to farmers.259 Each one of these 
companies stood in a food and fiber economy that offered expansion opportunities but also 
contained a minefield of potential pitfalls.  
It was through their relationships with each other, both as possible rivals and allies, that 
these companies crystalized their vision of competition for themselves and for their customers. In 
the dog eat dog world of the postwar agricultural market, many small and middling companies 
soon found themselves swallowed up by larger corporations. The seed-corn industry offered a 
glimpse into this trend of consolidation. With the refinement of hybrids in the early twentieth 
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century, hundreds of local companies, especially in the Corn Belt, sprang up to meet the budding 
demand.260 Gradually, larger and more well-connected seed houses began to separate themselves 
from local and eventually regional suppliers. The houses quickly acquired these smaller 
businesses as they failed on the open market, adding the best local varieties to the companies’ 
seed lines. Pioneer, DeKalb, Pfister, and others co-opted former small time seed growers and 
well-respected seed evaluators into the larger company structure through either contract work or 
buy outs.261 For example, in 1956, DeKalb bought out the Cornhusker Hybrid Corn Company of 
central Nebraska, a move that did not go unnoticed by their closest competitor, Pioneer. In an 
internal memo, Roswell Garst cautioned the company’s regional directors not to overlook the 
acquisition. Cornhusker’s hybrids were top-notch and their breeders originally connected to 
another prominent rival, Lester Pfister. While they out-performed other state hybrids (including 
Pioneer’s), Cornhusker could no longer compete because of their outdated equipment. Instead of 
investing in new and expensive technology, they sold to DeKalb. In the end, Garst commented 
that their rival buyout was not necessarily a bad thing for Pioneer, “All this does not scare me, 
nor disturb me. I just think it means harder work and greater planning and tougher competition, 
which will probably do all of us good.”262 
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 Garst’s response echoed the understanding of competition held by other successful and 
growing agribusinesses: that competition made the best stronger, and therefore bred 
accomplishment and progress.263 Garst was not afraid of DeKalb’s growth because he thought 
their acquisitions would push his own company to be more resilient. It was a combination of 
simple capitalist ideology and economic Darwinism, Adam Smith’s invisible hand working to 
ensure the survival of the fittest. Even when faced with the competition, John Deere’s Public 
Relations department noted that competition, “stimulated and accelerated [the company], rather 
than stifled the benefits for farm and industry.”264 And for those flailing in the wake of this 
consolidation, their trouble was a product of their own failure to adapt to the marketplace. Frank 
Perdue noted that most independent chicken breeders failed because they lacked the necessary 
management skills to keep up with the rest of the growing industry.265 When a Massey-Harris’ 
tractor dealer complained about Pioneer’s exclusion of Massey tractors’ seed plate size (a piece 
of equipment needed for corn planting) in their publicized seed charts, Pioneer’s response was 
predictably scornful. George Leininger, a representative for Pioneer, contemptuously replied that 
the seed house’s calibration man identified a number of issues with Massey-Harris faulty 
equipment. Consequently the company was unable to secure a proper plate recommendation, 
implying that Massey-Harris products were inferior in nature.266 One Monsanto corporate 
objective spoke of the need to fight “maturity,” a sign that the company had reached its 
maximum growth and could no longer be driven to find new opportunities. Still holding onto this 
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idea five years later, Monsanto noted that it must drop the “unworthy,” strive for originality, and 
continue to expand via vertical integration or lateral expansion.267 Clearly, notions of 
competition and survival influenced how companies understood their own development and 
success. From their point of view, economic struggle had made their corporations better, more 
efficient, and more productive. It seemed that competition was a natural force of progress itself. 
No wonder Pioneer told its salesmen to “be thankful for competition.”268 
 This corporate notion of competition was definitely a conception agribusinesses wished 
to integrate more fully into farmers’ view of themselves and their communities. Instead of 
functioning as an integral part of a localized network of exchange, these corporations encouraged 
farmers to view competition, not cooperation, as the primary driver of their success. Just as 
economic rivalry pushed companies to innovate and become better, so too would competition 
between farmers make individual agricultural operations more successful. Therefore competition 
within the community, even between neighbors and friends, was necessary and ultimately good 
for the well-being of agriculture itself. 
 One way for individuals to stay ahead of the competition, agribusinesses argued, was to 
embrace new techniques and products. This would allow them a competitive advantage over 
others slower to adopt to a more specialized, industrial mindset. Older practices, including 
greater crop rotation and diversification, were now unnecessary on the modern farm. One 
Pioneer sales letter noted that many farmers were abandoning old rotations because they were 
too costly. The letter promised, “those of you who are farmers should abandon rotations--that 
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you will make more money if you do abandon rotations.”269 Other companies also emphasized 
the ability of their products to increase profit. International Harvester repeatedly identified their 
products as “profit-boosting” implements that would help farmers retain their own farm’s 
viability. New drill planters allowed their farm’s seedlings that “important early step.”270 
Personal hammer mills allowed farmers to skip community milling and grind their own feed.271 
Power forage feeders turned cattle feeding into a one-man job.272 This emphasis on singular 
labor for profit and commercial advantage fit effortlessly into agribusiness’ own understanding 
of agriculture, one where competition pushed individuals to become better and more self-
sufficient. When discussing the Iowa State Fair in their company magazine, Monsanto 
highlighted the competitive nature of event. Remarking that the fair “throbbed” with 
competition, the chemical company emphasized how the best product sold for excellent prices.273 
Again, the intersection between profit, success, and contests reinforced how agribusinesses 
viewed the role of competition. 
 Monsanto especially underlined how competition molded farmers to become more 
successful by using idealized examples from the community. The men (always men) the 
company featured represented the traits that the company desired: faith in science and 
technology, business acumen, expansive productivity, willingness to accept outside expertise 
and, of course, a belief in competition. After all, “unless a farmer is advanced technologically, 
unless he treats his farm as a business and applies to it sound management principles, he cannot 
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compete in today's markets.”274 In an article highlighting five exemplary corn farmers, each man 
embodied a story of successful competition. Elmer Hohenstein of Minnesota, who worked his 
way up from a tenant farmer to owner of 600 acres, credited his success to competitive 
investments. Don Rakes of Waverly, Illinois used the concept of "base exchange capacity" to 
gain the upper hand. Russell Arndt of La Crosse, Indiana admitted that, “the whole apparatus of 
modern American business methods must become a part of farming.”275 All of these men used 
the tools of scientific agriculture to get and stay ahead of their neighbors, showcasing that 
success was born out of economic struggle within the community. These corn farmers succeed 
because of their willingness to become and stay competitive and to use new products to increase 
their advantage over others, sometimes even at the cost of their neighbors’ failure.  
 Fundamentally, this perception affirmed that competition in and of itself was a rewarding 
enterprise, leading those determined enough down the road to success. Perdue Chicken argued 
that their breeding contract program was inherently competitive and thus, “it is a rewarding 
business.”276 Those farmers who were unable to meet Perdue’s high standards would naturally be 
separated from those who could, leaving only the best to receive the reward of profit and 
satisfaction. John Harms, the agricultural editor for Kiplinger Washington (a Washington D.C. 
based business-forecast publisher), believed that great prosperity awaited farmers who survived 
the market upheaval. He wrote, “By the year 1970, there is going to be a rising boom in 
agriculture that will make farmers forget the searing headaches of 1967. By 1975, farmers will 
be king of the hill!”277 Pioneer assured their seeds dealers on multiple occasions that despite 
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cancellations by struggling farmers, their more aggressive neighbors would soon expand their 
operations and therefore pick up the leftover seed.278 Overall, they argued, the future looked 
bright for the farmers who successfully adapted to new competitive standards in the market. 
Competition was part of an organic process that uplifted the innovators and left behind the rest. 
 Agribusinesses particularly advocated this new understanding of competition when it 
came to their interaction with a certain target audience, farm children. As David Danbom, 
Charles Rosenberg, Mary Neth, and Gabriel Rosenberg have all shown, child-focused groups 
have long been the vehicle used by outside institutions looking to influence rural communities.279 
Rosenberg’s The 4-H Harvest specifically detailed that 4-H fostered a growing intimacy between 
rural children and capitalist institutions. One goal of the organization was to sell capital-intensive 
agriculture to rural communities (including reluctant parents) through children. Retailers of input 
industries had much to gain by developing this relationship. As Rosenberg noted, “bankers and 
businessmen gave cheap loans and prizes to 4-H in the belief that it would prime the sale of 
financial products for the next generation of farmers.”280 It was a marketing tool that could prove 
useful for building a future client base. 
 In order to further their economic goals, one that featured a highly competitive and 
agribusiness dependent market, these corporate entities targeted children with different activities 
and contests that emphasized competition over cooperation. For example, when Perdue Chicken 
decided to increase its advertising towards farmers, the company surveyed employees at Ralston 
Purina, Agway, Central Soya, and Eshelman Feeds to help understand that demographic. Out of 
all the responses they received, the most consistent suggestion centered on fostering company 
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connections to rural youth groups. Simply put, organizations like 4-H or FFA were effective 
image-builders for long-term success. Purina’s advertising department head stated that Perdue 
should give facility tours to 4-H and FFA members, because some of these kids would one day 
be their future employees or customers. Others added that sponsorship of youth projects was 
great free publicity in rural spaces. Agway’s head of advertising noted that program sponsorship 
looked unselfish and put the company on the same level as local farmers. Fred Walters, director 
of Central Soya’s public relations department, advised Perdue to “Identify yourself with groups 
that farmers feel are important.” He continued, “FFA and 4H are key to future business and 
image of the company. Build some amount of loyalty with farm people by supporting their 
children's activities, also county agents and Vo-ag teachers.”281 Company recognition was a 
critical sources of support. These corporations acknowledged that they needed to be seen as part 
of the community or “on level” with locals. Just as they attempted to foster competition, 
agribusinesses understood that their cooperation was inherent to any possible success they might 
have. Therefore, aiding local children’s groups accomplished a two-fold task; it both introduced 
their future customer base to a certain set of values and made the company look magnanimous. 
 It was these companies’ choice of collaboration that allowed them to both integrate their 
business into the wider rural community and promote their own interpretation of competition. By 
choosing to focus on contests between children, rather than cooperation or team building, they 
encouraged these future farmers to see one another as fellow competitors in the market, rather 
than allies within the agricultural process. Competition would drive away those unprepared to 
adjust to modernity, so these challenges, even though small and local, were important 
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experiences for the future generation. Frank Perdue echoed this sentiment by noting that parents 
wanted their children to further their education. “More and more parents are realizing the 
necessity for their children to be well educated in our competitive society,” he wrote.282 Of 
course, the “winners” of these contests, those who produced the best yields or the largest steer, 
would in turn be “rewarded” by the companies. Rath Packing purchased the best pens of 
livestock from 4-H members at local contests.283 Pioneer rewarded youth contest winners with 
trophies, plaques, and free bushels of their seed corn.284 This exchange symbolized what the 
companies sought in the rural community as a whole: a contest that would drive greater 
consumerism of input products, create better output commodities, and which would in turn 
reward those who successfully adapted to the new system, one which placed agribusiness at the 
center of the industry. 
 Why did agribusiness promote this conception so intensely? The question has several 
answers. First, corporations wanted to make themselves and their products completely necessary 
to the operation of agriculture. In order to achieve this, they needed to retain elements of 
expertise and authority. Companies needed to ensure that rural people saw these large businesses 
as part of the agricultural community. Agribusiness desired farmers to depend on companies 
(specifically their company), not their neighbors, kin, or other local forces. Even other sources of 
traditional agricultural authority, like the land-grants, USDA, or experiment stations, could 
sometimes be seen as threats to this position.285 In seeing other farmers as possible competitors 
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instead of indispensable parts of their own work, agribusiness hoped farmers would transfer their 
needs onto the companies. This would reframe very basic understandings of the rural 
community. Instead of limiting communal relationships to local physical spaces and people, this 
idea of community would grow to encompass abstract institutions that had no real corporeal 
presence in the farmers’ immediate area beyond a dealer or store. While a farmer could talk to a 
seed dealer or visit a Harvester store, he or she could never completely touch or see the full 
extent of the corporation. At its core, agribusinesses hoped competition would vastly widen 
agricultural communities, expanding what and who was involved. The world, they hoped, had 
just gotten a lot bigger. 
 Second, by persuading farmers to accept these new standards of competition, these 
corporations were looking to sidestep any criticism of their own involvement in current 
agricultural problems, namely surpluses and the trend of depopulation in the countryside. It was 
clear that rural communities were facing difficult times after the Second World War, with 
millions unable to keep up with the new costs of operation. Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft 
Benson once complained that the technological explosion almost guaranteed low commodity 
prices.286 It was a criticism that could easily be traced back to the companies directly benefiting 
from this overproduction. Resentment of rising implement prices eventually caused Congress to 
call a representative from John Deere to appear before the House Agriculture committee in 1961. 
While expressing concern about the rising price of farm equipment, A.B. Connell (director of 
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sales at John Deere) maintained that the causes were beyond the company’s control.287 This was 
an unpleasant event that other involved businesses within the industry wished to avoid entirely.  
Luckily, changing understandings of competition offered agribusinesses a convenient 
scapegoat. They increasingly portrayed struggling farmers as inefficient or poor managers, 
incapable of adopting new scientific techniques. They were, the businesses asserted, undeserving 
of the mantle of “farmer,” and their exit was ultimately good for the community as a whole. 
They were casting depopulation as a positive force. As such, corporations and their allies never 
had to analyze their own impact on agricultural problems. Corporate offices did not assess the 
possible unintended consequences of their own products and their effect on rural spaces. It was a 
tactic that would allow the companies to avoid blame as more and more rural Americans left 
agriculture altogether. 
 This dovetailed nicely with the dual understandings of competition’s new role in the rural 
community. Not only would it make the agricultural process stronger and more successful, it 
would also remove any incompetent producers who wasted resources. Seth Shaw, an employee 
of the supermarket chain Safeway, argued that the food and fiber industry (including farmers) 
must remove all “obstacles to competition---blockages to the most efficient, orderly flow of 
product through the production and marketing system." While this had resulted in some farmers 
leaving agriculture, on whole it had made the industry more profitable and effective.288 Pioneer’s 
Roswell Garst observed that inefficient farmers who failed to adequately utilize new scientific 
advantages would (and ultimately should) quit, leaving agriculture to others more suited to the 
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modern operation.289 Frank Perdue admitted that some farmers would have to leave the poultry 
industry. However, he claimed that once the poultry industry was held by a smaller, more 
sensible group of individuals, dangerous price swings would become a thing of the past.290 One 
year later, Perdue told his farm audience to “cut their costs” if they wanted to stay in business.291 
Even the federal government sometimes needed to be reminded that it should not waste time and 
energy on the country’s failing farmers. The editors of Successful Farming, in a special business 
dispatch sent to various companies, surmised that President Johnson would eventually decrease 
his support for farm price support programs. This would ultimately help commercial farmers 
earn more profit by winnowing out rural deadweight. The editors celebrated, “Perhaps most 
important of all, Washington may at long last be about to concede that it is unable to effectively 
raise the incomes of inefficient farmers by holding a rein on efficient farmers.”292 Competition 
was the gasoline on the fire of progress. Farmers as competitive entrepreneurs would create a 
well-organized and profitable system for the benefit of all involved. 
 While it is difficult to know how exactly farmers reacted to this promotion of 
competition, there are a few clues that hint at a mixture of both acceptance and reluctance. 
Certainly some members of the rural community wholly embraced this notion, including other 
businesses, newspapers, and especially large farmers. A.E. Haller, owner of an agricultural 
construction business in Wisconsin, declared: 
I recalled then, the many complaints I have heard over the years from farmers, such as 
'the fertilizer didn't give me the increase I expected,' 'the new seed corn brand didn't yield 
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like I was told,' 'my new weed spray hasn't increased my yield' and many similar 
EXCUSES. I am convinced now that many of these complaints are, instead, excuses for 
the farmer's own bad management and faulty machinery operation.293 
On a more basic level, the numbers alone proved that whatever agribusiness was selling, farmers 
were definitely buying.  
 Yet even when agribusinesses managed to gain a measure of success in promoting new 
standards of competition, they often had difficulty controlling what they unleashed on rural 
people.294 For instance, as International Harvester promoted and sold large numbers of its 
mechanized cotton pickers in the 1940s, the company still feared heavy competition from hand 
pickers.295 A loss of profits also came from a communal sharing of machines by neighboring 
farmsteads. Company documents showed that whereas large producers readily adapted to 
mechanization, smaller farmers often lacked the necessary funds to do so in the 1940s and 50s. 
Therefore, many southern farmers would either pool their resources to share a communal picker 
or pay for another local farmer to process their fields, thereby bypassing further company 
profits.296 More than nine years later, Harvester still struggled against localized economic forces. 
M.J. Steitz, a company researcher for the marketing department, conceded that previous reports 
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had failed to adequately account for continued competition from hand pickers. He noted that that, 
“reluctance of plantation owners to dispense with hand pickers” directly cut into Harvester’s 
market.297 Later, Steitz inferred, “mechanical pickers have never displaced hand-labor to any 
appreciable extent, but rather have moved into territories where labor vacuums were responsible 
for high wage rates.”298 He ended the report by optimistically maintaining that this continued 
resistance would fall away in time but still had an adverse impact on sales currently.299 
Of course, some farmers also turned this understanding of competition back on the 
companies themselves, using their role as consumer to leverage better prices or products. One 
proactive farmer decided to plant several different brands of hybrids in the same field, creating a 
simple but highly effective technique to analyze the right product for him.300 Increased farmer 
demand for custom blended fertilizer eventually forced Monsanto to change its distribution 
services altogether. In order to stay competitive in an increasing crowded market, the chemical 
company opened up their own franchised service centers. These centers marketed their ability to 
tailor chemical blends to meet the farmer’s individual needs (which would of course be analyzed 
by Monsanto specialists).301 And like other consumers unhappy with the quality of their product, 
many farmers had no qualms about invoking the competition's name to hammer home their 
displeasure. In letters to the seed house, several farmers mentioned how they would be buying 
from the Pioneer’s competition in the following years, naming Funk’s or DeKalb. In one 
particularly passive-aggressive note, a farmer casually mentioned that his neighbor was a 
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salesman for DeKalb, with the implication that he could easily be swayed to their rival.302 
Competition and consumerism, such important elements of the modern farmer, had wrought 
unintended consequences. Just as these companies sought to manipulate their customers, farmers 
in turn could also play these businesses off each other. Like their use of technology, farmers 
adapted competition to fit their own needs and expectations. 
Infiltration of the Rural Community 
On a fundamental level, agribusinesses promoted competition because they wanted to 
change the way rural people viewed and embraced “community.” By excluding struggling 
farmers from local exchange networks and viewing them as inefficient rivals, agribusinesses 
hoped that their customers would embrace a new modern system of agriculture. Depopulation 
trends only helped enlarge this perception, as farmers saw more and more of their kind leave 
agriculture. Instead of understanding community as a proximity, a physical space made up of 
flesh and blood individuals, agricultural companies wanted farmers to expand their construction 
to include non-corporeal entities like agribusiness. To achieve this, businesses sought to integrate 
themselves within these established bonds of community. Focusing on farm institutions, farm 
journals, and civic organizations, agribusinesses expanded their presence in rural spaces.  
 In order to endear themselves to locals, many agribusinesses pursued a deliberate strategy 
that concentrated on supporting important rural institutions, including churches, schools, and 
children’s organizations. This including exploiting the system of information networks already 
set up by earlier reformers. By providing financial and material support, the companies hoped 
that farmers would eventually recognize their brands as an essential part of rurality. This took on 
many forms. Sometimes it was as simple as giving monetary contributions to help remodel the 
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local church (as in Pioneer’s 1954 donation to the Hagertown’s West Street Christian Church in 
Indiana) or fund a charitable organization (a 1955 donation to Boy’s Town in Nebraska for 
example).303 Other times the businesses developed their own educational materials to be sent to 
rural schools free of charge.304 Some companies gave away small gifts, all decorated with their 
logos, as prizes or parting souvenirs. Something as simple as Pioneer napkins became a tool of 
marketing. In a letter to their regional managers, Pioneer instructed the company men to hand out 
these stylized serviettes to as many groups as possible. "O.K., let's place them in the right hands, 
so that we can expose the name Pioneer to a number of folks. You'll be able to quickly think of 
several organizations that sponsor banquets and ‘cook-outs.’" Church groups--schools--fraternal 
organizations--4-H clubs--agricultural sororities--and service clubs represent only a few of the 
outlets where you will want to place a supply."305 
 Targeting local community organizations and key individuals was another strategy. In 
one internal company memo, a Monsanto PR employee suggested that managers and their 
assistants should become “acquainted” with people understood to be key citizens or “molders of 
public opinion.” These people did not necessarily have to be wealthy but, “someone who is in a 
position to circulate lots of information.”306 John Eshelman, a feed producer, noted that it was 
desirable for corporations to have employees involved in local civic clubs.307 Frank Perdue made 
a point of meeting and speaking to farming and poultry groups throughout the Delmarva 
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region.308 Pioneer’s district manager, O.D. Powell, went even further, becoming chairman of the 
Ohio Kiwanis’ agricultural and conservation branch. From this position, Powell was able to shift 
the branch’s focus away from conservation efforts and towards agricultural “progress.” In a letter 
to the organization’s governor, Powell complained that, “Too many local Agriculture and 
Conservation committees consider they make a real contribution when they put a few fish in a 
pond and plant a number of trees.”309 Instead, Powell wanted to focus on the problem of falling 
farm income, an issue that would have a direct effect on his company’s bottom-line. By the mid-
1950s, the Kiwanis began advocating for farmers to employ better management and make use of 
new research, both private and public.310 Powell also directed local committees to seek out 
prominent agricultural experts, including hybrid seed salesmen, to help promote such efforts. He 
concluded that the Kiwanis needed to endorse “wider use of farm products” and get farmers to 
use more advanced methods.311 All of these interactions with civic groups had the potential for a 
big payout for agricultural businesses, as they offered marketing opportunities without the stigma 
of corporate advertising.  
Another example of agribusinesses trying to integrate themselves into the rural 
community was the relationship between these companies and another agricultural power player, 
the farm journals. As pointed out by many scholars, but especially Jon Fry in his article "Good 
Farming-Clear Thinking-Right Living," the agricultural press has long been an important yet 
incomplete part of the rural life. While certainly bought and read by rural people, the press itself 
was created in urban centers by non-farmers, often who only had limited connections to applied 
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agriculture.312 Throughout the twentieth century, the farm press became a critical venue for 
spreading the industrial ethos widely supported by agricultural experts at the land-grant 
universities and the USDA. With changes to biotechnology and mechanization, the farm journals 
became forums for new products offered by emerging companies. Ironically, as large agricultural 
companies mostly experienced economic growth during the 1940s and 50s, farm journals 
themselves had been in a long period of decline in general circulation. Just as farmers struggled 
with unfavorable commodity prices and rising operating costs, so too did their trade journals 
strive to fit a new type and size of audience. Depopulation caused a decline in circulation 
numbers. Specialization in farm operations required that once broad-range journals to 
increasingly focus their information.313 Due to these changes, these journals became more and 
more dependent on the advertising revenue bought by businesses. Because of their precarious 
position, the power dynamics between the agricultural press and its advertisers became 
increasingly lopsided. 
 Consequently, the press in many ways became another mouthpiece for agribusiness’s 
reframing of company importance in rural spaces and ultimately redefining community life. 
Journals promoted these companies as not just benign outsiders, but full members of larger but 
still tight-knit agricultural society. The companies were well aware of how they could use farm 
journals to promote this perception. An International Harvester 1970 public relations review 
argued that the company needed more complete coverage in farm journals. The PR team urged 
its dealers to prepare more area stories for trade journals and promised compensation and little 
corporate supervision. The department itself noted that they planned on revamping their mailing 
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list and quarterly review. Mindful of the press’s unprecedented reach into distant rural places, the 
review ended:  
We need as wide an exposure to as many publics as we can reach and I want us to 
develop good news stories about this Company. We need it right now. We need to get 
strong upstairs to get all the things we need so badly. I like to build contacts with every 
vehicle we can use and to buy drinks for newspaper people, and everyone should work on 
his contacts with the fullest of his capacities.314 
International was certainly not the only company to employ journals as Trojan horses to peddle 
their ideological promotions. Monsanto’s Public Relations department acknowledged that 
various trade and farm journals gave the company needed publicity for their promotion of 
inorganic fertilizer.315 Pioneer routinely asked its dealers to advertise on a more local level while 
the company bought up space in national and state farm journals.  
 But it was not just the journals that gave agribusinesses a forum to expose farmers to 
company rhetoric, but also different farm related events. Fairs, festivals, exhibitions, and other 
events were all a chance to both expose rural people to new perceptions of modern farming and 
to highlight company support of the community. For example, the Delmarva Chicken Festival, 
an annual event started after the Chicken of Tomorrow Contest in 1948, was an opportunity for 
Perdue and other poultry companies to promote their version of chicken farming as “progress.” 
The festival organizers wrote, “More than just a promotional scheme, the Festival is an 
opportunity for poultry dealers and others who are interested in this great industry to get together 
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and talk over some of the many things that will improve the industry.”316 In fact, the festival 
organizers argued that its promotional work (often aided by corporate sponsors) benefited the 
whole region.317 Companies outside of the chicken industry also used farm events to engage with 
local communities. Implement companies were quick to debut to new products at these events. 
Pioneer sent employees to state fairs and plowing contests across the South, Midwest, and 
Northeast.318 These events were contact points between corporations and farmers, spaces where 
agribusinesses could provide face to face communication about their vision of the future. 
 Ultimately, all of these interactions offered chances to infiltrate rural communities on 
multiple levels. By increasing their presence in the classroom, the town hall, the church picnic, 
and other local spaces, agribusinesses staged their own takeover of rural ideas and perceptions. 
This attempted integration blurred the lines between internal and external forces, challenging 
traditional notions of who belonged and who did not. Essentially, this also confused the 
conception of what farming was and who was involved. Were corporate entities farmers? In the 
end, they provided what seemed to be essential components of modern agriculture: products, 
expertise, and communal relationships. The final goal of the reassessment of competition within 
the community was to once again to reframe agribusiness as an essential part of agriculture. For 
all intents and purposes, agribusinesses wanted their institutions to become inseparable from 
farming itself.  
Farmers as Businessmen 
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One final identifiable feature agribusinesses pushed for was for farmers to see themselves 
as businessmen. This desire for entrepreneurship in rural spaces was hardly a new aspiration by 
large bureaucratic entities. Agricultural societies formed during the nineteenth century certainly 
encouraged the adoption of a business mindset, though it was as much to unite farmers against 
the growing power of railroad corporations as it was to promote more productive cultural 
practices.319 With the advent of scientific management and the emphasis on efficiency, reformers 
of the early twentieth century heavily endorsed its application in agriculture. Like other 
Progressive Era reforms, the Country Life Movement focused on bringing organization and 
improvement to a countryside they believed to be out of touch with a rapidly modernizing world. 
Unfortunately for these reformers, they often found their attempts ignored or openly resisted by 
the very farmers they wished to help.320 Other agricultural professionals too found their 
campaign for farm-business management did not necessarily change agricultural methods, 
though this did not stop groups like the Farm Bureau, Extension, or land-grant universities from 
continuing to push professionalization. Youth-centered organizations, allowed the state, 
commercial agriculturalists, and their allies a chance to plug modernization of rural life.321  
One question to be asked is why these companies would care about how their customers 
thought about themselves as long as they continued to buy their products? Obviously the state 
had policy and diplomatic reasons (national and international food security, basic economic 
stability, etc.) to want farmers to act and think a certain way. Agricultural professionals too 
needed validation for their research or they faced the possibility of being left behind in the 
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professionalization rush of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.322 Still, agricultural 
companies also had much to gain from the adoption of a business mindset. These agribusinesses 
saw traditional farming as fundamentally flawed and farmers as irrational actors. Agriculture, 
when viewed as a lifestyle, failed because it resisted modern applications of industrialism, 
efficiency, and consumerism. Agricultural economists remarked that traditional agriculture had 
failed because of its inability to coordinate with the market.323 Pioneer promised in one alfalfa 
booklet not to dwell on “how poorly the average farmer is doing.”324 Monsanto celebrated the 
wheat farmers of Sonora, Mexico for abandoning “traditional methods” and embracing modern 
business techniques and technology.325 This notion that agriculture was a “sick industry” that 
needed modernizing through business ideology challenged how farmers viewed themselves and 
their work.326 If farmers continued to identify with past stewardship, tradition, and making do, 
they would increasingly fall behind a rapidly advancing society. 
Agribusinesses believed that reorienting customers towards a business ethos provided 
farmers with a chance to improve their industry. “Business” required risk and innovation. It 
accepted that some would fail and that this failure was fundamentally good and natural. As an 
ethos, it solidified connections between national companies and farmers while fully bringing 
agriculture under the mantle of a global economic network. Basically, it helped unchain farmers 
from bonds of past tradition and freed them to pursue rational answers to the problems of the 
agricultural system. If farmers accepted their role as businessmen, they essentially bought into 
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the very process of modern, industrial, and capitalistic agriculture. It was a system that centered 
on agribusiness. It depended on the industry’s products to increase agricultural production. The 
structure required constant professional scientific and technological developments to address 
issues of erosion, pollution, pest resistance, and other problems of farming. In this system, 
farmers depended on input and output industries to buttress their own production. The postwar 
period was a perfect era for agribusinesses and their allies to push for the reconstruction of 
farmers as businessmen. It was a time of stress and success, when many failed but some 
succeeded. Farms grew larger as farming families grew smaller. Production increased but so did 
operation costs. At a crossroad, agriculture faced questions about its qualities and beliefs, about 
what it meant to be a farmer. This business ethos, along with consumerism and competition, was 
just another pillar to uphold agribusinesses’ vision of modern agriculture. 
In order to focus on the importance of business acumen in farming, agricultural 
corporations often highlighted the difference between farming as a lifestyle and farming as a 
capitalist enterprise. They did so by comparing the past to the present. When they discussed their 
own history, these companies often played on romanticized images of the past. One Rath 
advertisement, showing a small town butcher and family, highlighting the past with the headline, 
“Old Fashioned Values: It's an American Tradition.”327 John Deere reminisced that the 
agricultural frontier allowed every man the chance to work on his own.328 Monsanto recalled that 
farmers in the past would listen to the wisdom of their elders during planting time. The chemical 
giant maintained there was a "leisurely, friendly" way to run a farm in those simple days.329 
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Allis-Chalmers in particular utilized a Norman Rockwell-eque campaign to promote its tractors 
and other equipment. Quaint villages, small-town Americana, virtue, independence, and 
traditional values were all prominent themes that agribusinesses presented. They did this for a 
number of reasons.  
First, this romanticized version of agriculture made for excellent marketing material. 
Scholar Roland Marchand has shown that advertisements, though they do not reflect reality, do 
echo attitudes, values, and broader assumptions of society. Advertisements, Marchand noted, are 
"zerrspiegel, a distorting mirror that would enhance certain images."330 Advertisers deliberately 
chose to develop certain images because they believed it would move products, not because they 
were truthful or showcased real life. Images and symbols that reinforced patterns of 
consumerism and capitalism were therefore highly prized, as they would hopefully lead to more 
acceptance and fewer questions about the nature of the system.331 For companies looking to 
encourage agricultural consumption, the mythical and virtuous yeoman of the past was an ideal 
symbol to employ because of the social capital it already had with rural and urban Americans 
alike. For their part, rural people had long leveraged their own virtue to demand political and 
economic changes in their favor. From the Populists to the Farm Bureau, rural organizations 
played up their role as democratic institutions to achieve their goals.  
The more important reason why agribusinesses presented an idealized version of the past 
was to juxtapose it with current reality. The past was idyllic, companies argued, but the present 
required a different kind of farmer, one that saw agriculture with the keen eye of a businessman. 
New economic and environmental problems made the farming of the past an unrealistic notion in 
                                                          
330 Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920-1940 (Berkley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1985), xvii.  
331 Ibid, i-xxi.  
136 
 
 
the present. Instead of seeing farming as a lifestyle, farmers needed to approach it as a business 
operation, utilizing all the management skills and new technologies that would increase their 
overall production. Monsanto argued that since the end of the Second World War, farming had 
become increasingly technical, requiring farmers to acquire new abilities and management 
techniques. Farmers were, the chemical company maintained, no different than their “big city” 
business counterparts.332 In a 1965 article one featured farmer remarked, “The whole apparatus 
of modern American business methods must become a part of farming. The farmers of the future 
must no longer be willing to pay for a way of life, as they did in the past, when they settled for 
subsistence farming just so their families could live in the country.”333 Implement supplier John 
Deere reaffirmed this notion, remarking that, “Today, users of Deere equipment are 
businessmen…including the farmer. He is a businessman in every sense of the word, who 
struggles with the same problems of management, purchasing, production, and marketing as any 
other businessman.”334 The editors at Prairie Farmer even observed that competition and 
depopulation served as an example of why farmers needed to change their mindset towards 
business management. 
The squeeze has done farming a lot of good. It has been hard to take and sometimes hard 
to understand, because we persist in looking at farming as a way of life. All kinds of 
things have been tried to avoid the realities of today's farm productivity. In spite of a long 
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succession of protective and adjustive government programs, change has been taking 
place, steady, inexorably, until farming has been converted into a business.335  
Farming as a lifestyle might have worked in the glorious past, but those days were gone. In their 
place, agribusinesses urged a new way of understanding, that of the businessman.  
Sometimes promotion of business acumen was shown via the professional relationship 
between farmers and companies, as in the case of contracted seed dealers and poultry growers. 
Pioneer was especially keen on crafting a more professional dealership base. Standardization, 
both in company work and conceptions of agriculture, was the key to making this marketing 
tactic work. Pioneer needed its dealers to see themselves not just as farmers, but as businessmen. 
In a letter to its regional managers, the company commented that they needed to upgrade their 
sales force. Increasing their sales numbers would only be possible if dealers adopted, “a 
professional or business-like approach to the sales.”336  Pioneer, like Extension and the Farm 
Bureau before them, worried that most farmers failed to appreciate the importance of business in 
modern farming operations. In fact, Pioneer often partnered with other businesses to reinforce 
this belief. In 1958, Pioneer joined with the Greater Des Moines Chamber of Commerce to invite 
many of their dealers and customers to the annual “farm-business day.” Pioneer publicized that 
the “Purpose of the day is to acquaint our neighboring farm people with facts about the operation 
of business and industry. It is hoped that the day will promote better understanding by farm 
business men and their wives of how our businesses are operated, what our economic and social 
problems are, and why we need to work together.”337 The subtext assumed that farmers needed 
professional knowledge of how to run their farms with a business-like efficiency and more 
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production, a business model that directly benefited Pioneer. But it also posited that 
agribusinesses were the holders of that knowledge and it was only through cooperation that 
farmers would be successful. 
Pioneer’s attempts to professionalize dealers were not simply to avoid problems on the 
farm, but to demonstrate a philosophy that could easily be translated to other rural community 
members. The company openly encouraged its dealers not just to sell their products, but also to 
keep other farmers abreast of new information and techniques. In a celebratory letter sent out to 
salesmen, the seed house praised the dealers for their work in spreading professional knowledge 
to their customers and neighbors: “We know of course, that you salesmen made a real 
contribution to this growth--by encouraging the farmer to buy the varieties best adapted to his 
soils and his use, and by encouraging him to use the best cultural practices.”338 This was also 
evident in the company’s monthly journal, Pioneer Kernels. An odd brew of company 
propaganda, agricultural advice, and salesmen’s gossip, Kernels was a one-stop shop for Pioneer 
news. It played a critical role in persuading dealers to become both salesmen of seed and 
marketers of the agribusiness promotion. One article in the fall of 1955 insisted that farmers and 
salesmen were not all that different from one another. Just like farmers, local salesmen cultivated 
a “territory,” minding their fences and acting quickly to kill any “weeds” that threatened their 
“crop.” And as those who worked the field, salesmen also understood the importance of crop 
rotation when their plants or plans refused to stand.339 By blurring the lines between farming and 
business identity, Pioneer hoped their dealers would provide free and persuasive advertising to 
their kin, neighbors, and other locals. 
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But while some relationships pushed farmers towards professionalization, agribusinesses 
across America pressed others to adopt a more business-minded orientation by celebrating 
efficiency, large-scale industrialism, and scientific management. This emphasis had a long 
history in agricultural reform. Coined the “industrial ideal” by historian Deborah Fitzgerald, 
agricultural academics, government employees, Farm Bureau brass, and businessmen in the early 
twentieth century celebrated this ideology and believed it to be the future of American 
agriculture.340 Despite numerous setbacks, including the failure of model farms and unfavorable 
economic conditions, this ideal persisted and found fertile ground among agribusiness 
employees. These corporations believed that modern farming was a business, one that had a long 
and treasured history, but ultimately it was just that, a business that provided goods and services 
to those who paid them. To ensure that more farmers embraced business as a necessary 
component of modern farming, these entities touted “improved cultural practices” as a catch-all 
for greater efficiency, use of new technology, and overall implementation of a managerial style 
in agriculture. 
Understandably, advancements in scientific technology were an important part of this 
business-minded attitude. Just as a factory owner looked to new technology to upgrade their 
operation, so too should farmers look to improve their production methods through new 
products. When describing the “new modern farmer,” Monsanto affirmed, “He uses all the 
modern apparatus available to him: computer for accounts and farming planning, spectrographic 
leaf analysis, chemical weed control programs, hybrid seeds.”341 International Harvester 
illustrated a similar understanding of modern agriculture when describing farmers who use 
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automated cotton pickers, “By using mechanized equipment and planting to a stand on his best 
cotton acreage, the modern cotton producer plans his yield, computes his forthcoming costs, and 
budgets his resources for the finest stand of cotton he can possibly produce.” In adopting new 
scientific advancements like implements, herbicides, hybrids, and others, “the growing process 
has become a modern production line and the land has become a machine-equipped factory.”342 
In the end, the line between technological adoption and business mentality was one that 
agribusinesses very much wanted to draw. It obviously required products they produced. 
Secondly, it further integrated agribusinesses into rural spaces through their role as experts and 
holders of important knowledge.343  
Outside of technology, companies also focused on the need for better farm management. 
They stressed efficiency, specialization, and standardization as the keys to transitioning the 
agricultural process from a lifestyle to a business. Farmers, these companies believed, needed 
help learning how to properly handle a modern operation that required skills in managing 
overhead, dealing with technical issues, and balancing labor and time costs. For all the skill they 
possessed, these companies and their allies believed that many farmers would struggle. Paul 
Philips, Chairman of the Delmarva Growers Committee, put it bluntly when he suggested in 
1965, “Most of the farmers and small business operators are in need of more management 
education.”344 The simple habit of keeping a daily record and balance sheet was a major push for 
companies and other organizations desiring better managerial oversight. International Harvester 
even offered its customers a farm record booklet, urging farmers to track their long term profit 
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and to strictly separate household expenses from the farming operation.345 By following their 
helpful tips, the implement dealer stated, farmers could easily sharpen their farm’s management.  
Not only did these businesses believe that farmers needed to become businessmen, but 
also that it was the duty of agribusiness to lead and educate their customers in this 
transformation. Monsanto claimed that their chemists and crop specialists were fundamental in 
helping farmers implement business-like methods and techniques. For example, when it came to 
a specific crop (sugar beets), the company led the charge to educate their customers, noting that, 
“Growers are being shown new and better cultural practices--are urged to follow.”346 To 
effectively reach a wider audience, the company hired Earl Spurrier, a former county agent, farm 
manager, and agricultural professor, in a purely advisory role. Through a series of meetings and 
seminars, Spurrier would “help communicate the crop production information evolving from 
Monsanto's agricultural research and development efforts.”347 Pioneer and International 
Harvester also used employees to advocate for a more business-minded approach to farming. 
Both sent dealers booklets detailing how to boost sales but also describing new, more effective 
management skills for their own farm.348 The seed house also produced a number of different 
scientific management publications. Targeting “more than your average farmer,” these articles 
issued new information about insect control, fertilization efforts, and corn planter capabilities. 
One typical example asked farmers to “calenderize their harvest.”349 Though this may seem like 
a simple catchy slogan meant to attract customers, Pioneer’s words had a deeper meaning. By 
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inviting farmers to calenderize, (in other words, schedule their planting based on timetables, 
financial projections, and market analysis) rather than custom or situation, agribusinesses 
projected to farmers one of the main elements of industrial capitalism, control of the means of 
production. Like a factory owner, control over time and space would allow for greater efficiency 
and therefore greater profits for farmers willing to take up the mantel of businessman. 
Everything, when pursued by professional farmers, could become governable to some extent. 
Chemicals, machines, and biotechnology could and would bend nature to the will of man. Or as 
one Pioneer employee said, all “items are controllable by you except for the weather.”350 
Thinking like an entrepreneur would unlock new solutions to old agricultural problems, allowing 
the well-informed farmer to conquer even the most challenging of environments. 
Of course, it was not simply though their publications that agribusinesses advocated 
business management on the farm. These companies also took a hands-on approach through 
educational outreach in rural communities. Often this meant sponsoring lectures and seminars by 
university trained specialists. Monsanto funded several traveling exhibits, including an 
“Agricultural Field Profit Analysis Display.”351 International Harvester produced many small 
films featuring both their products at work and how to skillfully utilize efficient business 
methods. Companies like Rath, Pioneer, and Perdue, sponsored youth contests and other events 
to teach farm kids the value of a business mindset in agriculture. Perdue touted that its Breeders 
Program helped teenagers get a jump start in a competitive industry.352 Pioneer requested that 
vocational agriculture students involved in their contests plant two other corn varieties to 
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showcase the competitive advantage of Pioneer seed.353 Rath bought yearly 4-H contest winning 
cattle, an incentive for members to follow extension led educational efforts.354 In one of the most 
bizarre attempts to teach management skills, International Harvester even created its own board 
game uninspiringly called, “Farm Management.” Sold in their parts catalog, the company touted 
that the game would be fun and teach valuable skills, “Here's a brand new game for old and 
young. It's educational, practical, and entertaining. Up to six people can play, competing against 
each other to see who is the best farm manager… who can make the most profit.”355 Though 
soon pulled from distribution, no doubt because of lack of sales, the game still had its fans 
among agricultural experts. Frank Lanham, a professor of Agricultural Engineering at the 
University of Illinois, praised the game for its possible application in the classroom and 
recommended that it, “should serve as a device for promoting interest in farm management in 
high school and possibly in beginning college courses.”356 Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately 
for board game enthusiasts everywhere), the International Harvester game soon disappeared from 
the company’s business management strategy. 
Another important aspect of agribusinesses’ educational outreach was the use of 
demonstration farms. These physical spaces represented abundant opportunities to expose 
farmers, even non-customers, to multiple characteristics of modern farming. Demonstration 
farms allowed input and output industries a chance to spotlight their products in the best light, 
displaying their advantages on a local level. Rath’s swine demonstration was critical to showing 
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farmers important developments in hog technology.357 Pioneer and other seed houses often 
encouraged salesmen to use their own fields as demonstration plots. These corporations also 
asked dealers to bring potential clients to “field days” at demonstration plots directly sponsored 
by the company.358 For instance, the ever ambitious AJ Custer expanded his relationship with 
Pioneer by opening his fields (complete with company supplied fertilizer and seed) as 
demonstration plots.359 International Harvester hosted its own company farm in Ottawa, Illinois, 
believing it served as a strong stage for communicating new product information.360 The 
implement dealer even created a life size replica of a fully mechanized “modern” farm for the 
Chicago Museum of Science and Industry.361 Monsanto, though late to the party, quickly created 
their own string of demonstration farms in the 1960s. Realizing the potential revenue to be 
gained by agricultural chemicals, Monsanto’s marketing plan employed these farms as strong 
displays of chemical power. In 1965, the company’s annual report touted the demonstration 
farms. 
Marketing efforts were supported by innovative programs to merchandise Monsanto's 
agricultural know-how to growers. Farm tours, informational meetings and strategically 
placed demonstration fields helped illustrate the effectiveness and profitability of the 
company's techniques and products. Proven scientific methods--spectographic analysis of 
plant tissue, for example--were used to determine the precise nutritional needs of 
customers' crops.362 
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Just one year later, the company bragged that close to thirty thousand farmers had visited their 
series of twenty-two demonstration farms.363  
 In order to make these demonstration farms so effective, agribusiness often used the latest 
products from other industries. This was an important point of the corporate interaction. 
Theoretically speaking, companies across industry lines should have had very little 
communication. After all, there would be no real reason for Monsanto to engage with Perdue 
Chicken, or for John Deere to intermingle with DuPont or Hormel with more than a surface 
acknowledgement. In reality, however, these companies (even sometimes direct rivals) often 
connected to create loose alliances. Sometimes these were unconscious efforts for the sake of 
their own product. For example, Pioneer requested that their seed growers or demonstration 
farmers use chemicals on their fields.364 The corporation knew that hybrids actually needed 
fertilizer in order achieve the maximum yields advertised by the company.365 Therefore, Pioneer 
often advocated the heavy use of commercial nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus fertilizer 
within their own advertisements, pamphlets, and letters. Other times companies worked together 
directly toward a mutual goal. The Delmarva Poultry Industry connected with both retail stores 
and the chemical feed industry to sponsor and support the “Chicken of Tomorrow” contest and 
the Delmarva Chicken Festival.366 Obviously these companies had much to gain from working 
together rather than apart.  
Despite their different products, they all had the same goal: to create and sustain a new 
identity of modern agriculture. These companies also believed in a similar ideology; that they as 
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agribusinesses were essential to the process. In fact, the more deeply ingrained these 
corporations became to agriculture, the more they depended on one another. What was the point 
of a mechanical cotton picker if the crop could not be modified to fit the spindles? How would 
swine farmers be able to meet the demands of meat packers without confinement barns or 
antibiotics? As sales manager Wayne Skidmore noted, “We've been cooperating with many 
fertilizer, chemical, and machinery companies for several years in evaluating new products. They 
like to work with us because we can usually try out their new ideas on large acreages operated by 
good farmers…our seed growers.”367 Like Pioneer, other input industries had much to gain from 
encouraging dealers and their customers to adopt industrial farming practices. 
This corporate impulse towards professional agriculture fit nicely with other 
compartmentalized aspects of this new farming identity. Clearly farmers as businessmen would 
have to consume greater and greater numbers of agribusiness products and information. The 
move from “doing without” to “productive consumption” signaled the dramatic entrance of 
farmers into the ideology of the middle class, taking on many of the characteristics that 
symbolized a new socio-economic status. The celebration of competition and the subsequent 
dismissal of cooperation within rural communities also matched closely with this business 
philosophy. Competition, after all, was at the heart of capitalistic development. Those that failed 
to adopt these standards or to see agriculture for what it was, a business, would eventually be 
forced out. The connection between business, competition, and success also took on gendered 
consequences. Men of the middle class retained and performed their gendered identity by 
succeeding in business and hence allowing their families to consume material goods. Success in 
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competition showcased their masculinity. Maintenance and control of the land and everything 
upon it (including family members) was the symbol of masculinity, a responsibility and right. 
Consequently, men who “failed” to adjust were not truly men. They had failed to perform the 
necessary characteristics that denoted their gendered difference. 
These two themes, competition and business, intertwined to place agribusiness at the 
center of farming itself. Companies existed as providers of wealth, as community members, and 
as experts. In fact, modern farming would be impossible without these companies. This point 
was the key pillar upon which agribusinesses rested their considerable weight. As Deborah 
Fitzgerald noted, when a farmer brought a tractor in the early twentieth century, “he tacitly 
adopted a whole host of other practices and entered into a new set of relationships.”368 So too did 
farmers who embraced these features of identity ultimately accept the growing presence of these 
agribusinesses in rural life. Yet, more to the point, these traits and their consequences for 
agrarian society were to make what was once diverse, standardized, what was once local, 
globalized, what was once fluid, regimented. Farming, as conceived by these influential entities, 
reduced itself to a single simplified version of what it had been, a reflection that mirrored some 
traits and eliminated others. 
At the heart of the matter was legibility. Like governmental states before them, 
agricultural companies confronted a confusing mess of diversity across agricultural landscapes, 
one that no guidebook could easily translate. Therefore, codifying what exactly was a farmer 
took on all the more importance. It helped make sense of not just who their customer base was, 
but what their customers should be. Though designed to make rural environments and people 
knowable to outside institutions, it was more about how they planned to use this new 
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identification. It is here that we get to the core of this new identity and why these businesses 
poured such immense amount of time and energy into it. Manipulation can be made easier when 
watered down to an easily digestible bite. These traits need agribusiness, its products, its 
expertise, and its rhetoric to operate. The quest to essentialize an already functional system 
started here.  
What was the consequence of these actions? Agrarian life was and is still full of 
complexity. Practical farming depends immensely on uncontrollable factors and local situations 
that defy standard solutions. And yet, so often when it is portrayed, the image presented is very 
much like the zerrspiegel, a mirror that hides many realities to display a single distorted 
impression. It is not just that most Americans do not farm anymore, but that they have absolutely 
no understanding of the modern food system at all. This reflection is all there is to see. For rural 
communities centered on agriculture, the mirror also holds its own consequences. One outcome 
of this push was the consolidation of many different types and forms of agricultural identity to a 
single, simplified version favored by business interests and their allies. The mixture of the farmer 
as a broad scale consumer, competitor, and businessman limited the very type of person who 
could possible be conceived of as a farmer. Agribusinesses and their rhetoric ideologically 
separated non-white, non-male, small-scale, and a whole host of other Americans from 
agriculture.  
However, it was not just individual farmers who felt the weight of these campaigns, but 
the rural community as well. The conception of cooperation and independence was turned on its 
head. Farmers, though initially dependent on local networks to sustain themselves, found their 
operations becoming independent from their neighbors with the adoption of new technologies 
and new practices that made communal exchanges increasingly obsolete. Whereas local 
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economic bonds became more and more frayed, the tie between corporate agribusiness and 
farmers only grew stronger and more one-sided. Farmers, whose blend of adaptation and 
resistance to outside forces once made them so infuriating, discovered themselves more and 
more dependent on external entities for their farms’ sustenance. The sense of community grew 
larger as more farm families disappeared from the countryside. 
This strange duality, a complex reality underneath the simplified mirrored reflection, was 
the root of agribusinesses’ various marketing schemes in the postwar period. It characterized 
their peculiar relationship with the past and the present, allowing them to romanticize what was 
while selling what should be. It helped corporations infuse agriculture with traits they deemed 
worthy and discard others that stood in their way. Finally, agribusinesses used this contrast to 
illustrate their own control over science and technology. Despite their use of agrarian mythology, 
agribusinesses celebrated technological determinism and high modernism. We have already 
looked at how these entities attempted to simplify and recraft the identity of farmers. Now we 
will see how agribusiness used conceptions of science and technology to reinforce their belief in 
the triumph of scientific thought, to remake the agricultural process itself, to master the 
landscape and its people, and to codify its own expertise and core beliefs in the superiority of its 
methods. All of this was done to essentialize their system and their place in agriculture. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: IMAGINED HEARTLAND: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN AN 
AGRIBUSINESS MODEL 
 
In 1970, National Geographic sent a reporter to observe what they deemed the 
“revolution” down on the farm. Crisscrossing his way across the country, journalist Jules B. 
Billard witnessed a plethora of scientific innovations that altered the countryside in a shocking 
fashion. Billard marveled at changes to plant biology, admired the seemingly endless application 
of mechanical and chemical technology, and enthusiastically greeted the possibility of factory-
like precision and efficiency in the agricultural industry. He ended his article with speculation; 
this revolution was only just beginning, no doubt promising a world of plenty for those bold 
enough to take it. Underlining Billard’s interviews and research was an invisible but essential 
assumption; all of these changes were good. The article associated scientific advancement with 
organic human progress and assumed that this progress would solve innate problems often 
associated with agriculture. Billard displayed the issues of agriculture’s past (poverty, famine, 
and drudgery) as matters now conquered by a committed force of scientists, engineers, and 
progressive farmers. Farm wives, who once possessed, “ill-moded attire and drudgery –hardened 
hands,” now were as likely to own a mini-skirt and television as their city-sisters. Their husbands 
now enjoyed the fruits of a college education. They were aided by a dedicated network of 
scientific experts, whose mission was to increase profit and decrease the sweat equity needed to 
earn a decent income in farming. The possibilities seemed endless to Billard, who wondered 
about the consequences of this transformation, writing “My mind churned with the implications 
of such developments building on the progress of the past.”369  
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What Billard described very much echoed the beliefs of one of the main drivers of this 
transformation, agribusinesses. For companies involved in the agricultural industry, the 
advancement of science and technology was at the heart of their own personal revolution. 
Widespread adoption of new technology swelled company coffers and prompted massive 
growth. Moreover, this extensive application of their products validated agribusinesses’ own 
positive association between scientific development and problem solving. After all, it was their 
inquiry and experimentation that provided solutions to agricultural conundrums. For instance, the 
tomato plant (along with many others) could now be harvested in an efficient and clean manner, 
leading to greater profits for the farmer and lower prices for the consumer. Pests and weeds no 
longer stole profits from the hapless grower. Chemicals and hybrids multiplied yields. 
Environments that once stymied growers now burst with cultivated life. A world free of hunger 
and famine seemed like a real possibility. Of course, both Billard and agribusinesses took for 
granted the power of science and technology to solve all of these problems. They blindly 
followed this ideology and often ignored the costs of their venture.370 
The relationship between science and technology and agribusiness had two specific 
applications, as both a philosophy and a tool. On a fundamental level, faith in scientific 
development was part of agribusiness’ own internal ideological formation. Within their very 
construction, unquestioned faith in science and technology shaped these companies and their 
vision of themselves, their future, and the future of agriculture. The cross-pollination between 
academic scientists, reformers, and businessmen formed the foundation of these corporations. 
After the Second World War, this ideology continued to form the basis of the industry, with 
businesses dependent on the possibility of scientific solutions as the answer to questions in the 
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physical and ideological realm. Agribusinesses sought to create and fully control scientific 
development, placing themselves at the center of a system that needed continuous advancement 
to exist. But as they attempted to harness it, this singular focus on a specific application of 
science and technology also manipulated corporate actions and perceptions. It narrowed larger 
agricultural possibilities while opening new scientific avenues of inquiry. 
Along with its ideological influence, confidence in science and technology became a tool 
for these businesses to wield in their quest to essentialize themselves to the agricultural process.  
Agribusinesses employed this confidence for a dual purpose, as both the basis for physical 
solutions to agricultural problems and as an ideological ploy to convince others of corporate 
superiority. Companies believed that science and technology allowed for greater efficiency, 
which in turn would disentangle an industry from problematic tendencies of waste. It also helped 
support and justify their quest to conquer and control nature. Agribusinesses imagined an 
environment that could be wholly crafted by humans. The only way to do that was to fully 
engage their technological expertise in the environmental and social ordering of the landscape. 
The continued development of and faith in science and technology highlighted agribusinesses’ 
own expansion of private rather than public authority. While these businesses worked heavily 
with public institutions, they also sought to commodify the very knowledge that these entities 
(the USDA, Extension, land-grants, etc.) supposedly held for the public at large. Instead, 
agribusiness desired the constriction of this information to private sources, namely themselves. 
These companies could then merchandise this information, continuing to create their own layer 
of expertise and relegate public knowledge to the realm of private markets. 
In the end, the connection between agribusiness and science in the postwar period was a 
product of the legacy of high modernism. Defined by James Scott in his influential work Seeing 
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Like A State, high modernist ideology was a, “muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence 
about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of 
human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and above all, the rational design 
of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws.”371 Though 
agribusiness did not possess the sweeping power of a tyrannical government, it nevertheless held 
a similar vision of scientific purpose in society. Both believed, almost blindly, in the ability of 
scientific development to solve ingrained societal problems, including those of agriculture. 
Agribusinesses also retained a comparable number of high modernist supplicants within their 
corporate ranks, as engineers, technicians, and agricultural scientists held sway over company 
expansion.  
The growth of this ideology stemmed directly from the emergence of the agricultural 
sciences in the middle to late nineteenth century. As Charles Rosenberg showed in his seminal 
work No Other Gods: On Science and American Social Thought, science ascended to a place of 
authority during this time. As a conception, it was used to underwrite social conventions and 
explain an increasingly industrialized, modern world. Given the social capital of farming in the 
nation’s rhetoric (as well as the political power of the farm bloc), the agricultural sciences were 
the first to receive widespread backing from state bodies. While these sciences would create and 
sustain a critical part of the modern agricultural industry, their technocrats also shaped the basic 
interpretation of the role of science in society. One aspect of this was an unquestioned faith in the 
virtue of progress.372 Scholar Alan Marcus also discussed the expansion of agricultural science. 
Focusing on the period between 1870 and the passage of the Hatch Act in 1887, Marcus 
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examined the battle between systematic and scientific farming over the future of agriculture. 
After a period of intense rivalry, agricultural scientists eventually emerged victorious.373  
Faith in progress also permeated the widening web of expertise woven between 
reformers, scientists, bureaucrats, and emerging agricultural companies in the early twentieth 
century. Desires to improve efficiency and further standardize society were a hallmark of the 
Progressive movement, a wave of reforms that also sought to regularize and modernize rural life. 
Many key players, including those who would deeply influence developing agribusinesses, were 
part of these efforts.374 These reformers were also vital to solidifying the ascendance of the 
“industrial ideal.” This approach focused on industrializing agriculture, believing that 
modernization was the answer to solving agricultural problems. It thusly emphasized principles 
of “efficiency” and directed farmers to adopt new management styles, specialization, 
mechanization, and other facets of large-scale industrial production. This ideal naturally 
depended on scientific innovations and the belief that their application signaled progress.375 
 The period from mid nineteenth century to the early twentieth was a particularly active 
time for technocrats the world over. Even as reformers in America were attempting reshape the 
human order to fit a rational pattern, so too were government officials in Europe, Asia, and 
Africa struggling to do the same. With an intense focus on organization and legibility, 
bureaucrats (both externally and internally) employed a specific vision of scientific development 
that often justified their own authority and action. Timothy Mitchell’s discussion of the 
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relationship between European imperialism, conceptions of modernization, and the history of 
Egypt revealed the stark reality of the influence and hold “western ideas of progress” in the 
postcolonial era.376 Yet, this undertaking did not come without resistance from their test subjects. 
Obviously, people the world over were not merely vessels for bureaucratic efforts. Much to the 
frustration of these bureaucrats, they struggled against attempts to change their lifestyles. Two of 
James Scott’s books, Weapons of the Weak and The Art of Not Being Governed, focus on the 
interaction between the oppressor and the oppressed (often the imperialist and their subjects), 
speculating that resistance takes on a more subtle form than open rebellion. Instead, everyday 
resistance included non-compliance, especially when it came to issues of greater legibility.377 
While American farmers certainly held greater societal power than peasants beset by hostile 
foreign invaders, they displayed a similar form of resistance. Sometimes farmers flat out refused 
to adopt prescribed changes because of their ambiguous nature and unclear benefits.378 Other 
times, farmers disliked external attempts to “fix” something that they did not believe to be 
broken. Many were suspicious of urban reformers’ motivations, perceiving that their reforms 
were an excuse to bring agriculture under the larger mantel of an industrial economy. In the end, 
these doubts proved to be remarkably correct.379  
Faith and Belief 
It was out of this combination of professionalization, expertise, and emerging 
bureaucracy that agribusinesses’ own perception of the power of science and technology was 
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born. As they slowly expanded their operations, their relationship with science and technology 
also evolved. At its core, many of their assumptions came from their own historical experience. 
Prominent scientific developments seemed, at least on the surface, to solve issues plaguing 
farmers. Hybrid seeds, produced by a combination of scientists and businessmen, increased 
yields and allowed for greater uniformity. Mechanization, a benefit that seemed to lower labor 
costs, received the attention of both land-grant engineers and company technocrats. Commodities 
that were once expensive and time-consuming to produce became less complicated. 
Agribusinesses profited immensely from scientific advancements made by both public and 
private research. Most of the men and sometimes the women who staffed these companies spent 
their formative years learning from agricultural scientists in the land grant system. It was a 
relationship that would have a profound effect on agribusiness’s perception of their role of 
science in society. 
If early competition was the hammer that helped forge the organization of these 
agricultural companies, then this faith in science and technology was the very basis of their 
formation. It was the building material upon which all else rested. At the most basic level, these 
companies would not exist without the belief that science and technology can and should be 
implemented on a large, industrial scale. This was not Mendel cross pollinating flowers in his 
abbey. Agribusiness’ conception of the unquestioned abilities of science and technology was 
fundamentally tied to belief that scientific advancement equaled human progress, and that they 
should be the ones to wield this power. They understood that science should be used to order the 
world in a rational, efficient way. Wide scale application, not simply discovery, was the most 
important part of the process.  
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As an industry, agribusiness depended on constant research to support its growing power 
and continued infiltration of agriculture. Control was perhaps the crucial element. Science as an 
enterprise is not limited to men wearing white in a laboratory. Instead, it rests on the dual 
components of inquiry and experimentation. A child repeatedly trying to create the perfect paper 
airplane is involved as much in a scientific endeavor as a biologist cloning a sheep. This was not 
science for science’s sake or even their customers’ sake, but rather for the purpose of rendering 
these companies completely indispensable. Explorations of scientific ventures that did not further 
this goal were wholly rejected. Control was essential. It allowed companies to govern the 
avenues these scientific inquiries took and how they were applied on a practical level. It also 
reinforced their own authority as scientific innovators.  
Seed companies were some of the first to fully worship at the altar of science. Emerging 
after the rediscovery of Mendel’s work and the subsequent battle between lab science and 
practical application in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, companies that would 
eventually come to dominate seed corn grew up under the mantel of scientific improvement.380 
Their founders all possessed the belief that hybrids could and always would out produce single 
cross or open pollinated corn. This faith that their scientific research path would continue to 
churn out greater and greater yield potential was at the heart of company ideology after the 
Second World War. One advertisement reiterated Pioneer’s commitment to research potential by 
playing on this heritage: “Pioneer has invested nearly 50 years of time and hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in research…careful, skilled untiring research. Why? So that every grower 
of PIONEER BRAND SEED could be assured of having the finest, most productive, most 
profitable seed available. Human talent and money is dedicated to this end.”381 In fact, it was 
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their emphasis on research that also inspired the company’s new trademark in the mid-1960s. 
According to company president James Wallace, Pioneer’s infinity symbol represented, “never-
ending genetic research to bring better living to American farmers who grow corn, sorghum and 
alfalfa. It's a fresh, new look that denotes progress, growth and quality.” Wallace noted that 
confidence in scientific research was part of Pioneer’s legacy as the first hybrid seed corn 
company (a highly debatable claim indeed). The infinity symbol therefore served as an 
appropriate mark of the company’s philosophy, that endless research was the foundation of their 
products and goals.382  
The reason for such confidence in research ultimately rested on Pioneer’s belief in 
science’s ability to solve long term agricultural conundrums. Initially, the main challenge that 
hybrids “overcame” was the limit of production capabilities, especially when it came to different 
regions. The fertile Midwest often lend itself to seed corn, with its dense soil, abundant rainfall 
and waterways, and middling climate making it an ideal region for this plant type. Other areas of 
the country lacked such characteristics. Dry weather and thin topsoil of the Great Plains made 
corn difficult to grow. Rocky terrain, dense forests, and small acreage stymied farmers in the 
northeast and Appalachia. The South had its own problems. For one, corn had to struggle against 
the traditional commodities of cotton, tobacco, rice, sugar, and later poultry and hogs. Hot 
temperatures and a subtropical climate on the coastline made for swampy conditions. Yet, for 
Pioneer, all of these problems meant nothing in the face of applied science. Pioneer bragged that 
its hybrids overcame environmental limitations, allowing the farmer, no matter the region, the 
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control to decide what he wanted to plant.383 The company maintained that hybrids expanded the 
yield potential for all farms, which in turn would produce greater profits for the farmer. Roswell 
Garst commented that his company’s hybrids met the goal, “of the every corn raiser-more profit 
per bushel, more bushels per acre.”384 More bushels and more profit, even in the face of 
environmental impediments, showed the power that Pioneer’s hybrids possessed. A radio 
advertisement for their hybrid seed insisted that, “Pioneer corn was the farmer’s corn.” Its 
abundance allowed farmers to feed it to their livestock, leverage it against a government loan, or 
sell it on the market for big profit.385 Whatever the issue, hybrids were created to meet the 
challenge head on. 
However, regional issues were hardly the only problem Pioneer’s hybrids seemed to 
overcome. The seed house often bragged that its scientifically developed hybrids were hardier 
and more resilient against different environmental stresses than competitors. Varying water 
levels and soil types could all be met by specific strains of hybrids. Pests were another prominent 
issue that seed corporations believed could be surmounted by specialized hybrid seed. 
Infestations of the European corn borer in the mid-1950s prompted Pioneer to try to develop 
resistant hybrids with the help of Iowa State University.386 Nearly a decade later, chemical 
resistant rootworm ravished the corn fields of Midwest, motivating the company to create a more 
resilient crop. In the meantime, Pioneer sent out hundreds of free bulletins on the subject, 
claiming, “While the state colleges have all published bulletins on resistant rootworms, none 
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have fitted this new problem into an over-all soil insect control program as does Bulletin 8-A.”387 
This brash statement centered on who controlled the problem-solving scientific process. While 
seed houses might work with universities (which they certainly did), it was important for them to 
distinguish themselves as the entities driving this partnership. It was the company, not the 
university, which overcame agricultural problems. Farmers should have faith in company use 
and control of science. 
Another characteristic the company advertised was hybrid uniformity. Pioneer 
specifically marketed their hybrid production of better formed ears, which they argued made for 
easier mechanical picking.388 Pioneer’s new advertising manager, William Hill, looked to 
capitalize on the greater use of mechanization. He proposed that the company appeal to 
progressive farmers by promoting their hybrids’ usefulness in picker-sheller machines. Scientific 
breeding allowed the company to exploit changes in agricultural production methods, 
showcasing how their seed corn was tailored to fit an evolving market. Hill visualized a 
promotion that would link the faith in scientific development with real production modifications. 
He wrote, “Imagine what we might create, using our illustration, if we were to use it with a 
caption such as "PIONEER PUTS MORE CORN ON THE COB FOR INCREASED 
PROFITABILITY" or simply, "THE PROFIT’S IN THE CORN - NOT THE COB.”389 Of 
course, that profitability would not just flow into coffers of the local farmstead, but up the chain 
to the company that provided such advancements.  
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Perhaps the most blatant symbol of the company’s overwhelming optimism about the 
power of science was their firm belief in its ability to overcome market surpluses. A puzzle that 
frustrated both the farmer and government bureaucrat alike, Pioneer’s discussion of the issue 
seemed, at first, downright bizarre. For much of the conversation (which often included negative 
assessment of federal programs aimed at reductions) Pioneer simply denied that surpluses 
actually existed. One bulletin mailed out to farmers argued that America only possessed a 
“prudent reserve” of corn, one that would no doubt disappear with more exports to Europe.390 
Conversely, even when the company acknowledged their existence, surpluses simply became 
another obstacle for the “magic” of science to overcome. Corn, they argued, was still the basis of 
a growing number of products, with the implication that more were yet to come.391 Other times 
Pioneer explained that corn’s importance, combined with a growing population, made its peak 
production a must.392  
This optimism about surpluses did not necessarily mean that the company did not prepare 
for worsening economic conditions. A letter from Garst to Robert Woods, the head of Pioneer’s 
Eastern Division, noted that surpluses were going to put the company in a tight spot over the 
coming years and the best way to combat this was to keep customers buying.393 One tactic to 
achieve this was to use their conception of science as an all-encompassing problem-solver. 
Pioneer argued “The "know-how" and ingenuity characterized by Americans should challenge us 
to research our way out of any surplus that might be interpreted as a problem. This we can do if 
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we put our best minds to the task.”394 In the end, the reality of market surpluses made hybrid 
production capabilities less of a benefit and more of a potential economic calamity. 
Hybrid seed houses were not alone in their interpretation of the place of science and 
technology within the agricultural industry. Implement manufacturers also held a similar 
viewpoint on the power of their scientific and technological research. International Harvester 
discussed how improvements in farm mechanization allowed amazing capabilities in crop 
production, “These machines are the result of inspired invention genius and endless research. 
They reflect the American creed of lightening labor and increasing efficiency through the use of 
better equipment. All are designed, manufactured, and sold to produce a profit for their 
owners.”395 Both production and profit followed technological advancements, as these 
companies alleged their scientifically created and tested implements offered better choices for 
farmers. For example, John Deere suggested that their, “Engineering and Research over the years 
have exerted every effort to give the farmer more work capacity…more efficiency of 
operation…greater comfort and convenience and more usable horsepower for every dollar he 
spends.”396 This was pursuit of technological development with an eye specifically on the future. 
Each implement, these companies believed, added to organically occurring human progress. So 
when Harvester claimed that its tractors were “built for tomorrow” they were not simply talking 
about the next day.397 Instead, tomorrow was a combination of beliefs built on technological 
determinism and its connection to private corporations. The future would be better because of 
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International Harvester’s endless research into the possible applications of science and 
technology to human existence. 
One of the hallmarks of this better future came from the implement industry’s ability to 
unravel the agricultural problems of the past. As with hybrids, equipment companies believed 
their products would increase agricultural production across the board (which it very much did). 
As a whole, mechanized farming could make planting and harvesting more efficient, reduce crop 
waste, and speed up transportation. These companies were, as John Deere explained, the 
“bringers of plenty.”398 Furthermore, these implement giants also believed that their machines 
made the process itself much less time consuming and labor intensive for farmers. As companies 
introduced new features, they argued that farmers benefited from studier equipment and 
increased comfort. International’s Farmall Cub tractor was a prime example of this mentality. 
First introduced in the late 1940s, the company declared this new machine to be the answer to 
many of the problems facing small producers. The Cub promised a “more profitable system of 
farming,” with every job becoming easier without the need for constant hand labor.399 As another 
benefit, the Cub completely did away with animal labor for even the smallest of farmers, 
marking a new “beginning of an era in agriculture.”400 
Often these machines addressed specific problems related to certain crops, especially 
those that resisted past attempts to ease labor intensity or speed production. Implement dealers 
asserted that their scientific development created solutions that unraveled long standing issues. 
Though the mechanization of tomato harvest may be the best documented, the transition to 
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mechanized cotton harvesting was also influential.401 International Harvester, for instance, said 
this about cotton: “Every year millions of human hands have picked cotton in the same slow, 
tedious way that cotton was picked thousands of years ago. Man has never been able find a 
substitute for the ‘time-wasting, back-breaking method.’”402 Lucky for the “modern producer,” 
International’s engineers had managed to solve this agricultural enigma and fortunate growers, 
“will find that the eyes of the cotton world will follow their progress and success with these 
mechanical marvels.”403 It was a change that would have a deep impact not just on the 
agricultural production of the South, but also on the connection between the political economy 
and racial injustice.404 Other implements also seemed to solve different conundrums. Combines 
merged various stages of harvesting, allowing for one man to do the work of many.405 Sugar beet 
harvesters made a previously dirty and dangerous job more convenient and comfortable for those 
involved.406 Each piece of equipment added to the overall progress of agriculture, transforming a 
once tedious process into a modern, streamlined mode of production.  
Of course, the pursuit of scientific advancement also dealt specifically with questions of 
control. More to the point, technological change created questions about who had control and 
how these companies could maintain their jurisdiction over this process. Decisions over what 
implements to develop and research centered directly on these questions. Internal debates within 
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International Harvester illustrated how companies sought to shape scientific development in a 
way that would reinforce their own expertise (and therefore importance) within rural spaces. 
Though facing surprising competition from hand pickers and community owned machines, 
International Harvester’s marketing research indicated that mechanized cotton pickers would 
eventually become a permanent part of that industry. The trend would be helped along by key 
allies, as university researchers and extension agents would continue to perform demonstrations 
and help refine cotton hybrids that worked well with machines.407 Alternatively, marketing 
research found that some implements would cut into Harvester’s hold on their expertise. Hand 
welders, for example, were a possible money-making item. Marketing research showed potential. 
Farmsteads had a number of possibilities for welder use, especially as they became more 
mechanized. By the mid-1940s, nearly 45% of farms possessed the electricity to power the 
welder and only 1% of them actually owned one. The potential seemed so high that the 
company’s rival, Allis-Chambers, planned on entered the market. Eventually, however, 
Harvester decided not to pursue this implement as a revenue stream.  
 Ultimately, the potential income from welders did not outweigh the potential costs. 
Primarily, selling personal welders would cut into the company’s role as chief mechanic for used 
implements in rural areas. The likelihood of communal use was too high, as instead of venturing 
into corporate-owned shops, farmers would instead call on one another to service their 
equipment. An internal company memo posited, “If a farmer purchased a welder, he would 
probably have neighbors calling on him for welding services. This could easily expand to the 
establishment of a ‘cross-roads’ service shop with its unskilled servicing of our machines, 
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causing unsatisfactory performance and a loss of revenue in our dealer's shop.”408 Both loss of 
revenue and the possibility of poor performance were clear disadvantages to the equipment 
dealer. Perhaps the most damning problem was the possibility of Harvester’s loss of expertise. 
As holders of specialized knowledge, corporate-sponsored dealerships were essential to 
maintaining the equipment and reinforcing International Harvester’s place as professional bearer 
of technical information. Dealers were the guardians of the door between those who needed the 
knowledge (farmers) and the assumed creators of that knowledge (the company). Expertise was 
as much about control as it was actual information. If farmers could bypass corporate jurisdiction 
over technical problems, the assumption was that it would cut into the company’s bottom line. 
Controlling science and technology allowed the company to control the farmer. 
 The growth of both the implement and hybrid plant use in the agricultural field also 
helped the development of agricultural chemicals. By the end of the Second World War, the 
chemical industry was on the cusp of a revolutionary movement into agriculture. These 
companies believed that their insistence on scientific progress, both in the past and currently, 
faced an uphill battle with the American people. Convinced that they were dealing with serious 
public doubts, chemical giants believed themselves to be the vanguard of science’s place in 
society. Monsanto remarked in one of its company histories, “The greatest obstacles to 
accomplishment of the American mission have been neither pioneer hardships nor foreign 
enmities, but the strong doubts in American minds and hearts which rose with Science in the 
19th century.”409 By the late 1950s, the company still alleged that the American public 
demonstrated a disturbing apathy towards science. Seeking to educate the “science-shy” masses, 
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Monsanto created a science-themed television show, “designed to bring to the public the thrilling 
and vital story of today's scientific advances and to attack the critical shortages in scientific 
education and manpower.”410 The company argued that its show was less of a PR stunt (though it 
did show commercials on gas and oil additives, rubber chemicals, surfactant, and detergent raw 
materials) and more of an attempt to educate the masses on proper place of chemicals in 
society.411  
 Chemistry, especially when controlled by company scientists, offered incredible benefits 
to the masses. In the hands of Monsanto’s experts, chemistry created cleaner living 
environments.412 Food became fresher and healthier with chemical additives. Homemakers 
benefited from less intense labor and guesswork.413 Agriculture also benefited from Monsanto’s 
chemical research. One Monsanto magazine article quoted an Illinois farmer who assigned credit 
for his record corn crop to “the use of modern chemicals.”414 Another article maintained that the 
company’s scientifically compounded feeds helped produce meatier and healthier livestock and 
poultry. This in turn allowed meat packers to meet the growing demand for their products, 
stimulating the poultry, cattle, and swine industries.415 Charles Sommer, director of the National 
Agricultural Chemicals Association and a Monsanto employee, pointed out that the company 
excursion into retail chemicals was beneficial to all farmers.  
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By bringing our company into a direct relation with the farmer through these products we 
obtain a quicker and surer grasp of farm problem that may be solved chemically. This 
will permit us to aim our product research and development efforts more accurately at 
those problems, and to give farmers quicker access to new products born of these 
efforts.416 
By the 1950s, Monsanto was fully engaged in its quest to bring chemical solutions to America’s 
farm lands. 
Despite all the signs pointing to more chemicals in agriculture, many products developed 
serious problems in the application stage or long term unintended consequences. The most 
obvious example was dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, better known by its trade name, DDT. 
Employed extensively during the Second World War, DDT became the darling of chemical 
companies during the 1940s and 1950s. Despite earlier criticism of the product, Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring launched a level of scrutiny that eventually led to the chemical’s ban in the United 
States. Yet, this was hardly the first disappointment for an industry bent on agricultural success. 
Monsanto faced its own crisis soon after the war. In fact, one of its first ventures into agriculture 
ended in complete failure. Krilium, a soil conditioner, proved to be a problem not in performance 
but in marketing and cost. Initially, the company believed it had caught lighting in a bottle, 
announcing its discovery at the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
Conference on December 29 1951. However, despite optimistic predictions from company 
researchers, Krilium failed to live up to expectations. The cost alone limited the number of 
potential customers, and by the mid-1950s, most commercial farmers failed to adopt the new 
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product. By 1956, the company abandoned soil conditioners as the solution to fertility problems, 
disillusioned by their misstep.417  
In spite of this early blunder, the chemical giant quickly gained entry into the emerging 
field of agricultural pesticides. Randox, which would later be known by its trade name Roundup, 
became one of Monsanto’s big sellers. Although expensive to create, the company believed that 
its potential for weed control would prove to be worth the price. This argument was echoed by 
others connected to the company: “The university experiment stations workers and farmers and 
potential distributors of our product were unanimous in their belief that this was a good herbicide 
and one that the farmer needed.”418 Randox, along with other products like the popular weed 
killers Ramrod, Avadex, and Wallop, helped add to Monsanto’s emerging product line. In fact, 
agricultural chemicals rapidly became the company’s fastest growing department throughout the 
1960s. The years between 1964 and 1967 were especially profitable, with farm chemicals 
averaging 26% growth each year.419 Sales in 1966 alone totaled more than 37.1 million 
dollars.420 The company was able to take advantage of several advantageous events. By 1964, the 
federal Soil Bank Program released more than 7.4 million acres of land for use. That same year, 
the division also reached its first million dollar contract with feed giant Ralston Purina.421 
Monsanto’s MAC retails centers continued to make inroads in rural areas, selling a number of 
different products. In a final stoke of good luck, the Midwestern cornroot weed showed a 
growing resistance to their direct competitors’ (Shell and Veliscol) herbicide, opening a potential 
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market for the company’s product Parathion.422 This eventually led to several product 
endorsements from seven different state experiment stations.423 No wonder one annual report 
concluded, “The outlook for the farm economy continues excellent and, with the growing usage 
of fertilizing materials, the industry in general should prosper in 1965.”424 
Yet, none of this growth would have been remotely possible without Monsanto’s firm 
belief in the importance of scientific development for the good of the company and its clientele. 
The company decided to increase its focus on agricultural chemicals, securing vast funds for its 
Research and Development department. Monsanto bragged that its research underwent an 
intensive testing period, both in the laboratory and the field. Like other chemical products, 
Monsanto’s agricultural merchandise faced rigorous questions from government entities: “The 
pesticide industry is similar to the pharmaceutical industry in that disproportionate research 
outlays together with extensive clinical and field testing, and finally, drawn-out negotiations with 
the Food and Drug Administration are necessary to the development of a commercial successful 
product.”425 But more than insuring their products’ safety, this extra layer of study seemed to 
verify that their research was beneficial to wider society. The chemical giant also assumed that 
its focus on scientific advancements would not only help its clients in the fields, but also provide 
new market opportunities.426 Pushing for more scientific research was just good business, 
allowing researchers to open up intriguing uses for agricultural chemicals. No problem, not pests, 
soil erosion, or infertility, could dampen the power of applied chemistry.  
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 If the chemical industry had only recently found itself applying its vision of science and 
technology to agriculture, meat packers had long sought new inventions and techniques to extend 
foodways nationally. Historian Roger Horowitz noted that meat’s organic features led to 
repeated cycles of technological innovation to lengthen the shelf life of perishable food. The 
evolution of meat products aligned with developing consumption practices and processing 
elements.427 For corporate packers though, science and technology were a critical part of their 
industry culture and business outlook. Without refrigeration—a technological development—
their industry could hardly exist on a large scale. While a farm wife might preserve salt pork to 
ensure her family’s food security, packers were much more interested in using the science of 
preservation to safeguard their own place as producer. The creation of standardized cuts, new 
conservation technologies, and different meat products all helped fortify the role of meat packer 
as the primary source of this commodity. This understanding of control was also part of their 
overall vision of science and technology. Like agricultural input industries, meat packers 
believed that their scientific methods would naturally improve the human experience, both 
allowing farmers greater control over their livestock while also improving the freshness and 
quality of products for consumers. Solutions to agricultural and consumerist problems rested, 
they argued, in the hands of the most competent and most interested party, the meat packers. 
 Historically, meat packing was one of the first agricultural enterprises to industrialize on 
a national scale. The development of new technologies in refrigeration and transportation in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries allowed for the creation of the “cold chain.” The cold chain 
linked the livestock to the customer through a series of commodity networks. Early members of 
this chain, from the rancher to the packer, utilized scientific experimentation to extend the 
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possibilities of meat production. This eventually led to a near monopoly by the “Big Four” 
packers of Chicago (Armour, Cudahy, Wilson, and Swift). These companies forged a new 
conception of meat itself, severing customers from the production process. Consumers once held 
a greater understanding the slaughter process—the killing and butchering of a living animal—
because they practiced it. Now, Americans were divorced from those actions, reducing the 
conception of “meat” from a complex process to a simple refrigerated package bought from a 
store.428 Livestock farmers and ranchers also added their own voice to the developing industry. 
These producers, both large and small, demanded that the government both protect their interests 
and provide scientific help to combat costly problems. USDA scientists, along with the emerging 
land grant professionals, sought to combat diseases and other health issues, sometimes even 
against the wishes of the farmers themselves.429  
 By the Second World War, many elements of the once-monopolized industry were 
changing at a rapid pace, especially in terms of scientific inquiry. While changes in labor and 
business practices had altered the industry’s landscape, developments in biotechnology, 
breeding, production methods, and slaughtering techniques also redefined meat production on a 
national scale. Antibiotics allowed for better disease control, which in turn led to different 
housing methods. Feed additives and steroids made for faster growing and plumper livestock and 
poultry. New processing and packaging technologies deskilled the dismembering process while 
creating a more uniform product for the consumer.430 Even the basic biology of the animals 
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changed dramatically. For instance, experimentation in chicken breeding altered the birds. 
Sensing an opportunity to latch onto supermarket retail chains, various institutions pushed for the 
creation of a meatier, faster maturing bird. With the Chicken of Tomorrow contest, a previous 
diverse population of poultry breeds eventually coalesced in single genetic specimen still used by 
today’s producers.431  
 Despite both serving as meat packers, Perdue Chicken and Rath Packing Company each 
represented the different range of fortunes besetting the meat industry in the postwar era. Rath, a 
pork packer founded in 1891 and based out of Waterloo Iowa, grew fat from government 
contracts during the Second World War. By 1945, it was the fifth largest meat packer and 
possessed the most advanced packing facility in the nation. Unfortunately, the company found its 
sales numbers waning in the 1960s and 1970s. Partly due to falling consumer interest in pork 
products, Rath also dealt with souring labor issues, unstable hog production, obsolete equipment, 
and increased competition. The company limped along until finally closing its doors in 1985.432 
Like many regional packers, Rath failed to keep pace with the technical prowess and product 
diversification of vertically and horizontally integrated firms, like its intra-state rival Iowa Beef 
Processors.  
 Whereas Rath struggled to compete in a new era, Perdue Chicken thrived in the postwar 
environment. Founded in 1920, the company experienced rapid grow in the 1950s. Aided by 
biological advancements in chicken breeding and new production methods like contract farming, 
Perdue was able to quickly vertically integrate the Delmarva region. It successfully muscled out 
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independent producers and took over control of the different phases of the production process. 
By the 1970s and 1980s, the company became a national brand and continued to expand into 
new commodity markets. Today it is one of the largest poultry producers in the nation, 
competing directly with Tyson Foods and Pilgrim’s Pride.433  
 Rath Packing Company and Perdue Chicken, though moving in opposite directions of 
success, nevertheless held a similar faith in their scientific research. Both believed that their 
specific control would produce a better result for both consumers and livestock producers. Part 
of this perception came from the idea that company research produced products that had better 
quality and more uniformity. In one Rath booster plan, created to break into the Atlanta market, 
the packer sent sampler packages to retailers asserting, “Since the high quality of Rath products 
is derived from the scientific feeding of pork on the finest corn, Rath has built their selling theme 
on finer flavor from the Land’O’Corn.”434 Twelve years later, the company was still expressing a 
firm belief in the scientific superiority of their product. In one New England advertisement 
expounded, “Rath's Iowa beef is the result of years of successful scientific development. It has a 
flavor--a tenderness--a texture--unmatched by beef from any other source.”435 According to 
Rath, tenderness, taste, flavor, and price were all made better by the application of their carefully 
regulated expertise. 
 Perdue also employed a parallel argument about its chickens. The Delmarva company 
often stressed the need for their contracted hatcheries, growers, and processing plants to operate 
in a scientific manner. A 1971 TV commercial displayed the use of automatic feeders, asking 
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new chicken growers to use these machines to produce bigger birds more quickly.436 By 1975, 
Perdue divided the growing process even further, soliciting farmers to become “end brooding” 
growers.437 While this division had a deskilling effect on contracted chicken farmers, its 
industrial efficiency made the brooding process more rational and scientific, which companies 
believed was better for the industry as a whole.438 The company emphasized how its controlled 
environment, from the chemical based feed to the mechanically regulated temperature and 
lighting, created a more wholesome product. A New York City radio advertisement claimed the 
bird’s distinctive golden tint (gained by simply adding marigolds to the chicken feed) was, “the 
natural color of any young chicken brought up on a scientific controlled high protein diet--it's the 
sign of glowing health--the most wholesome and tastiest chicken you can buy for your table and 
family.”439 In another letter to New York City retailers and butchers, Frank Perdue insisted that 
the company’s new modern processing plant, along with the chicks’ “balanced, scientifically 
formulated diets,” produced well-formed and healthier birds.440 
 In the end, all of these companies across the agricultural spectrum held a similar 
confidence in their scientific processes and their own place as stewards in the quest for 
betterment. Their initial formation was shaped by invention and further germinated by new 
technological innovations. Companies saw their actions outwardly solve many problems that had 
plagued agriculture for years. The issues of famine, drought, pests, decomposition, excessive toil, 
and others seemed to fade with the application of agribusinesses’ scientific methods. And in 
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many ways, they were right. Access to new scientific advancements helped create the larger 
green revolution of the late 1960s and 70s. Food, at least for many people (especially those who 
experienced the benefits of western imperialism), became much more secure.441 Greater 
convenience and decreased labor intensity helped some farmers integrate more fully into the 
comforts of the American middle class. Science, the rationale claimed, was responsible for these 
boons.  
 Yet, the most important part of this ideology was not the mere pursuit of scientific 
inquiry but rather the conviction that large agricultural firms should be the ones to control its 
direction. These agribusinesses believed that they were at the heart of human progress, that their 
control over science and technology would create a better world. The technological revolution of 
the postwar period only served to increase this excessive belief in the power of their own 
ingenuity. Blind faith in the possibility of science to solve problems, even the ones that they 
themselves helped to create, was an innate part of agribusiness’ ideological makeup. This 
principle resounded within these corporations. Now, they wanted that same faith to resonate with 
a key audience, the farmers themselves. 
 Trying to change the various opinions and traditions of farmers was often a failed pastime 
of other high modernist practitioners working for the state and within academia. Private 
companies, however, often used high modernism with different goals in mind. The wider 
purpose of large companies involved in agriculture remained the desire to essentialize 
themselves to the system, to make their presence indispensable in order to secure their financial 
future. Locking in their role as scientific vanguards was a decisive part of this goal. If farmers 
came to believe in a similar ideology, that these companies were the producers of agricultural 
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progress, then they would come to see agribusiness as a critical tool to the farming process itself. 
Agribusiness’ use of science and technology was then just another way to reinforce farmers’ 
dependence on private entities. For once farmers jumped on the bandwagon of industrial 
farming, most found out that it was difficult to jump off. 
Agribusiness and the Conquest of Nature 
One of the most crucial elements of the agribusiness’ strain of high modernist ideology 
was the belief in not just the possibility of biological control, but also that nature itself could and 
should be mastered and improved by humans. Agriculture as a system lends itself to this 
assumption. Farming posits that, to some extent, humans can control their environment to ensure 
the viability of crops and livestock. Even the earliest settled civilizations learned to alter their 
landscapes to their needs. Some harnessed the power of flood plains to guarantee adequate 
irrigation and soil fertility.442 Others utilized planned biodiversity to safeguard against diseases 
and ensure soil quality.443 Later peoples constantly refined the biology of plants and animals. For 
example, Sam White’s article “From Globalized Pig Breeds to Capitalist Pigs,” demonstrated 
how people in Europe during the eighteenth century imported Chinese pigs as breeding stock, 
eventually overcoming environmental factors to enhance the production capabilities of their 
hogs.444 Yet, throughout all of this, it remained clear that man (emphasis on man because of 
gender assumptions of stewardship) could not completely regulate his environment. Sometimes 
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the floods did not come or competing plant and animal species destroyed carefully planned 
fields.445 Human manipulation could only go so far. 
It was this belief in limitations that the acolytes of high modernism sought to change. The 
laws of the universe were rational, they argued, and therefore humans need only apply 
rationalism to the landscape in order to fully control it. Enlightenment thinkers alleged that 
science could be used to order nature. Once the chaos of the world was made legible, experts 
could then modify the environment to fulfill humans’ greatest needs, whereby creating a utopian 
landscape that would provide for its people in the most efficient way. Of course, questions of 
what this perfect environment, this utopia, looked like were to be answered by those who had the 
most to gain from it. It was in their best interest to keep jurisdiction over scientific dominion.446 
The father of the scientific method himself, Francis Bacon, helped usher in a new age of human 
domination over the environment, using rhetoric that legitimized mastery over nature (and 
metaphorically, women).447  Agribusinesses claimed the legacy of this ideology. They resolutely 
believed that science and technology should be used to master the landscape. In fact, 
corporations believed that it was the environment’s very uncontrollable nature that produced the 
most serious agricultural problems. Uncontrollable meant standards of uniformity and 
predictability could not be applied. Environmental chaos created many of the issues that plagued 
humanity. Luckily for farmers, these businesses preached a new vision of what the countryside 
could be. Much like the Enlightenment thinkers and state officials before them, agribusinesses 
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envisioned a new kind of environment, one in which science and technology gave farmers the 
tools and expertise to control the landscape and master nature itself. 
Agribusinesses utilized science and technology as a philosophical device to craft an 
imagined environmental future, in which man applied scientific development to master 
agricultural landscapes. Scholar Diana K. Davis has employed the term “environmental 
imaginary” to discuss historical perceptions of the Middle East. She defined the term as the, 
“constellation of ideas that groups of humans develop about a given landscape, usually local or 
regional, that commonly includes assessments about that environment as well as how it came to 
be in its current state.” While Davis argued that Western conceptions of the Middle East centered 
on orientalism, agribusinesses used environmental imaginary to rhetorically conceive of their 
own planned landscape, an environment that needed agribusiness’ products and expertise to 
achieve its full industrial potential. Agribusinesses looked to help farmers harness the full 
capabilities of their land, imagining a future where the farmer had complete control over his 
farmstead.448 But only through the full exposure to science and technology, produced by private 
companies, would man finally be able to conquer the fickle whims of nature. In this way, 
agribusinesses, like the imperial state, used imagined environments to justify their expansionist 
actions toward rural communities. Obviously, American farmers had much more power and 
voice than the colonialized peoples of Northern Africa and the Middle East. Therefore, 
agribusiness deployed science and technology as a conception to convince farmers of the 
possibility of a controlled landscape in the future.449 
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Mastery over nature was a critical element in agribusinesses’ overall perception of the 
role of science and technology. What was one of the most startling elements of their view of the 
environment was that these entities actually believed in the possibility of total control. People 
involved in agribusiness often commented that their innovations allowed man a power that he did 
not possess before. The managing editor of the chemical trade journal mentioned that primitive 
man could use nature only as he found it, lacking any ability to mold it to his liking.450 John 
Deere argued that the tough sod of the prairie barred early man from reaching the rich soil 
below.451 According to International Harvester, the cotton plant resisted changes to its slow and 
tedious method of harvesting, forcing man to continue hand picking for thousands of years.452 
These assumptions describe the pre-agribusiness farming process as stagnant and the land and its 
plants as willful, implying that only with the advent of scientific innovation would there be 
opportunities to master the environment. 
 Of course, the reason why these companies made such distinctions between the before 
and the after was to show how their own control of science and technology allowed for greater 
ecological manipulation. It was their expertise that provided the necessary equipment and 
knowledge to remake the landscape to better fulfill the desires of farmers. Monsanto advocated 
using its scientific testing to accurately determine the condition of the land and therefore know 
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the proper blend of fertilizer to use. After all, a master steward, “can’t afford land that just loafs 
around.”453 Whipping the land into shape was also the job of mechanical implements. These 
machines did not just ease the burden of labor for farmers, but also actively reshaped the land to 
fit into modern agriculture. Much as a father governs and cares for his children, so too should the 
farmer mold his fields and flocks into imagined future possibilities. Using machines 
consequently was a way to achieve these dreams, “for the land is a heritage to husband, and only 
by conserving it can the nation be kept strong and prosperous.”454 Mastery ultimately hinged on 
perceptions of control. The environment needed to be brought to task. With the aid of science 
and technology, crafted and given to farmers by company experts, farmers could transform the 
land into a production paradise. 
The connection between control and the power to alter nature was a prominent theme in 
the postwar era’s burgeoning chemical revolution. Monsanto argued that its agricultural chemists 
controlled the essence of life itself, creating an era, “when the farmer will have cheap, easily 
applied fungicides and insecticides that will build a strong and impenetrable chemical fence 
around his crops, leaving only weather and markets to trouble his mind.”455 Images of an 
impenetrable and well-defended barrier conjured a battle between chemicals and the pests. This 
war-like rhetoric was a favorite of the chemical industry, whose promotions often raised images 
of battle between a harmful and uncontrollable environment and company experts.456 The 
chemical industry employed an “army of scientists, technologists, and engineers” to develop 
                                                          
453 Monsanto, “Fertilize your pasture this fall Advertisement,” circa early 1960s, Series 10, Box 2, File 10, 
Monsanto Collection. 
454 International Harvester, “The Working Tools of American Agriculture: International Harvester Farm 
Equipment,” undated, 1-2, Box 524, File 13944, International Harvester Central File. 
455 James E. Payne, “Architects of Molecule,” part of “A Better America Through Chemical Progress Program,” 
circa 1950s-60s, Series 10, Box 2, File 1, Monsanto Collection.  
456 Given that farmers often viewed nature as either an ally or adversary (rarely neutral), it was a marketing theme 
that worked well. 
182 
 
 
products.457 Monsanto’s pesticide Wallop, “banishes weeds and worms in one blow.”458 
Santobane, known by its trade name DDT, stood against the “hordes” of insects that threatened 
the world’s food supply.459 It was a show of force against nature, a defense against the chaos of 
the untamed wild. Producers were not there to work with the land, but to overcome it. Chemicals 
provided by agribusinesses helped farmers do just that. 
What made this rhetoric work was its villainization of those uncontrollable aspects of the 
environment. Bugs did not eat plants because it was a part of their innate biological drive; they 
did so because they wanted to devour human food security. Weeds choked the life from “useful” 
plants because they were a malevolent force. Diseases struck chicken hatcheries or swine lots 
with purpose. Monsanto emphasized the danger presented by these pests in multiple of ways. 
Sometimes the company described weeds and other unwanted flora and fauna as useless, ugly, or 
laborious.460 Other promotions took on a much more sinister tone. In the late 1940s, the company 
began calling weeds by the nickname “green death.” In an advertisement featuring a malevolent 
jungle of weeds menacing a garden, Monsanto declared, “simply put, weeds steal profit.”461 But 
chemical companies were not the only agribusiness to villainize the unmanageable aspects of 
nature. When discussing his travels abroad, Roswell Garst noted the sorry state of farming in 
Central America, outlining that their corn production was low, their cattle too skinny, and their 
food production unable to keep up with an exploding population. He attributed this not to 
political instability or economic degradation (or clear imperialist measures), but rather to their 
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failure to adopt new scientific advancements to resolve these problems. Luckily for the people of 
Central America, various charitable and private entities were already establishing research 
missions and businesses in the area.462 It seemed that agribusinesses and their clients were very 
much at war with an out of control environment. Or as one advertisement in the seed trade 
journal Right off the Cob declared, “Modernization in the Implements of Business Is as Essential 
as Modernization in the Implements of War!”463 The battle over who would win the day seemed 
to center on who had the tools to control the uncontrollable.  
Agribusinesses’ development of a villainous enemy was done primarily to emphasize the 
need to eliminate ecological variables in favor of uniform environment, the true hallmark of 
man’s conquest of nature.464 Untamed landscapes held a number of negative consequences for 
farms, including inefficiency, waste, and loss of profit. However, the primary issue for 
agribusinesses was that it stymied the possibility of standardization. Standards implied a level of 
predictability that offered farmers a chance at factory like production. Uniformity would increase 
both yield and profit, allowing farmers to avoid setbacks that cost them time and money. It also 
freed them from the shackles of traditional agriculture, which forced farmers to negotiate with 
the land rather than take what they wanted from it. This is why eliminating these variables was 
so critical. Corporations saw them as the enemies of agricultural progress and hoped for a future 
where many of the problems of the past would be eliminated. If an unruly landscape 
demonstrated poor farming techniques, lack of managerial skills, and inefficiency, then an 
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organized environment represented a master overseer who had accepted the role of professional 
expertise. In the eyes of these agribusinesses, variety was not the spice of life. 
Uniformity was the basis of agribusiness’ imagined future of the agricultural 
environment. It was an abstract landscape that looked remarkably similar across different 
regions, crop types, and local economies. Predictability was the end-goal and scientific 
innovation was means of getting there. Mechanical products would create a regulated field with 
precisely edged rows. Tractors and implements carved out straight lines; new liquid sprayers 
generated, “more uniform spreading--finer shredding.”465 Chemical fertilizers encouraged a 
stronger stand and provided a nutritious boost for crops. Pesticides killed off any competing 
plants. As Monsanto highlighted in its article on the rice growing McGowan family, these 
farmers “were among the first to evade hit-or-miss compromises by exploiting new herbicides 
designed specifically for removing weeds from rice.”466 The resulting combination of chemical 
additives produced a heady vision of an orderly and resilient field of monoculture. The crops 
themselves possessed uniformity not just from row to row, but even from region to region. 
Hybrid strains provided wind and drought resistance, bigger ears, and heavier stalks. Their 
uniform appearance allowed for easier mechanical harvesting, with combines and pickers 
collecting the grain in a regulated fashion.467 The agricultural process, not just the products, 
would also possess elements of homogeneity. Academic and company experts all suggested that 
farmers begin to adapt to a more standardized (and scientifically approved) version of planting 
and harvesting. For example, Pioneer was especially keen on showing the advantages of early 
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planting practices (which would ensure earlier orders of their seed corn).468 Other companies, 
like implement manufacturers, were more concerned about how their products could ensure 
precision planting and harvesting.469 Their message was simple, uniformity was good and the 
scientific products made farmers the “boss at planting time.”470 
Standardization found a welcome home in the corporate meeting rooms of the meat 
production industry. Perhaps because of the appeal of factory-like precision and efficiency, 
packers involved in the transformation of livestock and poultry into meat products found mastery 
over nature (both biological and ecological) to be an important element to their postwar 
mentality. The poultry industry specifically connected faith in the corporate scientific and 
technological process with changing consumer tastes. Contract farming, which would soon 
become the primary agricultural system for poultry production, fit nicely within this ideal. 
Advocates claimed that contract growing allowed the industry as a whole to become more 
efficient, cost effective, and scientific.471 Other observers also mentioned how this type of 
production gave chicken a pricing edge over its pork and beef competitors.472 Secondly, the 
biology of chickens made them an ideal candidate for regulated uniformity in taste, texture, and 
appearance. The ability to separate different stages of the broiler process allowed companies like 
Perdue, Tyson, and Pilgrim’s Pride to gain greater control over the standards of their product.473 
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Perdue Chicken eventually ventured into processing the chicken itself, allowing the company to 
enact more exacting standards for slaughter and evisceration.474 Firms could then meaningfully 
market “quality control” as a clear indicator of their product, ensuring that their product met the 
standards of customers. This was confirmed by different butchers throughout New York City’s 
boroughs. One butcher from the S.D. Palma Market in Queens remarked that it was Perdue’s 
uniformity that attracted area housewives.475 Others also noted that Perdue’s chicken sizing, 
color, and overall consistency impressed local customers.476 
It was this system of homogeneity that other meat industries tried to imitate, often with 
less success. Pork in particular struggled to keep up with consumer demand for greater 
uniformity and changes in taste. Packers spent a considerable amount of time and energy trying 
to persuade farmers to change their hog production methods.477 Facing fluctuating demand and 
supply, some pork packers attempted to move into the cattle market to stabilize their profit 
margins. Rath Packing tried to break into the beef industry by emphasizing the uniformity of 
their Black Hawk Beef: “a lesser grade variance means more uniform selection…no extreme 
high or low within grade.”478 The company claimed that their carcasses were, “suited for dealers 
who want high quality meat but dislike waste of U.S. Choice quality…better cutting yield…less 
fat trim.”479 Nevertheless, pork producers faced an uphill battle as the decades went on. Even the 
relative size of their animals, particularly with the emphasis on bigger and bigger carcasses, 
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seemed to hurt their retail value. As scholars Bernard Tobin and Henry Arthur pointed out, 
poultry held advantages over pork and beef because of their of inventory value. Buying whole 
cattle or hogs often created a backload of less-desirable or more expensive cuts. On the other 
hand, chickens could be sold whole without creating storage problems.480 While poultry 
producers were able to manipulate variables in biology, some livestock packers struggled to 
adopt these changes.  
 Despite these setbacks for some, most agribusinesses continued to emphasize how they 
brought scientific standards to control and aid in the mastery of the environment during the 
postwar era. In fact, one of the best methods for showcasing their ideology was to demonstrate 
how the corporate use of science allowed people to control extreme environments. The Rio 
Grande Valley, for instance, offered a great opportunity to illustrate the power that agribusiness’ 
products could wield over the wild.481 Calling the area the “magic valley,” Monsanto described 
how, “Engineers, chemists, and agriculturalists have cooperated to make the valley one of the 
leading year-round garden spots in the world.” Of course, nature refused to bestow the bounty 
willingly, so one must, “use elbow grease; you can't cultivate in a coffee shop and spray from a 
beer barrel.” And this elbow grease just happen to work because of the right combination of 
agricultural scientific know-how and application.482 Man could conquer and recraft the landscape 
to fit his needs, but only if he embraced the corporate power of science and technology. Other 
problematic regions featured a similar re-formation via private scientific innovation. The cattle 
lands of Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona received a chemical solution to their 
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overgrown mesquite problem.483 The Sonoran Desert in Mexico, was “brought to life” when area 
farmers turned, “to the technology of modern agriculture.”484 Agribusinesses, with their 
command of scientific innovation, made it possible for even the most willful of environments to 
be brought to heel.  
In the end, agribusiness’s physical and ideological transformation of the land also helped 
remake popular cultural conceptions of agriculture. Visions of prosperous and uniform fields, 
stewarded by a happy independent farmer, became a trope well-used by various businesses 
within the food and fiber industry. Changing conceptions of food and farming allowed private 
institutions a chance to not just recraft American images of the land or the farmer, but the 
process of agriculture itself. These companies gradually removed agricultural complexity as 
more and more people lost touch with rurality and embraced surface-level perceptions offered by 
these agribusinesses. It would have a profound effect on American understanding of agriculture’s 
past, present, and future. 
The Best of Frienemies: Agribusiness and Public Institutions 
Finally, another important element of agribusiness’ relationship with science and 
technology centered ownership of knowledge. These agribusinesses clearly saw scientific 
innovation as both a public service and a private commodity that could be bought and sold. 
While various public institutions formed the backbone of traditional agricultural expertise, 
agribusinesses explicitly sought to craft their own hold over perceptions of scientific 
development. This commodification was an intrinsic aspect of the agribusiness relationship with 
conceptions of science and technology, one that permitted them to deepen the interdependence 
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between themselves, farmers, and customers. Corporate pursuit of agricultural development also 
placed them in deliberate contact with other groups that shared and regulated the food and fiber 
industry. The USDA, state extension services, experiment stations, and land grant universities all 
interacted with these various agribusinesses in remarkably parallel ways. A high modernist view 
of science, though tinted with perhaps different understandings of ownership, was then the 
setting within which agribusinesses and these other entities operated.  
Despite similar visions of the agricultural future, dueling conceptions of public good 
versus private need sometimes caused rifts between academics and agribusiness. As such, the 
postwar period witnessed agribusinesses reaffirming their own hold over expertise and the 
importance of the private scientific enterprise. These agribusinesses, however aided by public 
entities, almost always sought to increase their explicit control over science and technology. 
Their interactions with government bureaucrats and university scientists’ ultimately then fell in 
line with their overarching goal: the essentialization of themselves to the modern agricultural 
system. 
Out of all of the various interactions, agribusinesses perhaps had the most frequent 
relations with the world of academia. In fact, because of the longstanding contact between 
universities and rural spaces, this relationship may have been the most important one for 
agribusinesses to cultivate. Without the backing of state systems and their own allegiance to high 
modernist ideals, agribusinesses may have found it very difficult to infiltrate rural communities 
without academic help. These public experts had long developed a dialogue with rural 
communities, providing advice, running local organizations, and offering a vehicle for communal 
social interaction.485 For instance, Monsanto’s employee J.H. Senger remarked that the local 
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extension service assisted the company in the quest to increase use of agricultural chemicals 
among farmers, providing a strong educational tool in rural spaces.486 These public outreach 
programs shaped, or at least tried to shape, expectations for agricultural production. But the 
relationship was not a one-way street. Luckily for private businesses, these institutions and their 
experts also needed the growing food and fiber industry (specifically company dollars) to 
continue their own work. Therefore, dual need bound the two institutions together, even as issues 
over authority sometimes made their relationship contentious. By reaching out to these 
institutions, agribusinesses sought to reaffirm their own position of authority and provided 
credibility for their private expertise. 
The development of this relationship, which had always been present in the twentieth 
century but intensified after the Second World War, was based on the exchange of gifts, ideas, 
and people. Because both institutions shared a similar vision of America’s agricultural future, 
this interchange generally featured mutual goals. On one hand, agribusinesses often provided 
free products and funding to these academic experts. Pioneer and other seed houses almost 
always gave free seed corn for testing by land-grant colleges or experiment stations.487 Perdue 
Chicken helped fund university poultry specialists in the Delmarva region.488 Monsanto, working 
with university chemists, tried to refine their use of pesticides.489 Rath Packing, with the aid of 
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other pork companies, sponsored university breeding programs and outreach to hog farmers.490 
These donations would help universities perform company-friendly experiments and facilitate 
transmission of information to rural people.  
Given that companies gave away part of their capital, they were often able to control the 
direction of university research. This frequently narrowed the search for agricultural solutions in 
a way that directly benefited agribusinesses. For example, sponsorship by chemical companies 
constricted the study of pest control, allowing chemistry to crowd out biological, entomological, 
and other sources of management. Hybrid corn companies intensified university research on 
hybridization and limited the study of single cross breeding or open-pollination techniques, 
despite the fact that this method could have offered similar yields. This essentially provided 
these companies with hegemonic control over the direction of seed corn research.491 During the 
1950s, Pioneer’s Eastern Division sponsored a number of different experiments and renewable 
graduate fellowships, an event that would become a common occurrence as the years went on. In 
turn, universities permitted the company to “suggest” projects and receive their experimental 
results (a move that Pioneer usually insisted on). And these experiments themselves were not 
cheap. One 1954 proposed project cost $3,600, with the money going towards graduate student 
salary, tuition, travel, and research expenses.492 Another cooperative agreement cost the 
company $6,000 dollars, a sizable investment that would today cost over $50,000. 
Yet, this exchange was hardly a one sided affair. For their sponsorship, agribusinesses 
received a number of different benefits, including free information, public endorsements of 
                                                          
490 Rath Packing Company, “Sales Training: Livestock,” 1960, 28, Series 8, Box 22, File 4, Rath Packing Company 
Records; “Hormel Product Line,” 1971-1972, Series 1, Box 1, File 43, Rath Packing Company Records. 
491 Jack Ralph Kloppenburg Jr., First The Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology (Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2nd edition 2004), 91-129. 
492 Letter to Robert Woods from E.C. Rossman, November 17, 1954, Box 1, File 108, Pioneer Eastern Division 
Records. In terms of today’s money, this was a 31,653 investment. Dollar Times Inflation Calculator, 
http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm. Retrieved July 19, 2016.  
192 
 
 
products and company projects, and support for private, corporate expertise. Perhaps most 
importantly, they benefited from the scientific research itself. University specialists helped work 
out kinks in various products, focusing on improvements that would benefit the industry as a 
whole. Monsanto stated that it was the experimental work done by scientists at Iowa State 
University that allowed for the development of their pesticides, Randox and Ramrod.493 
International Harvester’s cotton pickers did not reach their full potential until the development of 
specialty cotton strains by university scientists.494 Even more than these interactions, 
agribusinesses also freely used information provided by these public institutions to secure their 
own scientific authority in the eyes of farmers. Many publications quoted or outright published 
academic studies that supported company goals. For example, Pioneer circulated a study done by 
University of Maryland scientists on the market viability of corn over grass.495 In 1964, 
Monsanto issued a news release describing the damage done by wild oats and how the company, 
along with universities, developed Avadex and Far-go-2 to solve the problem.496 Using academic 
studies was a way to support corporate aspirations from a seemingly unbiased source. It also 
buttressed claims of scientific expertise from the companies themselves. By propping up their 
own status as scientific equals to university professors, corporations reinforced that they worked 
with universities in agricultural improvements. It was a fundamental part of the agribusiness 
commodification of knowledge. As private institutions staked a claim on scientific expertise, 
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they were able recraft expectations of ownership of knowledge, reorienting understandings of 
what could be bought and sold. 
Along with exchanges of money and information, these companies also hired many 
former students and professors from land-grants, creating a cross-pollination of expertise. 
Pioneer’s Eastern Division’s sales manager, A.R. Marston, had previously spent eighteen years 
working for Michigan State’s agronomy department before moving to the company. When 
getting in the business of processing their own birds, Perdue Chicken chose to hire Don Mabe, a 
student with a graduate degree in poultry science from North Carolina State.497 Monsanto 
frequently head hunted employees among the hallways of the university system, especially after 
it became clear that agricultural chemicals were going to be a big money-maker for the company. 
When creating a new management post for crop technology, the company snagged assistant 
professor Earl Spurrier from the University of Illinois.498 The chemical corporation also staffed 
their franchise stores with graduates of the local land-grant. 499 Both Monsanto and International 
Harvester clearly believed that maintaining this network of expertise was critical to maintaining 
their hold over the industry. An International Harvester public relations review meeting in 1970 
explained that the company needed to continue its outreach on campus “even during lean 
times.”500 Monsanto created a special post, held by a former professor, to coordinate the 
relationship between the company and various universities.501 They even initiated a three day 
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seminar to attract college students who were, “oblivious to the fact that industry and trade are the 
chief wellspring of our relative affluence.”502 This web of experts, both private and public, 
allowed for a hybridization of scientific knowledge as a private commodity that could be bought 
for the public good. While public institutions were (and are) supposed to be free of favoritism or 
bias, private funding made it difficult to resist company desires. This was a fact that many 
agribusinesses were well aware of and sought to exploit. Moreover, this intermingling of experts 
blurred the line between the public, the private, and who produced scientific innovation. When 
university professors and students became private employees, they brought both their scientific 
knowledge and a public persona with them. By employing these men, agribusinesses achieved 
some semblance of authority. It justified the commodification of scientific solutions and the 
weight of those solutions in the agricultural industry. 
These relationships also went beyond financial assistance and mutual employment. 
Public and private institutions also shared a mutual vision of the future of agriculture, one that 
depended on both input industries to supply the material and research to continually improve the 
product. Upon signing the 1955 cooperative research agreement, Michigan State’s agronomy 
department head, Kenyon Payne, waxed, “there is a tremendous future ahead if responsible 
industry and agricultural experiment stations…and join forces toward a common objective.”503 
Pioneer’s general manager Robert Woods replied that similar research programs would “make 
for a better feeling between commercial companies and experiment stations.”504 Monsanto 
declared that cooperation between themselves and academia helped educational outreach to 
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farmers, leading to agricultural progress.505 Other state agronomists were even more direct in 
their desire to promote hybrids. A.D. Stuart, an Extension Specialist from North Carolina, hoped 
that the company’s continued cooperation would ensure the state’s farmers would convert the 
remaining forty percent of corn acreage to hybrids. In hopes of “making progress,” Stuart asked 
if Pioneer would be willing to send free seed corn to county agents and vocational agriculture 
teachers throughout the state. It was a request that Pioneer quickly answered, offering free two 
pound samples to every county agent or vocational-agricultural instructor in the state.506 
Although agribusinesses had a cozy relationship with these agricultural scientists, a 
certain amount of tension also existed. While these companies courted and used land-grant 
institutions and the state extension service, they also conflicted over claims to expertise. Who 
exactly was the expert became muddled even as ties between these institutions grew closer. 
Pioneer’s desire to control information led the company to subtly challenge academic positions 
by presenting their own research as superior, often directly to the farmers and local agents 
themselves. In one internal company letter, Indiana Pioneer’s Vance York remarked that the first 
draft of a company alfalfa bulletin held too many quotes and references by university 
agronomists.507 Other times, however, the restrained nature of the conflict turned into a more 
obvious dustup between “experts.” Occasionally, academics did not approve of the 
agribusinesses’ tactics and their consequences in the rural community. One unnamed extension 
agent in 1934 wrote that the developing broiler industry was, “being falsely promoted by 
propaganda which is being distributed by feed manufacturers, incubator companies, poultry 
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journals, hatcherymen, lumber dealers, real estate dealers, and others who have things to sell.”508 
He concluded that this unstable base spelled future disaster for the region’s chicken farmers. 
Such an affront would not go unchallenged. Nursing a grudge for over twenty years, DPI 
responded to this and other claims of big businesses domination. They denied that corporations 
inhibited local wealth and competition, saying, “Growers are free to decide if they want to grow 
broilers, and if so, how many, as well as on what basis (independent or under contractual 
agreement) they will grow chickens.”509 DPI also maintained that contract growing actually 
helped farmers, allowing them to take on the labor without the risk.510 
One other telling instance was a clash between Michigan State’s Department of Farm 
Crops (headed by Kenyon Payne) and Pioneer’s Eastern Division, two institutions that until 1959 
held a mutually beneficial relationship. The company’s general manager complained that 
Pioneer’s own research plots had failed to yield similar results, with the heavy implication that 
either the test or the researcher was biased against the company.511 But the land-grant was not 
going to take that insinuation lying down. E.C. Rossman, professor in the crops department, 
defended the experiment’s results and his own department’s role in it claiming, “We attempt at 
all times to conduct the trials without bias or favoritism.”512 Then, in his own understated jab at 
the company, Rossman remarked 
I realize that this drop in the number of entries reflects your lack of confidence in the 
trials. Several other seed companies have markedly increased their number of entries 
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during the same period of time. If there is anything to the point with more entries one 
stands a better chance of coming out on top, it appears to me that decreasing the number 
of entries would be a mistake.513 
Perhaps to salve any sore feelings left by his professor, Payne sent a missive to the company 
observing that differences in opinion were good and ensuring that the communication lines 
would remain open.514 
While agribusiness sometimes faced challenges to their dominance by university 
scientists, both private and public entities maintained a similar understanding of the place of 
scientific discovery in human progress and their own role as authority figures. By the postwar 
period, America witnessed the full turn of a curious transformation: the transfer of agricultural 
expertise from farmers (who actually produced the agricultural commodities) to various outside 
entities. As this specific perception of science and technology became more entrenched within 
different organizations, both private and public, many came to believe that farmers themselves 
did not know how to farm in an appropriately modern fashion. Instead, they needed to be shown 
new scientific methods, which, not coincidently, required the aid of these businesses. Authority 
over agriculture therefore shifted from the actual local producer to a group of scientific experts. 
Though quick to celebrate the farmer for his perceived virtue, these agribusinesses firmly 
believed that the increasingly technical nature of agriculture made it impossible for farmers to 
fully grasp these necessary changes. Rather, farmers needed the help of agricultural experts to 
explain the finer points of their profession. Monsanto argued that after the Second World War, 
farming had become increasingly technical, requiring the use of “professional advisors” to bring 
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correct information to the farmer.515 Other times, modern applications were “too complicated” 
for farmers to understand and they needed someone with a professional background to translate. 
When developing new sales literature for the 1960 season, Pioneer employee R.A. Bibbins 
suggested that the company focus on production methods, as breeding research was too technical 
for farmers to understand.516 Earlier in December, the Eastern Division general manager praised 
research department scientist Owen Newlin for his breakdown of research breeding to salesmen 
(area farmers), most of whom could not understand the complicated process of seed production 
and therefore failed to realize how progressive Pioneer actually was.517 By the late 1960s, this 
shift in authority and expertise appeared so widespread that some even questioned the 
foundational conceptions of farming itself. If companies controlled the input and output 
production, if these corporation were both the producer, processor, and marketer of commodities, 
did that not make them farmers? Sure, they did not necessarily meet the traditional definition, but 
it was the companies that actually controlled agricultural production. Through their use of 
science and technology, corporations had allowed agriculture to progress beyond many of the 
problems of the past. No wonder retailer Seth Shaw pondered, “just who is the farmer in this 
case?”518 
So the real question then became: who was the farmer in a modern system so wholly 
based on the widespread implementation of science and technology? The answer for 
agribusinesses was simple: they were. Their use of scientific knowledge and extensive 
application allowed them to conceive of a better future, one in which man would have full 
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control of his environment. Ultimately, just as agricultural companies reimagined their history 
and attempted to reshape the identity of farmers on an individual level, so too did they utilize 
certain perceptions of science and technology to integrate themselves more fully into the 
agricultural system. Their place as innovators granted them authority to evangelize the scientific 
power, which in turned reinforced agribusinesses’ perceived role in agriculture. But while belief 
is all well and good, acceptance is another matter altogether. If customers were not buying 
whatever agribusinesses were selling, then there would not be an agribusiness system for very 
much longer. In order to integrate farmers and food consumers in their vision of agriculture, 
specifically a highly industrialized large scale system, agribusinesses needed to develop a 
marketing scheme, one that justified the price of admission. Luckily, America’s changing 
conceptions of consumerism also provided a vehicle to do just that. Witnessing the advent of the 
nation as a Consumers’ Republic, agribusinesses arranged their products and ideology under the 
mantel of the “cult of convenience.”  
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CHAPTER SIX: THE CULT OF CONVENIENCE: CHANGES IN FOOD RETAIL 
 
 Opening in 1957, “The House of Tomorrow” became Disneyland’s latest hit attraction. 
Sponsored and created by Monsanto, this house gave customers a glimpse into what Americans 
could possibly enjoy by the mid-1980s. Over the next three years, over six million visitors 
walked through the walls of this structure to ogle at the possibility of the future. With its bold 
lines, synthetic fabrics, and curved walls, this house seemed to offer an impossible number of 
advancements to wow the amazed crowds. One of the most popular rooms proved to be the 
kitchen. Stocked with advanced appliances, including a high-powered microwave for quick 
cooking, refrigerated pantry to freeze and store foodstuffs, and a sonic dishwasher for easy clean 
up, the kitchen looked to be a homemaker’s dream. Quick, easy, and most of all convenient, 
Monsanto’s house offered a happy future where the homemaker could enjoy all the benefits of 
modernity without the backbreaking drudgery of the past. In fact, in using the materials provided 
by the corporation, the whole family could find their food production and consumption 
completely changed for the better: “The fun is making the most of the ultimate in kitchen 
convenience and efficiency.  A dream of the future brought to reality by Monsanto”519 No longer 
a slave to the stove, Monsanto claimed to hold the key to unchaining America’s wives and 
mothers. Their ability to provide time-saving technology would deliver on their promise that 
“tomorrow is always built on today.”  
 This belief was reflected not just in Monsanto’s corporate attractions, but also within the 
wider transformation of the food retail industry after the Second World War. Just as 
agribusinesses involved in commodity production in agriculture looked to solidify its place 
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through the promise of biological control, so to would corporations connected to food retail 
(including processors, packers, supermarket chains, appliance manufacturers, and others), utilize 
a similar conception to ensure their continued dominance of this industry. For food retailers 
though, this promotion would center on their assurance of convenience. As a theme, convenience 
is one of the pillars of modern marketing. Since the 1920s, researchers and academics have 
documented this conception as a strong motivation in purchasing choice. While the earliest 
researchers viewed convenience through the lens of the actual purchase (quick and easy buying), 
the postwar marketer and interested scholars recognized convenience as a perceived attribute 
credited to the product itself. A convenient product gave the consumer non-pecuniary benefits 
that could not be completely quantified. Temporal convenience allowed customers to “save 
time” by using a certain product or service, therefore permitting them to spend their hours on 
other activities.520 Like time, “saving effort” has also been acknowledged as an integral part of 
convenience, though it received much less scholarly attention.521 Even today, recent studies have 
shown that convenience continues to have a major impact on both buying decisions and product 
usage.522  
 For consumers in the postwar era, this mentality can be placed under the umbrella of “the 
cult of convenience.”523 Much like the promotion of corporate science and technology for input 
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manufacturers, companies on the other end of the agricultural spectrum made “convenience” an 
elementary aspect of their version of modern food production, a version they transmitted to 
customers through advertisements, marketing ploys, and other corporate efforts. The cult of 
convenience promised accessibility, ease, and variety without losing quality assurance. In 
essence, corporate use and control of science and technology allowed people not just to have 
their cake and eat it too, but to make the cake with ease, on the cheap, and still have it taste as 
good as homemade. It permitted consumers to participate in this ideology of the middle class by 
“enjoying” the benefits of quick and easy meals, therefore letting them spend their time on other 
activities. By proving that large businesses could bring this convenience to customers, 
agribusinesses looked to remake the retail landscape and further insinuate corporatization into 
America’s grocery stores and pantries. 
 In many ways, convenience and its connection to the ideals of the middle class fit neatly 
into other changes the retail industry was undergoing. A postwar economic boom and changing 
attitudes retrained assumptions about consumerism and citizenship, championing mass 
consumption as both the key to holding on to democratic values and reaching economic 
prosperity. It also remade the environmental landscape, as demands for housing and new public 
spaces created suburbia as we know it today.524 In this way, mass demand for convenient buying 
also helped develop another staple of the era, the supermarket. These shopping centers owed 
much to the vision of collective order and predictability desired by the state and retailers alike. 
Helped along by federal policy, retailers looked to impose a top-down model of consumerism on 
one specifically troublesome group of consumers, housewives. Nineteenth and early twentieth 
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century patterns of consumption illustrated a surprising amount of female power. Bargaining and 
haggling were an intricate part of the shopping experience, with female demand for service and 
choice the driving force within interactions between retailers and customers. Supermarkets 
looked to move control from female to institutional authority, relegating housewives to the role 
of passive consumers in a highly structured world of individual choice.525 In this vein, 
convenience was a critical aspect of supermarket development. Beyond the physical benefits (the 
convenience of buying everything a family needed in one location), supermarkets also seemed to 
offer accessibility and variety. It was a model that appealed directly to postwar assumptions of 
middle-class identity, a fulfillment of individual desires through consumerism and the illusion of 
choice. In this way, the act of buying at a supermarket was a performance that signaled one’s 
socio-economic status to the wider world.   
 Just as retail changed after the Second World War, so too did the companies that 
packaged and supplied the products. The meat industry in particular faced considerable 
fluctuations within their production and operational processes. For one, American tastes in meat 
underwent a radical realignment, which in turn affected their systems of production. Appetite for 
beef and poultry soared as demand for pork and mutton decreased. The steady dominance of the 
Big Four packers slowly eroded, leading to a period of intensified competition which would 
eventually leave many former processing and packaging companies dead or sold off by the 
1980s. Changing taste and competition even modified the fattening process. Whereas large-scale 
ranches and grazing had once dominated the American beef and pork market, feedlots and 
confinement began to replace these older models. Commercial feeders could more easily adopt 
the newest technological innovations and scientific discoveries, including feed additives and 
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antibiotics. For ranchers, technological changes and market competition forced many to either 
expand or close down their operations. Much like farmers involved in dairy production, the 
growing overhead cost compelled many towards specialization.526 
Other innovations also dramatically changed both the physical landscape of packing 
plants and their processing methods. Perhaps the most transformative aspect was the movement 
away from large city-centers like Chicago to rural America. Avoiding transportation costs, along 
with undermining the well-organized meat packing unions, appealed to many corporations, and 
by 1970, the Windy City’s packing industry was dead. In turn, the move out to the countryside 
allowed packers to not only become more virulently anti-union, but also to utilize new 
technology to streamline the handling process. Iowa Beef Packers, today owned by Tyson Foods, 
remade the industry by dismembering and vacuum packing its own cuts of beef. This avoided the 
burden of shipping whole sides of beef, which further cut down on distribution costs and 
standardized specific cuts. This soon became widely adopted by other packers, leading to the 
vacuum packed, tiny pre-made meat packages consumers buy today.527 
Labor of Love: “Easing” the Labor and Time Burden of Homemakers 
 In 1949, Oscar-Award winning actress Spring Byington took on a new role. Playing a 
helpless housewife “Mrs. America,” Byington slaved away in her house. Overburdened by her 
food preparation and other duties, Byington ruined her family’s dinner and looked despondently 
up into the camera. It was here that the focus shifted to another famous actress, 1920s star Eva 
Novak, now playing a plump and pleasant older homemaker somewhere in Middle America. 
Novak sympathized with Byington, recalling, “there were certain days when everything was just 
too much for me.” But luckily, those days were over for Novak. Now, she claimed, “my cooking 
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is done in the modern manner.” How so, the viewer was supposed to ask? Well, through the 
power of new technology, specifically, the pressure cooker. Moving from a weepy tale of woe to 
a full on infomercial, a booming male narrator informed the audience that pressure cooking cut 
down on meal preparation time and labor while also improving food quality and taste. By the 
end, the commercial urged its audience to see pressure cooking as “a new way of cooking,” 
designed and built by the National Presto Company.528 This appliance maker was hardly the first 
or the last to conceive of their products as time and labor saving devices. In fact, the marriage 
between corporate created technology and easy living was one of the most prominent tropes in 
the cult of convenience. 
This desire for less labor in meal production came from very real pressure on female time 
management. While cultural normativity presented an image of traditional domestic bliss, with 
women playing the role of housekeeper, cook, and caregiver, the reality was that more and more 
women were entering the job market. The immediate postwar years witnessed a large drop off in 
female employment, only to tick upwards in the 1950s and 60s. In 1950, less than thirty percent 
of the American labor force were women. By 1975, that number had increased by more than ten 
percent.529 Educational opportunities, access to birth control, increasing divorce rates, economic 
hardship, and other societal trends all prompted female employment across class and racial lines. 
However, despite these material changes, society’s socio-cultural perception still reflected the 
assumption of traditional gender roles and expected men and women to conform to these 
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conventions.530 Societal customs considered meal preparation (along with other traditional 
household management) to be the responsibility of the family’s female relatives even if they took 
on other responsibilities. In this vein, convenience was a very real desire for many women 
struggling to balance household management. 
 Yet, changes in household duties were not the only development that had an impact on 
food production and consumption. The postwar period witnessed a greater adoption of 
technological advancements to domestic labor. From the microwave to the dishwasher, different 
appliances altered the preparation and preservation of food on a fundamental level. Advocates 
stressed these machines as labor saving devices, allowing women to spend less time on chores 
and more time enjoying family activities or personal hobbies. Of course, as Ruth Schwartz 
Cowan's More Work for Mother pointed out, these changes did not necessarily provide the labor 
easement they claimed. In fact, the industrialization of the household only increased the burden 
on women, freeing men and children to pursue public roles, and relegating women to the realm 
of unspecialized and isolated domestic labor. Moreover, the hours spent on household labor did 
not actually fall. Instead, these devices only increased standards of cleanliness and management 
expected of women.531 
 Food companies and other observers were very much aware of these changes to both 
meal expectations and widespread adoption of technological advancements in the kitchen. As the 
primary household spenders, women were an attractive target for companies across the diverse 
food and fiber industry. Even Monsanto believed that women were the key to developing a 
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strong public image.532 When speaking on the future of food and farming in America, professor 
of Agricultural Economics John Hopkins observed that with the increasing number of working 
women, “shoppers will be looking more and more for convenience as well as for quality and 
variety in the food items they buy.”533 Monsanto noted that more women were looking for 
convenience in food preparation.534 In one discussion of company marketing strategies, Rath’s 
W.C. Roberts remarked that supermarkets were increasing both their frozen and hot deli meals, 
looking to break into the growing market for easy mealtimes.535  
 As a result, the desire to decrease labor intensity became one of the primary marketing 
tools of many corporations involved in food production. Countless marketing campaigns and 
advertisements promoted food products as quick and easy to make. Beyond the advent of TV 
dinners and “instant” products, meat items also underwent image renovation with an emphasis on 
convenience. Certainly Hormel’s Spam was one of the most prominent foods to embody a sense 
of quick and versatile meal making. Introduced in 1937, this canned meat eventually became a 
staple foodstuff for allied troops in World War Two. Despite gaining a reputation as a poor 
man’s ham, Hormel’s ability to promote the product as a convenient and long-lasting alternative 
led to its continuous production into the twenty-first century. On a fundamental level, Hormel 
was able to turn their product into more than just a foodstuff, but an actual commodity in both 
labor-saving practicality and technical prowess. Spam sold on its ease of use and storage.536 Yet, 
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it was this very connection to practicality that allowed the Hormel product to promote itself as a 
product of the modern age. Spam’s ability to solve problems (particularly the issues of time 
management and storage) made it a source of progress. By default then, Hormel assumed its 
place as the agent of this positive change. The company believed and promoted that it was 
through their use and control of science and technology that more Americans were able to enjoy 
the “modern” way of eating. Or as one Hormel advertisement professed, “Hormel products are 
designed to meet the homemaker's needs for wholesomeness, freshness and flavor, convenience 
and variety.”537 
 But Hormel was hardly the only meat processor to tap into this cult of convenience and 
its connection to modernization. Rath Packing Company also made it a point to focus on 
convenience and the corporatization of science. Many campaigns emphasized the quick 
preparation of Rath products. One campaign scheduled in Texas during the spring of 1950 
advertised, “meaty, marvelous sausage…in 3 minutes,” accompanied by a comic showcasing 
Rath’s versatile nature.538 Another promotion in 1967 made a point to push retailers to display 
more Rath products in high traffic areas to showcase its shelf stability. 539 In a campaign closer to 
home, Rath salesmen in Iowa emphasized the theme of “easy suppers” made with Rath meats.540 
Throughout the years, Rath made a strong point to underscore simple preparation and easy 
storage as essential elements of their products. 
 Another key feature was the emphasis on the complete utility of Rath products. The 
company maintained that its packing process made their meat uniquely practical and adaptable 
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because it was completely consumable. Rath often touted its exacting trimming standards, 
“vacuum-sealed” packing methods, and even its “inject-o-cure” device for delivering a flavorful 
but completely useable product.541 Easy preparation meant that the housewife would not waste 
time trimming or de-boning the product. Rath believed this premise of a “waste-free” item to be 
strong marketing scheme, one that would increase sales for the company and retailers alike. One 
promotion leaflet argued that the “housewife enjoys every bite she buys of this waste-free 
product.” Profit, for the company, the retailer, and the customer all centered on food efficiency. 
The ability to combat wastefulness made less time and labor spent on preparation, making it an 
innate component of convenience. 
 Yet, perhaps one of the more difficult elements of this marketing of convenience was its 
elusive nature. It is clear that many companies spent a considerable amount of time and money 
trying to puzzle out an exact definition and what customers’ requirements were. Like taste, 
perceptions of convenience are fluid and vague, often molding to specific experiences in time 
and place. For meat, convenience often had a contentious relationship with notions of freshness. 
An organic material like meat has a rapid decomposition rate, making different preservation 
methods a critical component in taste. As such, the difference between canning, curing, salting, 
drying, and freezing was a major choice that all processors faced. Though technology often 
influenced what forms of preservation the packers chose, customer tastes also reshaped these 
methods. 
 One problem the pork packer Rath consistently had to confront was the negative 
association between canning and freshness. In the past, much of Rath’s success had come 
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through their sales of canned meat. When frozen foods became more and more popular in the 
postwar era (especially as refrigerators and freezers became more advanced and widespread), 
canned foods faced a growing negative response. Even during the company’s peak years of the 
forties and fifties, Rath was well aware of this emerging problem in their process. As early as the 
spring of 1955, the company’s marketing firm, Earle Ludgin & Company, warned Rath that the 
majority of housewives preferred frozen to canned.542 Other product testing also indicated a 
similar trend among tested customers. One experimental product demonstration showed that, 
“people liked canned for convenience and frozen for better ‘homemade’ flavor.”543 Reading the 
writing on the wall, Rath began to move some of its production towards frozen processed meats. 
 Even as Rath moved towards frozen foods, that too presented problems for the pork 
packer. Facing a decrease in sales (probably due to inadequate hog production levels and 
changing customer tastes), Rath launched an exploratory study to define existing attitudes 
towards processed meats in the late fifties. The study started with a simple interview session with 
eight groups of housewives and later their husbands. While the preliminary results showed a 
number of varying opinions, the most striking feature was disparate gendered attitudes towards 
acceptable meals. Both groups agreed that the presence of a male breadwinner constituted a 
“family meal,” which meant that frozen processed meats were fundamentally unacceptable. The 
interviewed men were especially forthright this assertion. Interviewers observed that these men 
believed frozen pot pies and casseroles to be primarily “women’s food.” Researchers remarked 
that these men really did expect their wives “to spend a certain amount of time in the kitchen 
putting some efforts into the preparation of his meal. They laced their comments with such 
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expressions as: ‘The lord and master.’ Big deal!"544 The women interviewed also echoed a 
similar expectation. Research indicated that the women felt that their husbands deserved 
“something better than packaged left-overs with a commercial, restaurant flavor when he comes 
home after a day's work.” The women openly admitted to feelings of guilt when serving such a 
meal.545  
 On the other hand, the interviewed women were not willing to completely abandon 
frozen prepared meats as a meal option. They pointed out the products’ serviceable nature for 
snacks or lunches, especially when the husband was not present. In general, the women agreed 
that the frozen meats were more convenient and quick to make, but considered them to have an 
overall poorer taste. Finally, unlike their husbands (who both the interviewers and women 
described as “fussy”), these housewives believe that frozen pre-made meats could be used at 
family meals during emergencies or special situations. They expressed the need for tolerance 
from men, particularly during heavy house cleaning or social events.546 It was a feeling that 
seemed to confirm a fundamental contradiction of the postwar era, the class focus on convenient 
consumption conflicting with the reality of gendered expectations. Promises of quick meals 
clashed with cultural assumptions about the place of men and women in society. Though 
technology claimed to help women, the promised reality was less assured. It was a complex issue 
that Rath and other meat packers needed to evaluate in their quest to increase sale numbers. 
 Some companies found their processing methods lent themselves well to marketing 
convenience as an innate quality of their product. Unlike Rath which struggled to keep up with 
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consumer demands, Perdue’s poultry processing made the company’s leap into new markets 
rather painless and led to a period of economic growth for the poultry industry in general. One 
observer suggested that the revolutionary development came from a fundamental change in 
shipping and handling. Before the Second World War, processers would often ship live birds or 
“New York” dressed (dead poultry with attached heads, feet, and entrails) chickens to city 
centers, where they would be bought and sold by local butchers. The movement towards full 
evisceration by processors was expensive but resulted in, “convenience and freshness, as well as 
sanitation and other considerations.”547 These other considerations also included the rise of 
branding and a focus on self-service. The prepackaging of poultry vastly changed the power 
dynamics between processors and butchers. The shipment of full birds meant that butchers 
controlled the flow of the market and their shops were the nexus points of choice. Housewives 
came and stipulated the cuts they wanted, allowing butchers to cut the birds to their 
specifications. Once prepackaged cuts came on the market, butchers were robbed of their 
primary role, regulated to being the middle-man in the cold chain. Branding, rather than 
butchering, was the principal source of choice, one that centered on the processors.548 
 Poultry packers like Perdue used this processing method to emphasize the convenience 
and freshness of their products. To drive this point home, the company advertised their cold 
packing and shipping as key to keeping the chicken fresh and convenient for awaiting customers. 
Perdue touted its large ice-making machines, remarking, “The ice is carefully chipped and 
shaved to the proper size. First the tender young golden-yellow color chickens are chilled to 34 
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degrees---never frozen, of course.”549 The cold packed chicken then saved housewives the time it 
took to defrost frozen meats. Cold but non-frozen meat offered a sense of preserved freshness 
without the hassle or taste aversion of other methods. The ability to provide cold but non-frozen 
poultry was one aspect of the company’s media blitz when entering the New York market. In a 
letter to Food Chief Supermarkets, CEO Frank Perdue noted that his company, “just commenced 
our first TV advertising of what we believe to be the finest fresh, ice-pack poultry product sold in 
the New York Metropolitan area.”550 Another advisor argued that the company should tell the 
“honest” story of the processor’s cold chain, highlighting their ability to bring in fresh chicken in 
a convenient way.551 This connection between cold packing and customer convenience was also 
used by Rath Packing, though to much less success.  
 Of course, marketing convenience was not just about the physical reality of less labor, but 
the hypothetical benefits of saving that all-important middle-class trait, free time. Corporations 
involved in all aspects of the food industry marketed their products as innately tied to greater 
possibilities of leisure and personal improvement. One Monsanto publication maintained that 
chemicals made food more stable and preparation much easier, taking the guesswork out of 
cooking. In turn, the modern housewife was able to have a “well-rounded” personality and more 
free time to pursue outside interests. The company’s research then made, “the job of being 
mother and housewife a lot easier, and the results more fun for her and her healthier family.”552 
International Harvester also promoted its appliances as leisure making possibilities, remarking 
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that their refrigerators made it easier for housewives to store more food. Thus, housewives could 
spend less time shopping and more on other family-centered activities.553 
 One of the major elements of this time saving consumption was the growth of the 
shopping mall. These new shopping centers of the postwar era promised greater accessibility, 
and with that, an innate source of convenient comfort. On a physical level, the development of 
the shopping center changed the environmental impact of shopping forever. The most obvious 
difference was the shift from urban spaces to suburban “centers.” These carefully planned spaces 
“brought the market to the people,” allowing suburbanites a convenient source of consumption 
without the hassle of travel to the city. Ample parking space, a litany of stores, longer hours, and 
carefully segmented spaces all appealed to a population shopping more frequently as a form of 
leisure. Of course, shopping centers also appealed to suburbanites not just because of what they 
offered but also what (or whom) they kept out. Unsavory elements of urbanization were 
seemingly eliminated. Retailers deliberately chose to exclude unwelcome segments of the 
population, including the underclass and racial minorities, from these centers by virtue of 
location. Building these shopping centers within new suburban areas, zones that purposefully 
prohibited people of color, retailers only added to the racial divide over accessibility. Therefore, 
ease of access and the comfort of quick consumption (with the understanding that these would 
lead to more free time) became yet another talisman of who could join in the consumer’s 
republic of the postwar era and who could not.554 
But perhaps more important than the physical change of the shopping center was its 
conceptual embodiment of middle-class identity. Shopping centers became important areas for 
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Americans to perform their identity through observed consumption. Those who could afford to 
venture to these centers could establish their place as consumers, partaking in shared patterns of 
buying and selling. Shoppers who bought goods at these centers seemed to enjoy the 
convenience of easy access and then, presumably, enjoy more free time. Easy consumption was a 
comfort given to those who could afford to attain it. It was just that the price of admission was 
higher for some. Stores at these new shopping centers deliberately situated themselves to appeal 
to a middle-class clientele, not just in location, but in mindset. One scholar suggested that social 
stratification was one of the most important influences on buying behavior.555 Another observed 
that since 1940, the leveling of incomes had encouraged department stores to appeal more and 
more to the middle class.556 Marketer Pierre Martineau noted that class identification played a 
critical role in the customer choice of store: 
The most important function of retail advertising today, when prices and quality have 
become so standard, is to permit the shopper to make social-class identification. This she 
can do from the tone and physical character of the advertising. Of course, there is also the 
factor of psychological identification. Two people in the same social class may want 
different stores. One may prefer a conservative store, one may want the most advanced 
styling. But neither will go to stores where they do not "fit," in a social-class sense.557 
What was revealing about these shopping centers and the performance of identity was not so 
much how they were based around actual income, but rather perceptions of what the middle class 
wanted. New shopping areas were meant to ease the time and labor burden on women, thus 
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creating more chances to enjoy other hobbies. But these shopping centers also looked to offer 
leisure opportunities for the whole family, thus keeping potential customers close even as they 
promoted themselves as convenient shopping areas. 
 Leisure time was also another point of emphasis for a lot of company-funded educational 
shorts and other commercials based around kitchen appliances. In 1956, General Motors’ 
Frigidaire division published the “Kitchen of Tomorrow,” a short ten-minute film that 
demonstrated the company’s vision of what future food preparation would look like when using 
corporate products. Featuring a long-legged and lithe housewife dancing around a kitchen that 
performed all the necessary tasks for her (including choosing and cooking the meals), the 
convenient technology of Frigidaire’s “push-button magic” allowed the happy housewife to “be 
free around the clock,” enjoying tennis, golf, and sunbathing.558 Nearly ten years later, their rival 
Ford Motor Company and their appliance division, also produced an industrial film on the future 
of the American household, titled “1999 A.D.” Ford predicted that a domestic network of 
computers would effectively control all household needs, including meal preparation and 
cleaning. Without the laborious tasks in the kitchen, this housewife of future was able to spend 
more time shopping, looking after her children, and enjoying hobbies like pottery and music. 
Ford remarked that this house of the future represented a society “rich in leisure and taken for 
granted comforts.”559 These films were not just flights of fantasy for corporations, despite some 
of their outlandish predictions (including a “home-health” couch that diagnosed health problems 
and a fish bowl oven that quickly whipped delicious baked goods). Each short made critical 
connections between the future, convenience, and corporatization. After all, it was corporate 
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production of technology that created this possibility. Their control was central to creating this 
utopian world, one that freed humans from labor while still allowing them to enjoy the comforts 
of a techno-futuristic world. 
 The ability to ease labor burdens and create a comfortable existence represented an 
opportunity for agribusinesses to solidify their place in all aspects of the industry. Just as tractor 
manufacturers’ touted the effortless nature of their implements in the field, so too did appliance 
makers and meat packers exploit desires for easy meal preparation in the domestic household. 
The postwar emphasis on consumerism and the middle-class lifestyle made “convenience” an 
attractive vector for corporate marketing. Finally, corporate constructions of history and techno-
futurism once again emphasized the role of companies to bring about a better tomorrow. Meat 
packers attempted to show how their products brought the speed, simplicity, and freshness of the 
future to present. Monsanto, International Harvester, and other businesses involved in appliance 
manufacturing, food preservation, and storage argued a similar theme. 
Affording Convenience: Price Drive 
 Of course, a decrease in labor time and effort was not the only aspect of convenience that 
attracted marketers and housewives alike. Though a booming economy increased household 
income for many Americans, it remained clear that product cost was integral part of buying and 
selling. Numerous academic articles testified to the continued influence of “price drive” in the 
market place.560 In fact, several researchers discovered that money-saving products seemed to 
have a greater effect on the choices of the more affluent. One study in particular observed that 
the members of the middle class placed much greater importance on price within the buying 
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decision than lower-income customers.561 No doubt this was in part due to the greater variety of 
brand choices afforded to customers who could shop at supermarkets and shopping centers. 
However, this hyper-importance placed on the cost of the product was more than just a 
response to physical location. Instead, price reflected a critical component of middle class 
identity. Low cost of foodstuffs allowed families to transfer priorities from basic necessities (like 
food) to luxuries that invoked their socio-economic status. Price drive was more significant to 
the shoppers of the middle class because other consumption defined their lifestyle. Household 
capital once spent on everyday provisions could now cover a second car, summer camp for 
children, or a new television set. In essence, low food cost set in motion other elements of 
consumerism. Convenience in food then defined not just labor intensity, but the capital 
investment in general.562 
Therefore, like saving time and energy, part of this cult of convenience became focused 
on price savings as an inherent part of the middle class lifestyle. Hoping to lure in discerning 
customers, companies marketed low-prices as an essential part of a convenient product. Just as 
convenience saved the housewife from excess labor burdens, so too would it save the whole 
family money to be spent on other, more enjoyable things. Cheap but hearty products promised 
to provide healthy food without breaking the bank. Companies involved in food processing 
maintained that this paradox, this convenience of “inexpense,” was possible because of corporate 
actions and methods. It was corporatization then that allowed customers to enjoy these savings. 
 Food prices in America have changed drastically over the last century, with industry 
developments, increased mechanization, and federal policy (among other factors) influencing 
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price point. High agricultural production and a lack of intense domestic crises, like civil war, 
have insured a stable supply of needed foodstuffs. But more than that, federal policy has 
undergirded a system that assured low food prices for the masses. Progressive reformers created 
the Country Life Commission of 1908 in part to guarantee an adequate food supply for a growing 
American population.563 During the Great Depression, federal relief agencies worked to bring 
low cost food to millions (even as the USDA and other agricultural services looked to increase 
farm incomes by decreasing oversupply). The First and the Second World War led to a drastic 
increase in federal oversight over food and fiber, attempting to feed a warring nation without 
shortchanging either its civilian or military populations. But it was the fight over consumerism 
and price controls in the 1940s that truly defined the rest of century. Despite withdrawing from 
overt market regulation with the end of the Office of Price Administration in 1946, the 
government nevertheless supported a system that supplied low-cost food to the American 
people.564  
 While inflation has clearly increased costs (after all, a loaf of bread that once cost 5¢ in 
1913 now averages $2.40), most Americans have enjoyed relatively low prices for their food.565 
This was especially apparent after the Second World War. In spite of federal deregulation, 
families spent less of their income on food than their parents or grandparents. In 1901, for 
instance, the average family spent over forty two percent of their annual revenue on food.566 
During the Great Depression, food expenditures remained high (33.6%).567 In contrast, 
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household income allocated for food decreased to its lowest point yet by 1965, with families 
spending just twenty four percent on food. For the first time, Americans expended more of their 
income on housing and accompaniments than food for the table.568 Today, these numbers are 
even more striking. Between 1960 and 2002, the percentage of household income spent on food 
dropped from 24% to mere 13.1%.569 Moreover, as income increased, the household capital 
percentage spent on food fell significantly.570 In general, statisticians of the Bureau of Labor 
calculated that in a year Americans spent only fifty percent of their income on basic necessities, 
down from nearly eighty percent at the turn of the century.571  
 Companies were well aware of these changes in the market and the appeal of price value 
in food retailing. Both from academic studies and their assessment of the market, major 
processors and retailers understood that cost could deeply influence the success of a product, 
even making up for negative associations with taste or flavor. In discussing the burgeoning 
poultry market in the postwar era, two scholars observed, “Anything that could be offered to the 
housewife at declining prices, especially when prices of almost everything else were going up, 
invited its use as a price leader in the retail trade.”572 They went on to argue that broiler chickens 
had assumed a popular image as a “good buy,” leading to greater market expansion.573 Marketers 
echoed a similar perception. When debating possible new products for Perdue, one potential 
advertising firm mentioned that chicken hot dogs might undercut the beef wiener market. The 
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important point was to consider, “what women think about the relative price of chicken versus 
regular hot dogs.”574 Other meat packers also used price as a marketing tool. When trying to 
drum up more retailers for their beef products, Rath made a special reference to cost-benefit, 
noting that their products had better value for the customer and the retailer.575 Savings were at 
the heart of many campaigns as businesses jostled with each other for retail supremacy. 
 Out of all of the singular tactics and possible modes of tapping into this price-drive 
market, none proved to be more pervasive or successful than coupons. These simple slips of 
paper, though existing since the late nineteenth century, increased greatly in popularity after the 
Second World War. Food manufacturers quickly bought into to their appeal, as they seemed to 
trigger more sales.576 Rath Packing heavily used coupons throughout their advertising 
campaigns, especially when introducing their products to new areas or to boost sales in a 
flagging market.577 During a company sales meeting, Rath justified the use of heavy couponing 
as expensive but ultimately worth it in the long run: “women like and use coupons. Survey after 
survey shows that 9 out of 10 women clip coupons. Most of these women end up redeeming their 
coupons for one simple reason…they represent real cash savings at the time of purchases.”578 
This impression of price value was the theme that the company wanted to associate with their 
products. Though seven cents was a steep cut into profit, Rath believed that coupons, “create an 
overall bargain value impression for Rath Sliced Meats.”579 Nearly five years later and one 
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thousand miles away, Perdue Chicken also employed a similar marketing scheme. Looking to 
increase their share of the New York City poultry market, the company saturated the area with an 
all out marketing campaign. The campaign theme partly centered, “around the ‘money back 
guarantee’ for its "golden yellow" broilers that are ‘healthier, meatier, and taste better.’”580 
 Corporations understood that inexpensive goods were a strong part of buying decision, 
especially when the consumer believed that they could transfer the monetary value to more 
desirable commodities. Acknowledging this trend, corporations looked to draw an association 
between the plethora inexpensive goods and corporate command over the direction of the food 
system. Companies wanted to draw parallels between their scientific and technological expertise 
and the ability of Americans to enjoy inexpensive products. As an appliance manufacturer (along 
with their other implements), International Harvester bragged that, “everything manufactured by 
our Company enables the user to earn a profit.”581 Even as Rath struggled to push their products, 
they honed in on the company’s ability to deliver quality beef in a price-minded market.582 
Monsanto highlighted their contribution to the “food revolution” in a 1953 series of articles. The 
company remarked that its research, along with help from farmers and the government, “has 
brought more and better food to the consumer, at the same time holding down prices.”583 Each 
one of these companies placed themselves at the center of this prosperous economy. While not 
technically connected in direct communication, these businesses were nevertheless linked 
through their active support of very deliberate and singular vision. 
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Even non-corporate entities could be used to support this association. Trade groups like 
the Delmarva Poultry Industry, the American Meat Institute, or the Manufacturing Chemists 
Association often endorsed this notion of corporate low cost goods. During DPI’s annual chicken 
festival, the group declared that local industry’s efficiency and production methods allowed for a 
tasty yet economical bird for everyone.584 It was the industry’s assembly-line methods, the group 
claimed, that let processors to pass on savings to their customers.585 The Manufacturing 
Chemists Association, which included Monsanto, DuPont, and Dow Chemical, also promoted 
the link between big business and economic convenience. In a booklet entitled “Food Additives: 
What They Are/How They Are Used,” the chemical association promoted chemical additives as 
necessary and beneficial to the food system. Along with a focus on easier preparation and 
storage, better taste and nutrition, and wider variety, the booklet also publicized the ability of 
chemicals to keep food cost-effective, noting, “Dollars spent for food must be kept in line with 
other living expenses. This means that, for the most part, food must be mass-produced to keep 
the price reasonable.”586 
Fundamentally, this period in food retail witnessed a startling number of changes that 
reflected the growing cultural hegemony of the American middle class. The quest for cheaper 
food increasingly intertwined a public hungry for more consumption with corporations ripe for 
expansion. Agribusiness viewed inexpensive products as yet another tool in their conquest of the 
fiber and food industry. By associating their ability to bring cheaper goods to the market with 
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scientific advancement, these corporations tapped into a new age of food and consumerism in 
America. 
The Lynchpin: Quality Assurance in an Age of Convenience 
Yet, all of these various aspects of convenience hinged on one all-important assumption: 
an expectation of continued quality despite these changes. The cult of convenience only worked 
when the products still delivered the things that customers desired, namely taste, flavor, quality, 
and the ever present yet vague sense of “wholesomeness.” Convenience then needed to deliver 
on the promised benefits of speed, ease of use, and inexpense without losing those other traits. 
To be exact, the convenient food also needed to taste good. Otherwise, all those amenities meant 
little. If a housewife made a cake with speed and efficiency (quickly enough to allow her to 
enjoy other pursuits) but the cake tasted poorly or lacked for quality, convenience failed the 
customer. Agribusinesses needed to demonstrate that their products met the customers’ 
expectation of quality. This was the lynchpin in the cult of convenience, the connection that held 
together all of these different strands.  
 Fortunately for agribusinesses, the all-encompassing theme of convenience fit neatly 
with the corporate promotion of their control of science and technology. These companies argued 
that their products could essentially “have it all” because they harnessed the power of scientific 
progress to solve the inconvenience of the past. Much like their attempts to woo farmers, 
companies involved in food processing also publicized how corporate expertise over scientific 
research and methods created products that retained the best elements of the past with added 
convenience of speed, economical price, and leisure. By engaging in research and development, 
agribusinesses insinuated that they eliminated the imperfect variables of food preparation, 
including unwanted drudgery and time wastefulness, to create a perfect blend of good food and 
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convenient living. Just as farmers could expect a perfectly controlled environment to grow crops, 
so too could housewives enjoy a food system that made it easier to buy, store, and make 
delicious and nutritious food for their families. In effect, these companies suggested that private 
institutions (specifically their institution) brought the future to the present, once again reflecting 
the ability of businesses to advance human existence and solve the problems of humanity.  
Retaining quality and efficient production was a critical theme of many advertising 
campaigns. Numerous companies promoted their products as fundamentally high quality. As one 
advertising firm put it, most companies, “try to create an umbrella of quality built around their 
‘name,’ ‘A tradition of quality’, ‘The most trusted name in Meat’.”587 But the definition of 
quality tended to be vague and difficult to fully describe. Though price was also an important 
factor in perceptions of quality, studies of the time showed that connection between cost and 
quality was not necessarily linear.588 In fact, the association between a certain product and the 
perception of “high-quality” relied on many different factors. When discussing strategies for 
marketing their canned hams, Rath’s advertising firm (Earle Ludgin & Company) maintained 
that consumers continually sought reassurance of quality through product traits of leanness, 
tenderness, and lack of fat or gristle. The firm believed that these attributes provided a strong 
direction for the company’s overall strategy.589 James W. North, Vice President of Client 
Services for the advertising firm of Al Lefton, told Frank Perdue that chicken already possessed 
high level of quality acceptance from customers. He noted that, “Chicken can stand on its own. 
It's a food of recognized quality.”590 Chicken, unlike other kinds of meat commodities, benefited 
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from a historic legacy of exclusivity, reserved for only special occasions. Pork, on the other 
hand, had to work to overcome the stigma of poverty and disease.591  
Sometimes corporate processors preferred to showcase the quality of their products by 
heralding the superiority of their stock. Rath Packing constantly promoted the preeminence of 
their cattle and hogs, claiming that they only bought the best stock available.592 Early on, the 
company used their location in the state of Iowa as evidence of quality insurance. Looking to 
associate regional fetishism with innate quality, Rath used Iowa and the tagline “Land’O’Corn” 
to suggest the superiority stock of their meat products.593 Later on, the company would move 
away from this theme to suggest a more uniform quality based solely on their tradename. Due to 
their diversification and acquisition of smaller regional firms, Rath’s new advertising firm, 
Gardner Advertising Company, advised the company to use simple statement like, “if it weren't 
as good as our hams, we wouldn't put our name on it” for acquired products with different brand 
names. They insisted that dropping the “Land’O’Corn” and focusing simply on Rath would 
capitalize on and reinforce uniform quality.594 Rath was not the only packer to suggest this 
theme. Many other companies, including Hormel, Swift, Armour, and Wilson also used this 
claim. Hormel argued that the, “heritage of the Hormel Company has been based upon strict 
adherence to quality. From the very beginning, George A. Hormel's major concern was that 
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quality be built into each product.”595 Superior meat, especially in connection to a company’s 
personal history or superior animal production, was one avenue to showcase innate quality. 
Another marketed characteristic of “high-quality” meat that many corporations used was 
the concept of flavor and taste. Clearly, flavor was a critical part of any successful food 
commodity. Yet, there was no guide to determine what the consumer wanted, and what they did 
not. As a result, companies and researchers spent a great deal of time and effort to determine 
customers’ taste. Unfortunately, just like conceptions of freshness, taste tended to be difficult to 
accurately measure. J.O. Eastlack, the research director for Duncan Foods Company, remarked 
that communicating flavors was the most difficult research problem.596 However, this vagueness 
did not stop meat packers from developing favor as a key part of their advertising. Oscar Meyer 
launched their “sack o’sauce” product with the tag line “fresh cooked flavor,” promising to add 
distinctive flavoring to their canned meat. Armour franks promised an “open-fire” flavor even 
when boiled. By the late 1950s, Rath decided to move away from the regional focus towards an 
explicit emphasis on flavor. During a review of their ham advertising, the analysis noted that 
their hickory smoked flavor had recently become a major point of difference. It continued, 
“During the years that followed, the creative approach evolved into discussions of leanness and 
quality, with holiday-oriented serving suggestions. Gradually the strategy evolved into one of 
exploiting the flavor concept with some tendency back to the product benefits.”597 Eventually, 
the emphasis on flavor moved beyond canned ham to other company products. For the 1973 
fiscal year, Rath began to use hickory smoke to market their bacon. Company advertisers 
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described their primary marketing objective was to, “Exploit and advertise hickory smoking as a 
basic product difference of Rath bacon. Promote hickory smoking as the end benefit for better 
flavored bacon.”598 Even when companies already had another point of stress, flavor was a 
difficult theme to abandon. In the late 1960s, Frank Perdue commented that the company had 
been advised to remove the word healthy as a feature in favor of the flavor. While “healthy” 
seemed like a strong point of emphasis for poultry, advertisers had warned Perdue about the 
possible unwanted connection between health and disease. Therefore, flavor seemed like a better 
option.599   
Whatever the theme that meat packers decided to use (superior stock, flavor, taste, etc) to 
prove quality, all buttressed their arguments by connecting these conveniences with corporate 
use of science and technology. The meat industry projected an image of scientific expertise and 
technological control, demonstrating how they had tapped in to scientific research to create 
convenient yet still wholesome meals. Every step of the process, from breeding and feeding, to 
handling and packaging, seemed designed to increase the convenience of the customer. DPI 
bragged about their ability to improve poultry quality through science: 
From scientifically bred baby chicks, the Delmarva peninsula sends you high quality 
birds, marketed at the tender age of ten weeks. Confined in large, modern houses, fed a 
well-balance diet and grown with care, these chickens provide you with a high quality, 
low cost protein meat. Prepared for market in modern processing plants, our chickens are 
rushed to you daily in large refrigerated trucks.600 
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One of DPI’s major contributors, Perdue Chicken, constantly linked the quality of their birds to 
their modern production process. In one radio commercial, the company boasted, “The 
controlled Perdue broiler quality is absolutely consistent and the finest in the industry--why? 
Because Perdue controls the diet, housing, health and environment of their beautiful laying 
flocks--the quality eggs produced are hatched in their own modern, scientific hatcheries.”601 
Another advertisement claimed that Perdue’s chickens were “pampered,” growing up in a 
scientifically controlled environment that guaranteed a tasty product.602 Corporate control 
ensured that poultry reached a high level of quality and met the needs of customers. 
Other companies, both those involved in poultry production and others concerned with 
beef, pork, lamb, and other meat commodities, also looked to project a similar correlation. Rath 
associated the innate quality of their lamb products with their funding of 4-H, FFA, and other 
vocational agriculture projects. The Waterloo business argued that their continued support of 
academic advancements at the high school and collegiate level (along with their development of 
transportation and advanced processing methods) encouraged more profitable and marketable 
commodities.603 When introducing a new boiled canned ham product, Rath guaranteed the 
quality (“plenty of flavor”) and convenience (leanness with no waste) by highlighting their 
various technical methods of processing. The packer claimed that the boiled hams were, 
“genuine because these muscles are trimmed to 1/8 on the outside and completely defatted 
internally.” Later they maintained, “Rath's double cure guarantees plenty of flavor too. First, 
"inject-o-cure" insures the hams carry our famous flavor clear to their very center. Then hams are 
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placed in vats to further cure.”604 The key to this was proving that the trifecta of quality, 
convenience, and science was completely predicated on corporate scientific research and 
technical expertise. Each one of these terms highlighted the company’s scientific ability, their 
knowledge working to bring the consumer what they wanted.  
Golden Hue: Quality Defined by Color 
Out of all these meat processors, none utilized the correlation between quality and 
corporate science better than Perdue. Their successful application of the cult of convenience, 
with its emphasis on their company’s proficiency in science and technology, allowed them to 
outpace many competitors and expand their hold over the east coast poultry market. While Tyson 
may have produced of a greater range of poultry products and Pilgrim (a rival poultry company 
out of Texas) expanded the scope of their operations through acquisitions, this Delmarva area 
company grew rapidly through smart marketing choices and a drive to capitalize on changing 
customer tastes. Perhaps the best example of Perdue’s success was their employment of this 
marketing strategy to win a dog fight in the most competitive market in America, New York 
City. 
The Big Apple represented a unique situation in the commodity market of America. 
Clearly desirable for its population, potential revenue, and connection to Wall Street, the city’s 
tight and expensive quarters made the turn to mega-stores and one-stop-shopping difficult. 
Moreover, the city’s distinct ethnic neighborhoods and their tendency to frequent specialty food 
stores further proved resistant. The city’s butchers, deeply connected to their neighborhoods 
through their shops, still retained much of the agency that their occupational brethren had lost 
years before to industrial meat packers. This meant that processors had to court local stores. 
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Even processing methods (New York dressed evisceration) placed control of the actual 
dismemberment in the hands of the local butchers, who then listened to the customer and cut the 
poultry according to their wishes. This interaction between local butcher and local consumer was 
the sovereign point of exchange, one over which corporations had very little control. If Perdue 
wanted to succeed in this market, their marketing scheme had to both address the wider 
consumer desires and break into this interchange.605 
Perdue cracked this market with a well-timed media blitz and a perfect representation of 
their corporate superiority through the promotion of their birds, golden-yellow hue. This 
deceptively simple theme, a mere color change made possible by feed additives (marigold petals 
to be exact), proved to be incredibly successful. The color change made the company’s perceived 
distinction possible on a theoretical and material level. The difference between Perdue’s golden 
birds and other poultry was easy to spot, so much so that it became a consistent theme in their 
advertisements.606 On a metaphysical level, the golden hue was a symbol of innate superiority. 
One advertisement argued that color was, “built on quality,” and that, “when it comes to 
healthful, tasty nutritious food for your family, quality is always your best bargain.”607 Perdue 
advertised that not all chicken was the same and that their poultry’s hue indicated “wholesome, 
plump, tender built-in quality!”608 It was here that the lines between the conceptual (quality) and 
the physical (golden color) became blurred.  If customer could literally see the difference, it 
could possibly bind the association between the company and product quality. No wonder Perdue 
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told customers to, “insist on golden-yellow Perdue quality. Perhaps your store will get the quality 
message to meet your quality demand!”609  
It was this demand and its consequences that moved the Perdue’s golden hue from a 
simple scheme to a marketing revolution. Perdue was hardly the first poultry company to try to 
associate their specific birds with high quality. Long before Perdue launched its campaign in 
New York City, several Maine poultry firms managed to command high prices for their quality 
control. However, product differentiation had not allowed these firms much leverage over 
sellers.610 This, combined with the evisceration process and New York’s powerful local butchers, 
placed the agency of choice away from the corporations. But Perdue’s marketing campaign 
changed all of that. Despite resistance from some butchers, more customers began to demand 
Perdue specifically. A company questionnaire, completed by 58 Queens butchers, showed that, 
“The single thing that seems to impress the housewife the most is the advertising.”611 The 
butchers noted that housewives had favorable comments Perdue’s taste, bulk, and especially 
color. More anecdotal evidence from individual surveys suggested a similar conclusion, even to 
the annoyance of local shop owners. Dominick Falletti, a shop owner from Queens, noted that, 
“Sometimes women will come in and ask for Perdue but never tell me why they like it.”612 
Another butcher off handedly commented that local housewives just depended on their butchers 
to sell them the best, but still admitted that some explicitly asked for Perdue.613 The owner of 
Charles Prime Meat Market disclosed that Perdue advertising changed customer demand. He 
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remarked, “Women see all the ads and then come in my store and want to see the Perdue wing 
tag before they buy a chicken. If it don't say Perdue--they not buy.”614 
This customer response fundamentally changed the interaction between firms, sellers, and 
customers, effectively removing much of the power of local shops and turning them into a 
middleman between the supplier and the consumer. Butchers resisted the use of “tags”—
branding labels—because it both inconvenienced them and removed their power to control what 
birds were sold to customers. Some early poultry companies had tried to develop a similar 
branding, only to fail when retailers would simply remove identification.615 But Perdue’s media 
campaign had made that tactic impossible. Customer demand for Perdue products required that 
shop owners procure those birds, and the golden hue made it difficult to disguise anything else as 
the healthy, tasty Delmarva poultry.  
Certainly this pressure to meet new consumer desires made for disgruntled butchers. One 
member of Miller Bros. shop complained about Perdue’s advertising, “All the time it's crammed 
down their throat Perdue--Perdue--Perdue, till now people think it's the only chicken on the 
market!”616 The owner of Galante’s Butcher Shop Food Market explained that housewives 
believed newspaper advertising and forced him to sell Perdue.617 This was confirmed by another 
owner, who acknowledged, “with all the ads in the paper and radio it would be hard to sell 
anything without a Perdue wing tag. Women demand Perdue!”618 Some butchers were especially 
put out by the swelling demand and the changes required to meet it. The owner of Stock’s 
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Market went so far as to experiment with Perdue’s tags and see if it was the advertising or the 
innate quality of the meat that made the difference 
I don't understand it--my customers rave to me about the wonderful Perdue chickens--yet 
I put a few Perdue tags on Rabinowitz and the same women still telling me how good that 
Perdue chicken was! It has got to be the advertising; there is just no other explanation. 
Me, I don't think there was a difference between Perdue and Rabinowitz, that's why I 
made the test.619 
Obvious difference or not, the proof was in the (marigold) petals. New York women brought 
Perdue’s chicken by the truck full. By the fall of the next year, even radio stations that ran 
Perdue commercials began receiving calls demanding to know where to buy the golden 
chicken.620 
The key to making this marketing tactic work was to advertise Perdue’s processing 
methods as uniquely scientific and advanced, allowing the company to deliver convenience to 
the customer. To put it simply, the company had to make people believe that Perdue poultry was 
exceptional, that their process, based on scientific inquiry and technical capability, is what made 
it possible to have tasty and easy to cook birds. The company advertised that their employees 
were “fussy” about their broilers and that their product was the most consistent and superior 
chicken on the market because of the scientifically-controlled environment of their flocks.621 In a 
letter to potential retailers, Frank Perdue insisted that their “scientifically-formulated diets” made 
a money-back guarantee for sellers.622 So when the company rhetorically asked customers what 
the golden-color meant to them, the company answered its own question by stating, “It means a 
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pampered chicken that was scientifically fed computer-formulated feeds containing only highly 
nutritious ingredients. It means that most wholesome, tastiest chicken available today-- that 
golden-yellow color means freshness, ice-packed freshness unequalled--"623 It was the emphasis 
on corporate science that was the lynchpin between quality and convenience. Perdue claimed that 
they (and only they) could deliver on the taste customers wanted with the ease they expected. It 
came as no surprise then when describing Perdue advertising scheme, one New York City 
merchandising director implied a revolutionary change in the merchandising of chicken.624 
The Failure of Fun: Rath Wieners 
Not all companies shared the same success as Perdue and their entry into the New York 
market. Other companies, in particular pork packers like Rath, struggled to project a similar 
connection between their products, the cult of convenience, and their control of the scientific 
process. Rath failed to increase the sale of their wieners by the mid-1960s. Trying to cash in on 
the growing hot dog market, Rath spent a number of years attempting to win over customers by 
concentrating on product superiority and quality. Unfortunately, by 1966, company advertisers 
began to acknowledge that, “there is no meaningful product advantage for one brand of wieners 
over another.”625 Sales numbers quickly showed that proposing quality based on corporate 
scientific research was not a viable marketing strategy. Instead, corporate studies showed a 
growing influence of children on brand selection.626  
Even when Rath attempted to attract children to their product, they failed to successfully 
entice them with corporate scientific prowess. Adopting a strategy that melded humor, health, 
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and current kid interests, the company looked to appeal to children through the lens of “fun 
food” and to their mothers by emphasizing “the nutritious value of Rath wieners as an integral 
part of good health food.”627 To achieve this, Rath hatched a number of different advertising 
promotions, commercials, and other marketing schemes with “Indians” as a major branding point 
because, the “Indians theme ties in well with Rath and kids find Indians exciting and fun.”628 
Some Rath brainstorming ideas never materialized, including a plan to publish a series of comics 
or developing packs of “Indian” trading cards.629 But other ploys to connect Rath with this dual 
conception of health and humor did emerge in the late 1960s and early 1970s. First, the company 
contracted a commercial spot and “Indian Joke Contest” (which featured a bank of distasteful 
and racist jokes) on a popular children’s television program, “The Floppy Show.” After 
reminding its viewers to keep eating Rath, Floppy the dog would reiterate that the company’s 
wieners, “helps you run and jump all day. You’re a winner every time you eat.”630  
This play on nutrition symbolized a real attempt to tie Rath to strength and well-being, 
showing that quality was an innate part of the company’s products and the development process. 
Other promotions promised kids “energy all day long,” and their mothers that they would be 
serving, “real good, wholesome Rath meat.”631 One commercial featured a “Beatles-like” quartet 
of Indians playing guitars and singing, “Eat Rath wieners, come on strong. Heap big energy all 
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day long.”632 The company emphasized that they did not want to characters to be “old-
fashioned” but rather young, hip, and in line with current kid interests. By reconceiving the Rath 
trademark in a modern, youthful way, the meat packer hoped to appeal to their audience’s need 
for strength and health. But the marketing ploy ultimately failed, leaving the company back at 
square one. 
For other products, Rath’s desire to connect to a “wholesome” image hindered their 
projection of scientific quality. By the early 70s, the company was struggling in a number of 
different ways. Uneven pork production, increasingly tense labor disputes, and outdated 
equipment made the operations at the company more difficult as the years went on. Another 
added concern was failure of the company’s marketing strategies. Having lost out on the wiener 
market earlier, Rath found that their canned hams were losing out on the open market. Part of 
this was due to generational and taste changes. Business data showed that canned hams were 
unpopular among younger couples. Market research showed that their best customers tended to 
be older, with either a college education or skilled trade, and lived in smaller cities.633  
However, it was Rath’s full reliance on wholesomeness as a sales tactic that also proved 
to be ineffectual. This was particularly the case for Rath’s Hickory Smoked “Picnics.” Instead of 
invoking a positive aura of physical and moral well-being, “Picnics” failed to generate a 
wholesome sense of value because of their price. As one marketing report revealed, “Our 
inability to establish "quality" in the minds of the consumer because they carries the name picnic 
which is synonymous with low price.”634 Picnics, though they seemed to meet the bill of 
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wholesome food, did not easily associate with advanced scientific methods. Rath needed to make 
customers think that they were essential because of their ability to contribute tasty food in a 
convenient manner.  
Rath consistently failed to adequately gauge what their customers wanted out of their 
food. Falling sales in wieners and canned hams were only the tip of the iceberg, as the product 
sales trends implied a long term stagnation and decline in many of their markets. One employee 
blamed the company’s failure to modernize: “In my opinion, this is a true result of not keeping 
modern giving these individual situations enough attention from that viewpoint. We are not only 
missing growth opportunities, but our business is being taken over by competition.”635 A year 
later, board member D.G. Waterous implied a similar contention, “I have long felt that the [n]ew 
products Committee of Rath takes a frightfully pessimistic view toward new product 
development.” He argued that the company should try and spend more on modern products 
because these they were the “life blood” of most business.636 Yet, many company activities 
indicate just that. As early as the mid-1950s, Rath undertook several studies to understand the 
desires of the modern consumer. The meat packer sent out questionnaires to target markets, had 
employees attend seminars on sensory testing, and created (and tested) dozens of new 
products.637 In many ways, Rath did everything right. They foresaw a problem and took 
necessary steps to try to correct it. Using the information processor Market Fact, Inc., Rath 
looked to train its employees to translate customer desires into new products. The company 
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noted, “An approach to developing new products or product modifications is to find the benefits 
that consumers, or a segment of consumers, want in a product. The market researcher must learn 
to describe consumer wants in consumer language.”638 Yet, for all these actions, Rath never 
really learned how to speak the language of convenience.  
In the end, these campaigns failed for many reasons (fickle consumer taste, production 
levels, poorly conceived promotions) but most of all, because they lacked clarity. Rath tried to 
hit too many targets at once and therefore ended up missing them all. They could not establish 
quality for their child or homemaker audience, they failed to showcase any sense of convenience, 
and did not emphasize their scientific expertise and technical ability in bring these products to an 
increasingly modern consumer. Whereas Perdue was able to attach quality and convenience to 
their scientific methods through their golden-hue campaign, Rath failed to do the same thing 
with either their wieners or their canned hams. The confusion about their audience and inability 
to adequately connect to those people doomed Rath’s hot dogs. On the other hand, their picnic 
campaign chose a poor theme at the start, making their canned ham (a commodity that already 
suffered from cultural associations with poverty and disease) seem low-quality and impossibly 
antiquated.  
Conclusion: Convenience meets Romanticism 
During the 1950s, a happier and much more prosperous time for Rath Packing, the 
company looked to bolster their spring sales with an Easter-focused media blitz. Promising high 
pre-sale numbers for salesmen and retailers alike, the crown jewel of the campaign was none 
other than a full page advertisement in one of the nation’s most popular magazines, Life. The 
packer promised many things, not the least of which was a strong public relations movement to 
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entice home economists and food editors. They claimed that the Easter campaign would prove to 
be a big hit. After all, “Ham at Easter is an American Tradition--these millions of selling 
messages and reminder will change the climate--Ham will be in the spotlight.”639 So perhaps one 
of the oddest aspects of the campaign was what exactly the Life advertisement choose to focus 
on. Ham, of course, was present. But another theme claimed most of the spotlight. 
It's Springtime in Iowa. And all the folks out these are planning the very newest for the 
Easter Parade. But when it comes to the Easter table, they're downright old-fashioned. 
For nothing in this push-button world has come along to equal the old-time county 
goodness of Rath Black Hawk Hams from the Land O'Corn. All Winter long, pampered 
porkers feasted on the golden harvests of the sun-drenched Iowa corn fields. And when 
they grew as plump as plum puddin, they came to Rath to be mellowed by the sweet 
smoke of hickory. You'll find them at your store in the familiar paper wrap or in vacuum-
sealed tins. Then, add your own sugar 'n spice--and here's how it looks on the table. But 
no picture can capture its exquisite flavor. Only your fork can do that!640 
When looking through the lens of historical research, the focus seemed to be not on the product 
itself (though clearly the attributes of taste and accessibility were present), but on some mythical 
system and land of food production.  
Land O’Corn communicated a host of different images and associations. All the 
convenience of modern life was there, naturally, as the company trumpeted its vacuum sealed, 
sweet hickory quality. Yet, so too was an emphasis on rurality, a connection to the old-fashioned. 
Rath celebrated its connection to the past and its ability to bring that nostalgic goodness to its 
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current, modern customer. The packer associated agriculture with wholesomeness and past 
goodness. Perhaps more importantly, Rath then associated itself with this conception of 
agriculture. They were, the company claimed, the twin providers of food to the masses and the 
purveyors of this special kind of wholesomeness, the gatekeeper between the past, present, and 
future. 
And with more and more Americans stepping away from core food production, it was a 
seed of an idea that fell in increasingly fertile ground. For this blend, this contradictory melding 
of romantic ideals of an imagined past with the (mostly hidden) modern industrial system, would 
grow to encompass all aspects of the food and fiber industry. From the seed house that supplied 
the hybrids, the chemical corporation that provided the perfect biological environment, and the 
implement manufacturer that delivered quick and convenient harvesting, to the packers that 
processed those corn-fattened animals, agribusinesses from every aspect of the industry 
subscribed to this new understanding of farming and food, one that would both hide their 
growing influence while actually increasing their own hold on America’s agricultural system. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE AMERICAN WAY OF FARMING: THE EMERGENCE OF 
CONTRADICTION IN AGRICULTURE 
 
In the early 1970s, two different men from two different industries found themselves with a 
similar purpose in mind: to find what sells. Before the golden hue campaign, Frank Perdue was 
looking to take his growing poultry company to the national market. On the other side of the 
table sat Al Paul Lefton, Jr. A marketing executive, he sought to add another high profile 
corporation to his growing list of advertising accounts. And while their backgrounds diverged in 
time and place, their experiences shared some remarkable parallels. Both men ended up working 
for companies founded by their fathers. Perdue and Lefton eventually took on leadership roles, 
becoming president and CEO of their respective companies. And both ultimately surpassed their 
fathers’ legacies, helping their companies become nationally recognized brands within their 
industries. Finally, Perdue and Lefton each had an eye for advertising. It was this last fact that 
was the key to their wider success.641 So perhaps it was sad twist of not-quite-fate that instead of 
agreeing on a shared marketing scheme, Perdue spurned Lefton for another advertising firm. 
After all, a joint venture between such different yet oddly comparable men would have made for 
a serendipitous historical narrative. 
Yet, this crucial non-meeting of the minds chronicled an even more important historical 
realization, the full scope of farming as a marketable conception. When wooing Perdue, Lefton 
and his employees pitched a company makeover based on one word: farm. The ad man wrote 
that inserting “farm” to the Perdue name 
triggers a whole range of positive associations that would be to your benefit. It further 
quickly telegraphs the nature of your business. Also, there is a wholesomeness to farms 
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that's undeniable…it tends to transport a company from the cold impersonal association 
of manufacturing to a warmer, more relatable human enterprise. Furthermore, there is a 
distinctive rural, agrarian feel to Farms that would be a natural for Perdue.642 
In a market saturated with products and companies competing for attention, a solid “identity” 
was the pivotal piece of the puzzle. “Farms” offered a substantial array of positive assumptions 
to a public facing a consolidating and rapidly changing food system. Farming was culturally 
valued, possessing an ideological capital in American society. As such, “farming” as a form of 
identification could be a profitable and effective conception to exploit. Perdue could harness this 
association to sell their products and the system that produced them. And though the poultry 
company decided to pass on the advertising firm that first suggested it, Perdue did eventually 
decide to change its tradename to “Perdue Farm.” Despite the failure of the gambit, Lefton’s 
ideas about the marketability of farming could not have been more on point. 
 The postwar period witnessed a shocking number of changes to America’s food system. 
State policy encouraged a “get big or get out” mentality in agriculture. Scientific and 
technological development increased agricultural efficiency and production. The growth of 
supermarket chains reconstructed the physical landscape of buying and selling. Middle class 
values levelled customer expectations and consumption patterns. Finally, the explosion of 
agribusiness produced a new level of corporatization never seen before in the food chain. These 
changes, even when embraced, were no doubt unnerving for many. The takeover of a treasured 
cultural icon and American tradition by a corporate agro-industrial complex was an 
uncomfortable thought. The public did not wanted to think of a cold, impersonal bureaucracy 
controlling the process of food production. The notion of industrial farms and corporate factories 
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producing a “wholesome” meal seemed at the same time preposterous and unpleasant. Instead, it 
was much easier to accept agricultural production as warm, human enterprise, even if the 
material world reflected very little of this. This contradiction was a quagmire for companies. 
How did a company sell a food system that made people uncomfortable with its very reality? The 
answer, it seemed, lay in the power of perception and the ability of private institutions to 
manipulate public awareness. 
Aware that this new system of food production and consumption was problematic and 
difficult to market, agribusinesses deliberately crafted a nostalgic and romanticized vision of 
agriculture that was much more palatable and comforting. This “American Way of Farming” 
sold agribusiness’ products (and the system that produced them) by shrouding them in talismans 
and symbols of an older, more understandable agricultural network. In dressing this new system 
with elements of the old, companies could affirm that despite some changes (always portrayed as 
beneficial), the essential parts of production and consumption had not changed: that agriculture 
and the food it generated were still created in a certain kind of place and sustained by a certain 
kind of American. This allowed businesses to attach themselves to wholesomeness while 
actually hiding unpleasant elements of corporatization.  
Agribusinesses at both ends of the food chain used this deliberate veneer of farming as a 
marketing tool to simplify public conceptions. Companies across the spectrum, from the seed 
houses that sold the hybrids to packers that processed the corn-fed meat, all played a role in 
creating and sustaining this façade. Using America’s cultural mythology surrounding agriculture, 
agribusinesses sought to repackage themselves in a way that made their operations more 
palatable to the masses. In the end, they attempted to obscure the totality of their business and 
the changes it inflicted behind comforting images of an American icon.  
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Consequently, corporate manipulations created a profound disconnection between the 
public’s conceptual understanding and the industrial reality of postwar agriculture. It was just 
another way agribusinesses sought to solidify their place within the food and fiber economy. By 
hiding the reality of a capitalistic and industrial food chain, agribusinesses attempted to control 
how the public perceived the industry. These illusions limited questions and inquiry by a public 
that increasingly lacked real experience with agricultural production. This marketing strategy 
rendered unpleasant elements invisible while highlighting others that neatly fit into this public 
relations strategy. It also allowed businesses to continue their appropriation of the industry in 
relative peace, ignored by the public and sustained by a web of expertise. For agribusiness, “the 
American Way of Farming” was a happy veneer covering the rapid growth of corporate forces 
within agriculture. 
Public Awareness and Public Relations 
Corporations were well aware of the strong influence public perception could have on 
their continued success or failure. While federal law or competitors could derail a new product or 
revenue stream, the consumer represented the most dangerous of potential pitfalls. Customers, 
when armed with negative information and united in purpose, could bring down even the most 
prosperous of companies. As such, engineering public opinion took on new importance in this 
age of corporate growth. From an occupational standpoint, public relations took steps towards 
professionalization, becoming an essential part of corporate structure by the midcentury.643 
Public relations as a tool allowed companies to translate corporate information to the public and, 
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in turn, interpret customer desires and values to the company. Understanding the customer base, 
and having the customer understand the company, was a key aspect of this growing sub-industry. 
As a vehicle of information, a company’s public relations department was also the first 
line of defense when scandal, corruption, or other publicity nightmares rocked corporate offices. 
Writing for the University of Chicago business journal, Nugent Wedding remarked that the 
widening distance between management and the public created more possibilities for 
misinformation. Thus, “One of the important tasks of public relations is to bridge these gaps, to 
bring about better mutual understanding and appreciation of the vital part business management 
plays in our economy.”644 Albert Ayar, at the firm Hill & Knowlton, Inc., argued that the 
purpose of public relations was, “to build and maintain public good will and thus assure the 
survival of the free competitive enterprise system which has been instrumental in establishing for 
Americans the world's highest living standard.”645 Even scholarly dialogue about the nature of 
corporate action could be seen as a threat to the industry. When historian David M. Potter argued 
that modern advertising subverted American values, he quickly found himself attacked by a 
defensive professorate. Professors of Business Thomas Petit and Alan Zakon bristled at Potter’s 
assumptions. Instead, they insisted that advertising was an institution that educated an 
information-needy public and therefore supported and strengthened the larger economy.646 Those 
involved in the study of agriculture also understood the transformative power of public relations. 
Perception concerned many agribusinesses and most took steps to understand public 
attitudes and increase their reputation. International Harvester invested a significant amount of 
capital attempting to pinpoint what the public thought of their company and what they could do 
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to improve these opinions. Throughout the fifties and sixties, the implement dealer 
commissioned a number of public surveys.  Some examined specific topics from particular 
audiences, such as trade name usage by local farmers and dealers.647 Others were much more 
general, covering basic public opinions about the company itself. Administered by the Opinion 
Research Corporation, the general survey was meant to, “provide participating companies with 
information that will help them in the conduct of their relationships with the many publics with 
which they must deal.”648 After a disappointing review in 1966, the company’s public relations 
department wanted to revitalize their image. Sending out a statement of company objectives, the 
primary goal was to present the company in a positive light. The key was to show the company 
as a dynamic and progressive organization with high technical competence. In doing this, the 
ultimate goal was for the public to view International Harvester as a good company to buy from 
and work for.649 
Other agribusinesses also tested the waters of public opinion. In 1956, Pioneer contracted 
with a market research firm to investigate the views of their contracted seed dealers. 
Interviewing these men and women (and recording them without their knowledge), the Opinion 
Research Consultants sought to understand dealer sale techniques, how dealers viewed the 
company, and how customers perceived the company.650 Six months earlier, the company had 
hired a different firm to examine the attitudes of their dealers. After a round of consultation, the 
Research Institute of America concluded that company salesmen generally viewed Pioneer in a 
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favorable light (though grumbling about internal strife did exist).651 Taking a slightly different 
tack, Monsanto sought to move its market research in house. Stressing the need for better 
marketing research and customer inquiry, Monsanto’s planners suggested that improved study of 
public desires could cut down on losses and set the stage for continued growth.652 Rath routinely 
gave out consumer surveys about their various products.653 Even Frank Perdue acknowledged the 
need to look carefully at every letter sent by a housewife and classify why she decided to write. 
He commented, “I am not saying they are not all ‘nuts’ but we should see what those thought 
who were interested enough to write.”654 Apparently, the crazy customers mattered too. 
Ultimately these surveys allowed companies to get a better understanding of consumer 
attitudes and beliefs. Corporations wanted to be seen as friendly, progressive, and decidedly 
human. Dirty laundry wrecked this image and caused a number of different headaches. 
Sometimes these problems could be systemic issues that plagued the industry as a whole. Labor 
disputes and health scandals could dominate the airwaves and generate negative publicity. After 
the Second World War, much of the nation’s manufacturing sector, including implement dealers 
and meat packers, entered into a protracted battle with labor unions over pensions, hours, 
compensation, and other basic workers’ rights. Over a five year period in the early 1950s, 
International Harvester scrambled to put a positive spin on its bitter dispute with plant workers. 
Annual shareholder reports conveyed several different yet equally unsatisfying conclusions about 
these distractions. In 1950, they reported an agreement with the Congress of Industrial 
Organization (CIO), announcing a return to long term stability and implying an end to labor 
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issues.655 The peace lasted less than a year, with slowdowns and other labor resistance once 
again prompting the company to publicize a new and improved plan to eliminate labor 
problems.656 By the next year, perhaps exasperated and unsure of its next move, International 
Harvester meekly promised to create a harmonious relationship with various unions without 
giving further details. It concluded, with more feeling, that it was sick of all the strikes.657 
Monsanto faced its own national headache in the form of a book that threatened its most 
promising new source of revenue, DDT. With the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, 
the chemical industry faced one of its greatest challenges. Public awareness of the use of 
pesticides soared, creating a debate about ecological consequences that could not be easily 
quelled. In fact, many of the aggressive tactics adopted by chemical corporations only 
exacerbated the problem, causing more of an uproar.658 
While national scandals were never good for company image, even small local issues 
could threaten public relations.  Something as minor as inter-departmental rivalry or employee 
miscues might depreciate the company’s value in the eyes of the public. Pioneer, with its 
company structure built on contract work, especially struggled to contain problematic dealers.659 
One Arkansas salesman named Melvin Callahan became angry when the company contracted 
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other nearby locals to sell hybrids, complaining that these sub-dealers were infringing on his 
territory. Sales director A.R. Marston directed area manager Harris Hix to let to situation cool off 
to avoid creating a worse condition for the company.660 During another intra-company squabble, 
several Pioneer salesmen from different divisions (Eastern and Illinois) found themselves 
directly competing for sales in the same territory along the Illinois-Indiana border. Facing a 
competitive price that could hurt local sales, Pioneer Eastern Division agreed to lower the cost 
for their division’s specific dealer as long as the as the situation was handled quietly. Unable to 
punish the Illinois dealer, Eastern Division Head Robert Woods worried that the situation would 
spread to other border territories and give leverage to other salesmen who wanted a better 
price.661 This problem soon repeated itself on the border between Michigan and Ohio, when an 
enterprising dealer placed an advertisement in another salesmen’s territory. Woods asked the 
regional manager to contain the issue and explained, “I realize it is a pretty hard thing to try to 
build a fence around any given territory, and we of course never like to take the position of 
trying to tell any farmer that he definitely has to buy Pioneer from a certain salesman. Also, we 
know it’s not good business on our part to have two men canvassing the same community.”662 
Although Pioneer wanted to enforce its will, the company did not want to alienate contracted 
dealers who could easily terminate their relationship with the company, or worse, jump ship to a 
competitor. Therefore, Pioneer and other seed houses were forced to walk a tight line between 
corporate desire and local wishes. 
Other times the threat of possible public displeasure became so large that business rivals 
would band together in an attempt to secure favorable industry standards. When public unease 
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over slaughtering methods grew in the late 1950s, Rath Packing formed a committee with other 
members of the American Meat Institute to discuss their options. The committee acknowledged 
that the Secretary of Agriculture, “could conceivably say that the present shackling, hoisting, and 
sticking process for hogs is humane. However, in the face of all the public agitation it is doubtful 
he would make such a ruling.” Representatives worried that this public pressure could force new 
federal regulations, a possibility that no one within the industry wanted. Instead, AMI 
recommended that members encourage new methods of slaughter within their plants, with an 
obvious undercurrent stressing a need to decrease public awareness of this difficult topic.663  
In a similar vein, marketers warned Perdue Chicken that certain imagery and phrases 
could hurt their sales. The advertising firm of Byride, Richard, and Pound, Inc. also advised 
Perdue to keep “forbidden thoughts” from entering the mind of their customers. This included 
completely removing the packing process from marketing. The firm stressed that the poultry 
company should, “Never show a live chicken or chick. Never show an uncooked Perdue chicken 
except in the exact form and package the housewife will see it in the shop. Never imply that the 
user will be eating a live animal or fowl. Never imply that Perdue must kill something to bring 
the housewife her food. Never imply that what the user is eating was, at one time, cute or darling, 
or cuddly, or small, or tender, or needing care.”664 Along with these clear guidelines, the 
advertiser insisted that company should never suggest that their food was anything less than one 
hundred percent nutritious and perfect. The moral of the story was, “don’t mention processing at 
all.” With these suggestions in mind, Byride, Richard, and Pound, Inc. implored Perdue to drop 
their advertising tagline that their chickens were guaranteed, healthy, and (disturbingly) less than 
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nine weeks old. The age piece was particularly damaging. “You are hurting your own sales, and 
the sales of the industry. What your present agency may consider to be good selling copy is in 
fact--in the minds of many of those who have heard it--repulsive. It doesn't matter who is right 
and who is wrong. We have gone out into the market and found that women realize you are 
killing little things less than 9 weeks old.”665  
On the most basic level, this American Way of Farming sought to hide all of these 
possible problems behind a convenient façade. By emphasizing an idealized place (heartland), an 
idealized people (family), and an idealized tradition (nostalgia), this trope appealed to a 
population divorced from real agricultural experience. Though Americans think of the postwar 
period as an age of stability, America was undergoing a great many changes. On an agricultural 
level, trends in the economy made it difficult for many to continue on as farmers. With input 
costs rising and overproduction causing commodity values to drop, a price squeeze caught many 
farm families in the middle. Some, the most well off, were able to adapt to the changing 
economy, getting bigger and more specialized. Others altered their income sources, staying on 
the land by having family members work off the farm. For many though, the only option was to 
leave agriculture altogether. These families sold their farms and the move away was permanent. 
Though fewer and fewer families were involved in the production food and fiber, surpluses of 
key commodities grew larger. More than ever before, business firms played a role in the political 
and economic direction of agriculture. At the same time, as more people left agricultural 
production, changes to food consumption patterns profoundly altered what and how people 
shopped, prepared, and ate. Conceptions of convenience, middle class values, and corporate 
growth altered the consumption patterns and environment. People spent less time on food 
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preparation partly because they could and partly because time was a finite commodity that 
needed to be conserved for other more pleasurable activities. In the end then, from a food and 
fiber standpoint, such changes radically altered the American agricultural network, food chain, 
and conceptual understandings of production and consumption. 
Wholesomeness: It’s What’s For Dinner 
Many of these alterations, along with a tense geo-political atmosphere, created a social 
longing for something simpler, cleaner, and all together wholesome. The American Way of 
Farming fit this desire perfectly. It offered customers what they wanted in a convenient, modern 
way. Americans could conceivably believe that their food came from a moral and clean place, 
created by honest and healthy people. Agribusinesses checked off all the necessary marketing 
boxes, while ultimately hiding displeasing truths. They could both present themselves as innate 
parts of an idyllic system and veil the system required to bring Americans such low-cost, 
nutritious, and tasty food. From a marketing standpoint, it seemed like winners all round, hiding 
the inhuman bureaucracy behind a human face. 
The feeling of wholesomeness was in many ways the key ingredient to making the 
American Way of Farming work as a marketing strategy. As a conception, wholesomeness 
invoked feelings of mental, physical, and spiritual wellness. It sought to soothe customers’ 
anxiety about health and freshness under a guise of natural goodness and simplicity. Its purpose 
was specifically not to examine, define, or elaborate, but to simplify and obscure, to “make it 
seem simple for shoppers to get what they wanted for their daily meals,” as historian Roger 
Horowitz wrote.666 In her discussion of the changing conception of freshness, Susanne Friedberg 
remarked that the removal of food production from everyday life made it easier to overlook the 
                                                          
666 Horowitz, 151. 
254 
 
 
sharp difference between how food was marketed and how it was actually produced. Just like 
freshness, marketing wholesomeness served to show one thing and hide another. She wrote, 
“advertising sold both goods and reassurance, as it still does. It prompted newness for its own 
sake and as protection against modernity's potential harm to social, physical, and spiritual 
wellbeing. Fresh foods embodied this paradoxical message better than most goods."667 During 
the postwar period, wholesomeness carefully aligned with images of postwar idealism, romantic 
agrarianism, and human goodness, all elements that food and fiber corporations coveted. 
Additionally, the conception’s vague nature gave it a fluidity that was attractive to many 
different types of corporations. Its ambiguity was a strength rather than a weakness, allowing it 
to be used for many different situations and products. 
 As an attribute, wholesomeness corresponded well with agribusinesses’ own desire to be 
viewed positively by the public. Instead of being viewed as a large corporate bureaucracy wholly 
concerned with making money, many companies wished to be seen in a more human light. From 
a corporate point of view, company products and services were there to serve the good of 
humanity. In one John Deere booklet, the implement dealer complained that not enough respect 
was given to the company whose commodities created “plenty” in a world filled with need. The 
corporation therefore created this booklet as a revealing look at its contribution to human history 
and as a “reflection of the fruits of free minds, as proof that a company can be something other 
than a big, impersonal, unfeeling machine.” By discussing John Deere, the man and his legacy, 
the agribusiness looked to bring a more personal vision of their company, one that emphasized 
simplicity and homespun values.668 Rath stressed its leadership in the food industry by boasting 
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of its pioneering techniques and focus on farmers.669 Perdue Chicken spent considerable effort 
attempting to elect its founder, Arthur Perdue, to the APHS Poultry Hall of Fame. By 
emphasizing his personal and business standards, the company hoped customers would see a 
softer, familial side of the chicken company.670 
Monsanto also sought to change the way certain segments of the population regarded the 
chemical giant. The corporation looked to produce a more favorable mindset in an important 
future investment, college students. Corporations involved in technical and scientific innovation 
were keenly aware of the need to groom future employees. International Harvester maintained a 
serious public relations campaign across agricultural campuses even after it began to shift its 
focus away from farm tools and machines.671 For Monsanto, especially after the PR debacle of 
Silent Spring, the push to reshape young minds started in earnest in the early 1960s. The 
company began with the appointment of a new manager of professional recruiting and college 
relations, a move that combined all of the company’s higher education programs under one 
department.672 This eventually flowered into a company sponsored symposium in 1965. Meant to 
lure interested student chemists and engineers, the event was specifically designed to change 
opinions about Monsanto and the industry at large. Chemical Week praised the move, reporting 
that most of the young people, having grown up under prosperity, believed that profit was 
undesirable and, “oblivious to the fact that industry and trade are the chief wellspring of our 
relative affluence.” The trade press commended Monsanto for creating a constructive university-
business dialogue that showed the industry in the best light: “Business is not the enemy but 
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rather the sustainer of nonmaterial values.” The best opportunity to do this was to find a way to 
play on the students’ need to be useful, to show that the chemical industry provided goods and 
services that satisfied human needs.673  
When it came to their products, agribusinesses also wanted to evoke a sense of 
wholesomeness. It is important to recognize the power of wholesomeness in marketing, 
especially when selling products that had such a profound connection to the human body. Food, 
as a consumable, is unique among products. It is perishable, consumed through ingestion, and 
has a profound and immediate effect on health. Taste, flavor, nutrition, and individual perception 
all play critical roles in its marketability. A campaign that satisfied these traits and associated the 
product with moral and physical wellness was then an especially attractive option for companies. 
When examining Rath’s irregular growth since the late 1950s, their marketing firm, Earle Ludgin 
& Company, stressed the need for the company to continue its commitment to strong meaningful 
graphics (especially in the face of competitors claims of quality). The marketers then suggested a 
bold new theme to jumpstart Rath’s return to prominence, “Rath is a Sunday Kind of Ham.” 
They argued that, “A Sunday kind of ham is the best you can buy. It's the kind you serve when 
the whole family is finally together on Sunday. It's the kind you serve to friends and special 
guest. A Sunday Kind of Ham evokes memories about the good old days - the way everyone 
likes to remember the past. Nostalgic. Warm and human, secure. It establishes a quality identity 
for Rath.”674 This appeal fit neatly with much of the market research that Rath undertook in the 
late 1950s. Their studies indicated that housewives saw cooking as a method of earning approval 
and praise. While good housekeeping received little recognition from other family members, 
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cooking resulted in immediate satisfaction.675 Foods that fulfilled this need for recognition and 
helped demonstrate talent were therefore much sought after. 
On the other hand, if products incited a sense of “unwholesomeness,” the consequences 
could be devastating. Though marketing campaigns mostly tried to create and maintain demand, 
sometimes situations arose that required companies to approach their campaigns in a different 
manner. One such condition was negative demand, “a state in which all or most of the important 
segments of the potential market dislike the product and in fact might conceivably pay a price to 
avoid it.” In order to combat this, a marketer needed to first examine why the population 
devalued the product the way it did and then take steps to modify such feelings.676 For instance, 
many pork products faced negative demand from a population hungry for beef and chicken. Rath 
took steps to identify the issue (problematic production, customer demographics that trended 
older, competitor claims, and overall lack of demand) and sought a solution that addressed some 
of these problems (a Sunday kind of ham).677 Surprisingly, chicken also had to reckon with 
possible unwholesome images disrupting their growth in the market. While demand for broilers 
rested on an “old impression of luxury,” economic integration and new production methods 
threatened to expose unpleasant changes to the industry.678 The growth in broiler contracts and 
factory-like confinement did not meld with perceptions of happy and healthy chickens. One 
housewife claimed she could tell which chickens were allowed to breathe fresh air and which 
ones were confined to dark henhouses. She maintained, “it's a terrible thing that they keep hens 
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cooped up in cages in the dark--you can tell from the flavor whether they are happy or not.”679 
Luckily for the broiler industry, public awareness of confinement and contract farming remained 
relatively minimal for the rest of the century. 
The Response 
In order to fulfill this need for wholesomeness, agribusiness looked to create a specific 
trope that satisfied public craving. Its image was something that agribusinesses across the food 
chain played a role in creating. Despite the fact that input companies like Pioneer or DuPont did 
not sell agricultural commodities to the public at large (for the most part), their actions still 
affected wider conceptual understandings of farming. As part of their makeup, these companies 
were some the first names that came to mind when it came to agriculture. While people might 
not understand the farming process (a much more likely experience as the century crept onward), 
they would know that John Deere sold tractors or that Pioneer was somehow connected to corn. 
It was a powerful association that agribusinesses wished to deepen on a cultural level, using this 
marketing façade to further bind the associations between themselves and farming. On an 
economic note, agribusinesses like International Harvester, Monsanto, and others were publicly 
held corporations with shareholders across the country. Not only was it important to 
continuously reassure these individuals of constant growth, but also to attract new investors. PR 
campaigns were meant to bolster stock revenue. On the whole, public relations were meant to 
generate positive responses by the public at large, not just the specific customer base. A 
campaign idea that could both attract new investors and create a positive public persona was 
therefore extremely attractive. Many companies deliberately conveyed an external appearance 
for shareholders and the public based on agrarian ideals. Annual reports, newsletters, company 
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magazines, booklets, and other documentation all contributed to this conception of agricultural 
production and food consumption. 
Crafting a public façade that repackaged an industry to fit public desires was difficult task 
to say the least. Companies needed to tap into cultural longings without tipping their hand too far 
into the outlandish or cartoonish, telling the public what they wanted to hear while not fostering 
more inquiry. Luckily for agribusinesses, they were already intimately connected to a cultural 
mythology that fit many of the requirements. All these corporations had to do was conflate this 
agrarian mythos with the totality of their business: playing on symbols to redecorate their wider 
public image. In order to walk this tightrope, the façade needed to be adaptable to businesses 
across the food chain.  
With this fluidity a purposeful choice on the part of agribusinesses, identifying the exact 
traits of this marketing invention can be difficult, especially when put under a historic 
microscope.680 Companies never constructed a defined image of this message because its 
vagueness and fluidity were two of its major benefits. The marketing needed to be malleable to 
fit new situations and new products, from a new strain of hybrids to canned pork. Specificity 
could do more harm than good, forcing companies to address missteps and obvious signs of 
misinformation. Agribusinesses crafted this ethos to give off positive impressions and 
associations, not to be interrogated and examined. In fact, doing so would destroy the illusion.  
All of this being said, there were certain identifiable features of this marketing trope. 
These specific tenets intermingled to form a marketable image of agriculture that agribusinesses 
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used to tie their operations to a wholesome conception of agriculture. On the most basic level, 
“the American Way of Farming” was an idealized depiction of agriculture with corporate 
products and operations. Even as it reinforced the moral economy of farming and celebrated 
farmers as honest, salt of the earth stewards of the land, this marketing scheme also sought to 
align their efforts with those of yeoman. Tapping into public longings and cultural mythology, 
agribusinesses presented a sanitized version of farms as clean, pure, and wholesome, an idyllic 
heartland stewarded by happy and healthy family farmers. This crafted image, one so seemingly 
divorced from reality, was the Trojan Horse in the agricultural economy. By continuously 
making the association between food production and this happy image, agribusinesses could both 
draw on positive overtones and hide any inconvenient truths when necessary. 
One of the clear ideological pillars of this conception rested on was the belief in 
agriculture’s moral superiority and the benefits it gave to its practitioners and society at large. 
Within the wide range of agrarianism, the morality of its subject has always been a prominent 
part of its rhetoric. Salt-of-the-earth and independent, these people represented ideal Americans. 
In order to convey these notions, agricultural companies set out on extensive public relations 
campaigns that bombarded the nation with tailored images and suggestions. Constant messaging 
appeared to be the key to successful promotions, as one Rath employee commented, “In the 
modern marketing of [meat] products, communications are vital to success. Communications to 
retailers through your personal selling and to consumers through merchandising, advertising, and 
sales promotion are all necessary to the success of the products we sell.”681 To make their 
communications work, agribusinesses tapped into three identifiable and easily advertised sub-
themes: the Heartland, the Family, and Nostalgia. 
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The Heartland 
An emphasis on “the heartland” was a good fit for companies looking to tie vague 
sentiments of wholesomeness and agricultural environments together. Though originally used to 
describe the hinterland of North-Central Europe, Americans began to use the term in earnest 
after the Second World War. Applied extensively to an ambiguous definition of the Midwest, the 
“heartland” embodied a sense of health, wellness, economic self-sufficiency, hospitality, and 
hominess.682 Agribusinesses used this theme extensively in their descriptions of America’s 
agricultural land. International Harvester remarked that tilled soil was a hope for the future and 
the land was a “heritage to husband.”683 John Deere described the land of the Midwest as “rich” 
and America as the most, “abundant horn of plenty the world.”684 Rath boasted that it was 
located, “right in the richest corn-fed livestock area in the world.”685 In promotions sent to 
retailers around the country, the Iowa packer often showed its products next to cartoonish 
depictions of barnyards surrounded by lush fields, a picturesque version of America’s middle 
landscape.686  
Like Rath, other companies often utilized images and symbols to show rather than 
describe this romantized agrarian landscape. Advertisements for farm products from businesses 
across the food chain frequently featured rich landscapes flowering with carefully cultivated 
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plant life.687 These depictions regularly included male figures, clothed in the workmen’s gear, 
engaged in some sort of serious stewardship of the land. Sometimes these men were 
concentrating on the crop itself, dramatically examining the plant for the camera.688 Other times 
they appeared to be in serious discussions with other like-minded individuals or posing on large 
mechanical equipment.689 Whatever the variety of props and postures, the basic formula 
remained the same; America’s agricultural land was rich, filled with abundance (made possible 
by products) and stewarded by a serious, well-intentioned farmers.  
Out of all the symbols used, the focus on corn was perhaps the most prominent. While 
many employed barns as a symbol of agrarian promise, corn fit well as an embodiment of the 
heartland.690 It represented a very real and very recognizable emblem of farming, an emblem of 
successful cultivation and rural spaces. After all, the corn ear had long been the brand symbol of 
hybrid seed houses. While DeKalb’s winged corn was the most recognized house symbol, less 
famous hybrid companies also used the cob as a mark of success and quality.691 DeKalb’s rival 
Pioneer also utilized corn in the realm of marketing. Pictures, cartoons, salesmen letters, and 
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many other company documents used corn to symbolize their connection to rurality. It was not 
just an emphasis on rural life, but a specific kind of prosperity that could be bought and 
consumed. As maize held a symbolic significance for early Native Americans tribes, so too did it 
signify fertility and agricultural richness for Americans in the twentieth century. Agribusinesses 
alleged that they could control, bottle, and sell this fertility for a price. Pioneer, DeKalb, Funk, 
and other hybrid companies believed they could breed it. Chemical giants Monsanto, Dow, and 
DuPont argued they could nurture it. John Deere and International Harvester claimed to cultivate 
and harvest it. Conceptions of agricultural prosperity and success compressed into a simple 
symbol of a corn cob. 
This representation was also present among food processors. Some meat packers in the 
early postwar period especially saw corn as a viable advertising symbol. Rath’s marketing 
campaigns in the 1950s focused almost exclusively on their location deep in the cornbelt. Using 
the slogan “from the land’ O’Corn,” Rath touted its corn-fed meat as uniquely tasty and rich in 
flavor. Whereas corn symbolized agricultural fertility and ripeness for input companies, Rath 
used corn to show quality. The richness, it seemed, was not in the land, but rather livestock. By 
ingesting the fertile goodness of the corn, Iowa’s hogs and cattle took on the same qualities. One 
Rath ad stressed that their luncheon meats’, “Corn-fed flavor needs no ‘fancy fixings.’” Instead, 
“To make this tender luncheon meat, we take choice, sweet pork that's been raised on fine Iowa 
corn…the finest-eating pork there is!”692 A later advertisement for bacon continued to stress the 
company’s placement in the nation’s cornbelt. Rath’s bacon postcard boasted, “Lean--tender--
hickory fragrant--and with that extraordinary corn-fed flavor. Here's a special kind of Bacon that 
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we produce in Waterloo, Iowa, the heart of corn country.”693 Though the company did move 
away from this singular focus by the mid-1960s, it was continued in some regions. Starting in the 
early 1970s, Rath commissioned a sub-brand called Kornland. Much like their other sub-brand, 
Cedar Farm, Kornland’s boneless ham and bacon products played on a pastoral motif.694 The 
company was not alone its continued use of corn as symbol. Its competitors, including Corn 
King and Roegelein, also sought to remind their customers of country goodness through the 
usage of corn. One Corn King advertisement for the Dallas market repeated that its hams were “a 
feast of corn-country flavor.”695 Another proudly displayed the Corn King slogan, “as Sweet 'n 
Fresh as an Iowa morning.”696 This imagery of a corn-laden heartland reinforced associations 
between a specific kind of wholesome agriculture and the Midwest. 
Regional fetishism was not an uncommon practice in the food retail industry. The 
association of place and commodity has long influenced American perceptions of states and 
regions. For example, despite the fact Georgia produces more pounds of chickens, eggs, 
blueberries, peanuts, pecans, and cotton, the nation still connects the state with peaches. 
Wisconsin has been out produced by California’s dairies for decades, yet the state still claims to 
be the nation’s dairyland. And while Hawaii might be famous for its sugar production, foreign 
imports have whittled down the state’s industry to nothing. Yet, these associations persist and 
reveal important popular reflections of these places. In the realm of retail, these connotations 
represented attractive marketing opportunities for companies. As scholar Cary de Wit noted 
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when discussing food-place associations on product labels, “food producers and marketers use 
specific place references because their popular images lend an air of distinctiveness, authenticity, 
or quality to the products and marketers' choice of labeling accurately reflects popular 
perceptions and association.”697 In fact, this regionalism can have a decisive impact on market 
creation, both within and outside the United States. Moya Kneafsey and Brian Ilbery showed 
how small producers within the English “West Country” have been able to create connections 
between regional images and quality.698 Domestic tourism within Japan depended heavily on 
consumption of a “disappearing” rurality and its traditions in urban focused society.699 In the 
United States, Helen Zoe Veit argued that interest in regional cuisines skyrocketed in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when industrializing forces homogenized national 
foodways.700 Perhaps more than any other commodity, food and fiber retains the ability to be 
recognized as a specific cultural icon of place. 
The Midwest, with its heartland reputation, was an ideal candidate for agribusinesses’ 
regional fetishization. It hit all the correct cultural buttons, featuring a godly, hardworking people 
living in a well-ordered and wholesome landscape. When Monsanto described the values of Iowa 
farmers, the company remarked that, “cattle-raising was next to godliness, and cleanliness a 
respected but distinct third.”701 Rath advocated that customers who bought their sliced meats 
could “do-it-yourself, Iowa Style,” alluding to the practical and independent nature of country 
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life.702 Pioneer pronounced that the reason they decided to focus their egg laying efforts in the 
Midwest was due to the region’s emphasis on “family and community.”703 Though more than 
just these cultural touchstones, the fetishization of region (particularly the Midwest) played an 
important part of crafting agribusiness’ illusion about food production. Its presence helped 
conceal the very real changes the food chain was undertaking while reinforcing assumptions of 
country life. Instead of thinking of industrial agriculture, factory production, and the long 
winding road of the cold chain, it was much easier to imagine a pastoral heartland, where 
wholesome land created wholesome food.  
Perhaps no company placed more emphasized on this imagined Midwest heartland than 
Rath. Although many other corporations held meaningful connections to the Midwest, Rath 
completely crafted its public image around this regional identity. The packer looked to correlate 
the superior quality of its products with Iowa itself, stressing the company’s origins in “corn-
country.”704 Rath underscored the ability of Iowa’s corn to give Rath meats innate qualities 
unmatched by products produced elsewhere. Tenderness, leanness, flavor, freshness, and 
richness were all aspects that an imagined Iowa countryside bequeathed to its harvests.705 By 
extension, the customer could expect to ingest the rich goodness of an Iowan summer day. Even 
when the company moved on to new thematic campaigns, Iowa as a fantasy heartland lay at the 
center of their marketing efforts. The packer’s “Iowa Sends Her Best” campaign was meant to 
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revitalize sales on the West Coast, utilizing regional associations with the Midwest to evoke a 
sense of heartland values. One San Diego advertisement for Rath’s cold cuts announced, “In 
Iowa, where Rath meats come from, good food is a matter of pride. Because there, in the center 
of the heartland, there's no need to settle for second best.”706 Without ever setting foot on a hog 
farm or visiting Rath’s Waterloo plant, the people of San Diego knew everything the company 
wanted them to: “we think you’ll appreciate the Iowa in us!”707 
Whenever possible, agribusinesses tried to meld themselves with an illusory depiction of 
the Midwest. Within that same story about Iowa farmers, Monsanto insisted that its brand of 
chemistry, “is there too, in the fat calves, sleek hogs, blushing tomatoes and golden corn.”708 
Roswell Garst argued that by informing customers of new techniques and advancements, Pioneer 
dealers served the farmer and the wider community.709 When contracting an institutional history 
of Rath for the company’s anniversary, the book promised to include, “a background of Iowa 
agriculture and animal husbandry, two of the fundamental reasons for Rath's success.”710 Instead 
of hosting an open house tour of the processing plant, the public relations firm in charge of the 
event, Young and Rubicam Inc., suggested testimonials from different farm groups, including the 
Farm Bureau and the Grange.711 Though left unsaid, Young and Rubicam’s hesitation over the 
plant tour was obviously tied to both issues of feasibility and the unpleasant elements of hog 
processing. It was so much easier, not to mention cleaner, to dwell on statements of satisfied 
farmers. Seeing the actual disassembly process would fundamentally subvert the image Rath and 
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other businesses tried to market. These corporate entities definitely wanted consumers to 
associate agribusinesses with wholesome food, just not how that food actually got there in the 
first place. 
Ironically, this emphasis, though important to building an overall image for the wider 
public, did not extend to all aspects of the public relations. Young and Rubicam expressed doubt 
about Rath’s planned anniversary event for area farmers. While acknowledging the goodwill it 
could generate, the firm doubted it could make the experience attractive enough to entice farm 
attendance. Finding a suitable speaker was another major issue, as Young and Rubicam 
remarked on the difficulty of locating a “natural” speaker who would be accepted by the farming 
audience. With these issues in mind, the firm recommended that the company drop the event 
from the celebration altogether.712 In fact, sometimes this single minded imagery could even 
undermine other aspects of company marketing. For example, International Harvester’s 
insistence on utilizing heartland imagery annoyed many of their agricultural audience outside the 
Midwest. These men and women expressed irritation with what they viewed as a clearly false 
landscape, one that had no connection to the one they saw outside their windows. The major 
offenders, the flatness of the land and the lack of recognizable local families, subverted 
meaningful messages in the company’s regional publications.713 Although blurring the lines 
between what was real and what was imagined benefited companies with the larger public, it did 
have its consequences with specific audiences. 
However, the Midwest was not the only region used by agribusinesses to sell their 
products. In fact, when it came to chicken, regionalism formed a critical juncture in the 
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burgeoning poultry market. Though the South would eventually reign supreme in terms of sheer 
production, the Delmarva poultry industry successfully manipulated provincial competition to 
promote its own association with health and wellness.714 By characterizing its own people as 
hard-working American farmers, Delmarva both affirmed its own poultry as uniquely 
wholesome and not so subtlety defamed southern competitors. In a speech reaffirming Perdue’s 
commitment to Delmarva, Frank Perdue described the struggle: “Competition between us and 
the south is not between companies or products, but rather between the people who make up the 
business.”715 In order to maintain its national presence, Perdue and many other members 
believed it was critical that Delmarva continued to expand its operations: “We say Delmarva 
cannot afford not to expand. If we are going to keep this business virile, we need to make the 
industry stronger.”716 As the economic lifeblood of the region, industry supporters needed to 
remain forward thinking and on guard. 
In the end though, Frank Perdue and others were ultimately confident that the innate 
quality of Delmarva and its people would continue its leadership in poultry production. On one 
hand, industry members believed that their region’s farmers possessed more fertile land, better 
know-how, and greater management skills than those of other broiler growing areas.717 This 
stemmed from the perception that Delmarva’s people held intrinsic characteristics that other 
regions lacked. Paul Phillips, head of the Delmarva Poultry Industry grower committee, an 
employee of Dow chemical, and close associate with Frank Perdue, discussed his thoughts on the 
subject, “The stock of the Delmarva peninsula area is what we would call the heartwood of 
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America's family tree. Enterprising, aggressive, stable people that have shared their knowhow 
and knowledge of poultry production with the world. People have initiated the role of chicken 
from a Sunday luxury to a food staple in the world's food basket.”718 Speaking at the Poultry 
Workers Conference in 1964, Phillips expressed what many in the region believed: that 
Delmarva’s people were uniquely qualified for this particular occupation. The generalization of 
the region and its people were one of the reasons that Perdue and others felt confident in the 
future of their regional power, even during economic downturns or periods of problematic 
production.719 It was a belief that bled into advertising claims, making Delmarva as much 
“chicken country” as Iowa was “America’s heartland.”720 
Conversely, while Delmarva’s Poultry Industry depicted its growers as enterprising 
individuals, its competitors in the South displayed many negative qualities. Beyond the long 
standing cultural biases against people of the rural South (including assumptions of ignorance 
and laziness compounded by ingrained poverty), the growing competition between Delmarva and 
the South for poultry supremacy led to a negative view of Southern chicken.721 Unlike their 
farmers and broiler processors, industry members in Delmarva argued that southern growers 
lacked both the skill and innovative spirit necessary to make a good product. In 1964, Frank 
Perdue bragged that his growers averaged $2000 more in farm income than similar farmers in the 
South.722 In another speech, Frank Perdue blamed the processors in the South for problems 
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within the industry as a whole, stating, “I think this is partly because the broiler business 
nationwide is getting more into the hands of financially stable companies which make decisions 
based on an intelligent appraisal of the important economic facts as compared to the harem-
scarem decisions made by half-bankrupt, inefficient companies of the past.”723 Part of the 
problem extended from assumptions of general dirtiness and disease found in Southern climates. 
Paul Phillips, on advice from Frank Perdue, noted the difference between Delmarva and the 
South on disease control, insinuating that Southern chicken was more likely to be weak and 
unhealthy.724 Despite not working directly for the company, Phillips’ loyalty to Delmarva 
influenced how he and many others thought about the region’s commodities and the quality of its 
competitors. 
The Family 
Along with an imagined heartland, agribusinesses also emphasized an idealized vision of 
the American family. Their marketing campaigns often projected images of families to conceal 
the corporate presence in agriculture. This focus on familial production of food and fiber was 
part of the overall marketing strategy, a façade that was meant to fuse social desire for 
wholesomeness with the totality of the agribusiness’ process. The key was blurring the 
understanding of who exactly was driving production. Of course families (farm and not) still 
played a serious role in the food system. However, agribusiness deliberately conflated their 
industrial operations with these small-time familial actions, attempting to exploit public 
responses to cultural triggers. Through advertising, these corporations tried to elicit the same 
reaction by presenting their business through a more pleasant and palatable lens of an idealized 
family. It was an essential part of making this trope work. If consumers believed that families 
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were the main producers of food and fiber, they could conceivably ignore the corporate network 
behind these efforts. Just as the heartland theme focused on an imagined version of agricultural 
environments, so too would this theme confine itself to a middle class ideal of the nuclear family.  
This simplified and glorified version of family held the same values triumphed by so 
many in the postwar era. Each of these projections assumed many of the features of middle class 
living, including the nuclear structure, expectations of consumerism, strict divide between work 
and leisure time, public and private sphere, access to educational opportunities, greater economic 
security, and home ownership. Not only did the family shape take on the standard father-mother-
two-kids formula, but the roles of each member had a similar value. Father played the role of 
breadwinner and patriarch, steward of the family’s economic wellbeing and ultimate authority. 
Mother confined herself to the household, taking care of the children and maintaining a healthy 
living space for her family. Children were meant to experience the carefree and innocent 
existence of a long childhood, free of the responsibilities of labor and adult worries. Of course, 
people were well aware of these as ideals rather than reality, but that does not mean they were 
not expectations and guideposts for how families should arrange themselves and act in wider 
society. In fact, their role as ideal made them all the more powerful. This was a conception to 
reach for, a goal for all families and an expectation that all were judged by. Its place as an 
American paradigm made it an attractive marketing option for companies.725 
 Businesses that retailed directly to the wider public found this idealism a critical 
component of successful campaigns. Many advertisements centered directly on an association 
between family and food. This took on many different forms of interactions, from mealtime, to 
actual preparation, supermarket shopping, and other distinct family exchanges and celebrations. 
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All of these centered on an idealized vision of a middle class family unit producing or consuming 
food. Hormel’s Spam and other canned meat ads frequently showed different members of the 
family enjoying the products. One boasted that the kids never got sick of Spam because of its 
versatility. Another noted that the husband who used to be grumpy in morning now looked 
forward to his breakfast Spam. Wilson’s meat product Mor, a similar commodity, ran a 
campaign promising that kids would love their product. It was a strategy that Oscar Mayer built 
its wiener empire on, using children as powerful symbols of product enjoyment.  
While plenty of advertisements focused on the husband or children, many companies also 
highlighted the role of wife/mother as the primary consumer. Armour, Wilson, and Cudahy all 
ran advertisements showing a happy wife buying and preparing their meat products. For 
example, one 1948 issue of the Ladies Home Journal had no less than three competing 
advertisements all featuring a woman preparing a delicious meaty meal for her family.726 
Although these advertisements were created by different companies, most direct competitors for 
the same customer dollar, they all expressed similar assumptions about America’s family life. 
The husband/father and children were freed from meal preparation altogether. Children’s 
preferences were given top priority. The wife/mother freely bought and happily prepared the 
meals. The assumption that Americans would identify with these social roles was a major part of 
their appeal. 
Other companies utilized “family occasions” as a marketing ploys. Holidays, parties, and 
barbeques all offered perfect settings to craft a wholesome image of families enjoying these 
products. A Perdue radio ad commented that, “If you are like my family, chances are you cook 
outdoors on a regular basis during these warm evenings. Our favorite main-stay is barbecued 
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chicken. It's economical too as good quality Perdue broilers cost far less.”727 Several years later, 
Rath articulated a similar vision in their advertisements for holiday hams, “Holidays are home 
cookin' times, when the family gathers around a table filled good food. And Rath is in the center 
of it all with picture-perfect mouth-watering hams that make the meal.”728 Another advertisement 
assured housewives that their reputation was “safe with us” as long as they used Rath’s hickory 
ham. Each one of these promotions offered a plethora of family-centered images for the 
companies to rally around. As an illustration, they each reflected the pleasure the family would 
receive by buying these products. But more than that, they each concealed corporate food 
network behind the façade of the family. Perdue, Rath, Hormel, and other packers wanted 
customers to first association their products with wholesome family life that aligned with middle 
class values and expectations.  
Rath’s early to mid-1970s television commercials perfectly encapsulated this normative 
family experience. Still fighting to stay viable in an increasingly competitive market, the 
company commissioned a series of TV commercials. The thirty-second stories showcased a 
number of family-centered activities. One presented a family hiking together through the woods, 
only to stop and enjoy Rath lunch meat in a picnic.729 Others featured a similar narrative, with 
fishing and picnicking replacing the hiking. Another showed a growing boy waking up in the 
middle of the night to share a midnight snack with his father.730 All of these commercials 
intertwined family time with Rath’s products. Yet, no commercial signified this theme better 
than Rath’s 1974 Breakfast Bacon commercial. The advertisement started with a young farm boy 
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collecting eggs from a chicken coop. Intercut were images of his mother cooking Rath bacon. 
The commercial then jumped to the farmwife serving the bacon to her husband/farmer and two 
children. Throughout the commercial, a jingle played in the background, “To all you folks 
through out our land, Iowa sends her best. With plain good eatin meats from Rath, Iowa sends 
her best. Rath was born in the great Midwest where the corn grows tall and the meats are the 
best. Iowa sends you Rath, Iowa sends her best.”731 This commercial represented many of the 
features that that these companies publicized: a contented family, with the appropriate roles, and 
an idealized setting, fulfilled by these products. Rath positioned its products as the source of 
satisfaction, but not its corporate process as the creator. The key was to show Americans what 
they wanted. 
Although many input companies did not sell to the same customer base as food 
processors and retailers, they also used a similar image of the happy nuclear family and its 
contribution to food production. Many implement dealers leaned on familiar images of 
wholesome families as part of their advertising schemes at the midcentury. In an advertisement 
for John Deere’s Model 70 tractor, a farmer and his faithful dog gazed wistfully across at a 
tractor.732 Massey-Ferguson’s 1961 tractor ad for Successful Farming featured a parade of 
tractors rolling through a small town, children excitingly chasing after the machines.733 In other 
advertisements, children and family projected a picturesque vision of rural life. Introducing the 
Cub tractor in 1947, International Harvester advertised that its new tractor brought the “Farmall” 
system to the small family farm. One advertisement emphasized the tractor’s family-friendly 
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nature by showcasing a young boy riding the machine, his beaming father proudly watching.734 
A year earlier, Minneapolis-Moline used the theme of familial responssibility as a key part of 
their anti-erosion campaign.735 Nearly ten years later, Minneapolis-Moline would continue to 
draw the connection between Americana and farm families. One 1955 advertisement announced, 
‘the kids can’t wait to take over!” Showing a picturesque farm (complete with fertile fields, well-
equipped barn, and the All-American nuclear family), Minneapolis-Moline reminded customers 
that, “power-matched machines open a whole new future of progress and plenty for the boys and 
girls who stay on the land to become tomorrow’s farmers.”736 These advertisements were meant 
to provide an impression of wholesome and normative values, a life that the customers wanted to 
believe existed.  
Input companies also used the trappings of a happy nuclear family to describe various 
parts of their corporate structure. Both John Deere and International Harvester stressed that many 
of their relationships with their dealers were inter-generational. In one Deere publication, the 
company boasted that 24% of their dealerships were operated by father-son teams. This 
messaging implied that these dealers were passed down through the generations, just like the 
farmsteads they supplied. The implement manufacturer underlined that these men were essential 
parts of their community, locals that lived and worked in these community spaces, “He is not 
outsider peddling his goods for everything he can get. He is no fly-by-nighter hopping from one 
community to another to skim off the economic ‘cream.’ The typical John Deere Dealer has roots 
in the community he serves. He raises and educates his children there. He enters into community, 
                                                          
734 International Harvester, “Presents the Farmall Cub,” 1947 found in Fetherston, Farm Tractor, 62. 
735 Minneapolis-Moline, “Interested in Saving the Top Soil,” 1946, found in Fetherston, Farm Tractor, 68. 
736 Minneapolis-Moline, “The kids can’t wait to take over,” 1955, found in Fetherston, Farm Tractor, 70. 
277 
 
 
church, and school activities. More often than not, he is one of the community's leaders.”737 In 
stressing this, Deere once again looked to draw a link between themselves, families, and tightknit 
communities. The company concealed itself under the motif of home and community. 
International promoted a similar version of their salesmen’s network. The company insisted that 
their dealerships were a “friendly landmark,” like the community school or post office and the 
men who served them were part of the neighborhood.738 The company’s 1952 annual report also 
publicized their connection to family dealerships. It revealed a heartwarming story of the 
Grigsbys, a multi-generational family of Kentucky salesmen who began selling International 
fifty years prior and continued to pass down the tradition from father to son.739 These companies 
hoped to associate the familial traditions of farmers with their own employees, further blurring 
the lines between farming and their corporations. 
Seed houses like Pioneer and DeKalb also sought in ensure their customers and 
dealerships that their contracted salesmen were part of a “wholesome” family system. Company 
publications and corporate-sponsored events would often highlight family as a critical part of the 
overall focus of the company. Pioneer’s monthly publication, Kernels, had a special section 
completely dedicated to family, reporting births, marriages, deaths, and other family-related 
events. When the company added a flock of new salesmen in the late fifties, regional managers 
insisted that these dealers report family and community-related information, including their 
involvement with children’s groups, volunteer organizations, and church.740 Corporate events 
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and sales drives also took on the gloss of family involvement even as the company looked to 
confine women to a smaller realm of influence. Regional sales meetings were often joint-affairs 
between husbands and wives.741 Company prizes and gifts, including Thanksgiving turkeys, 
kitchenware, and free aprons, frequently appealed to various members of the family or supported 
family-related activities.742  
Outside of their dealerships, Pioneer and other agri-companies were also quick to 
showcase their support of rural families through sponsorship of children organizations. 
Obviously many agribusinesses were well aware of the importance of paying lip-service to this 
kind of support.743 It was a tactic that Pioneer pursued with zeal. Out of all the community 
support leant by the company between the years 1950 and 1970, contributions to groups like 4-
H, FFA, and various vocational-agriculture programs far outweighed the rest. These 
contributions took on many forms, from a ten dollar ad in an FFA calendar to sending trick 
pencils for a club meeting. Pioneer even supplied Vo-Ag programs with a short video “The Grain 
that Built a Hemisphere,” a Disney short that celebrated the utility of corn and the importance of 
hybridization. The company donated trophies to state corn champions, awards specifically 
adorned with “presented by Pioneer.” Perhaps one of the most telling signs of Pioneer’s 
commitment to children’s marketing was that they sponsored contests only for children, not 
adults.744 Pioneer provided two seven pound bags of seed to any children engaged in vocational 
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agriculture projects. The only guideline the company required for participation was that the 
children plant hybrid competitors next to Pioneer’s seed.745 
Each one of these advertisements, promotions, and events were part of a larger marketing 
façade that connected corporations to wholesome family sustainment. International Harvester 
highlighted the family-nature of their dealerships because it was easier to market than discussing 
their labor problems, the slowdown in farm implements sales, or the capitalistic and increasingly 
technical nature of agriculture. Rath featured a happy farm family eating eggs because it was 
more appealing than showcasing an industrial meat plant that slaughtered hogs, processed their 
carcasses, and canned them in tiny packages bound for customers thousands of miles away. 
Families were integral to food production, but were hardly the movers and shakers in a rapidly 
centralizing and industrializing food economy. It was corporations that controlled and often 
drove these changes. Families were wholesome. Corporate entities were not. All of these efforts 
were meant to craft and sustain a certain kind of image, one that was easier to sell and simpler to 
hide behind. 
Nostalgia  
In the end though, perhaps no other sub-theme was more integral to this marketing trope 
than an emphasis on nostalgia. If “the heartland” was to connect vitality to an agricultural setting 
and “the family” was to associate food production and consumption with the wholesomeness of 
the postwar family unit, then “nostalgia” was meant to tap into wider social longings for the 
simplified past and beliefs in the innate goodness of the American countryside. A strange brew 
of nationalism, homesickness for a past age, and a jeremiad for an imagined past, nostalgia 
associated nicely with cultural understandings of rural spaces, rural people and agriculture in 
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general. Using Norman Rockwell –esque pictures and selective memory, agribusinesses 
celebrated farmers as ideal Americans and rural spaces as tranquil gateways to a lost past. This 
sub-theme provided excellent concealment to the material change actually taking place within 
the food chain.  
Nostalgia, as a conception, has been defined as, “a preference (general liking, positive 
attitude, or favorable affect) toward objects (people, places, or things) that were more common 
(popular, fashionable, or widely circulated) when one was younger (in early adulthood, in 
adolescence, in childhood, or even before birth).”746 Many academic studies indicated a strong 
emotional response tied to nostalgia in advertising. As early as 1943, scholars interested in 
marketing began to study the effects of nostalgia on consumer preferences.747 Nearly five 
decades later, scholars William Havlena and Susan Holak found that advertising could evoke 
positive recall in response to past associations. They maintained, “The products themselves may 
also engender nostalgic emotions during consumption, allowing consumers to ‘re-experience’ 
aspects of their past or to experience the collective past of the society vicariously through fantasy 
in much the same manner as Disney's Main Street U.S.A. allows visitors to ‘experience’ as small 
town America that never really existed.”748  
In many ways, these advertisers were merely tapping into America’s generalized anxiety 
about modernization and fear of past values being lost. Nostalgia functioned as a sort of 
redeemer of virtues in peril, a belief that older traditions still held relevance and could be 
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retained through consumption. One of the most popular TV shows of all time, The Beverly 
Hillbillies, succeed because it offered its viewers a reaffirmation traditional American values. 
The Hillbillies presented a lost world based on community and egalitarianism, while also 
presenting a critique of post-war consumption and affluence.749 The culture wars of the late 
1980s and 90s were partly based on nostalgic visions of family life, with many politicians and 
social commentators gaining popularity through their repeated calling for an unrealized past.750 
In her study of homesickness in American history, Susan Matt discussed how the advent of 
nostalgia coincided with Gilded Age industrialization and the continued disruption of older ways 
of life. Family reunions, “hometown days,” and local festivals offered momentary respite in the 
form of consumable leisure. Or as Matt argued, “the same technologies that had brought them 
home had also disrupted traditional way of life. Home was gone, lost in the past. And while 
space could be traversed, time could not. This realization was at the heart of what we now call 
nostalgia.”751 
 One way that these companies employed this theme was through idealized images of 
country life. Obviously agribusinesses did not hold a monopoly on idyllic images as marketing 
tools. Plenty of other industries also employed these kind of designs to sell their products. But 
businesses involved in the food production especially found nostalgia an easy device to convey 
their marketing message. After the Second World War, the meat packing giant Swift embarked 
on a marketing campaign that offered consumers a chance to revisit the past through the 
consumption of their product. Calling their campaign, “Great American Customs,” Swift 
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advertisements celebrated blissful small town events and the place of meat products within them. 
One featured a nuclear family (white and middle-class) walking into a fair, leading to a delightful 
picnic with Swift luncheon meats. Another presented a town enjoying a holiday parade, with a 
family grilling hot dogs as part of their 4th of July tradition. The tagline boldly asserted, “Great 
American Customs: Holiday Parades [A Day At The Fair]…And Holiday Picnics with Swift’s 
Premium Franks [Table-Ready Meats].752 The association, of course, was meant to insinuate that 
Swift was an essential part of retaining tradition. Customs and rituals that Americans used to 
glorify the past and celebrate the present were innately tied to the consumption of these products. 
All of these images, though clearly idealized, nevertheless conveyed important messages about 
the connections between companies, agricultural production, and the past. They insinuated that 
these products (and by extension the agribusinesses themselves) were innate parts of recalling 
this idyllic system, as traditional as mom and apple pie. It also projected the sense that these 
companies were always present in American history. The past, glorified and made simple, could 
be used to further draw the association between nostalgic interpretations of the past and 
corporations.  
One of the most prominent marketing methods both now and then, nostalgia uniquely 
appealed to agribusinesses in the postwar period for a number of different reasons. Rewriting the 
historical narrative certainly allowed food companies to exalt corporate innovations, insinuating 
that these advancements created abundance without breaking the bank. Conversely, it allowed 
retailers to conceal events or trends (like unsanitary environments or protracted conflicts with 
labor) that would hurt their public image. Yet, perhaps most importantly, nostalgia allowed these 
companies subvert the expectations of the consumer. Instead of a large, seemingly unfeeling 
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corporation operating thousands of miles away, nostalgia put a human face on an inhuman 
institution. It masked corporatization under the guise of a romanticized past. Looking to evoke 
strong emotion, nostalgia was an essential part of agribusinesses’ bait and switch platform. By 
baiting customers into satisfying their longing for an unrealized past, consumers actually bought 
into an increasingly corporatized system based on efficiency, vertical integration, and large 
bureaucracies. These two seemingly opposed conceptions were nevertheless intertwined through 
the use of nostalgia. 
As a tool for retailers, nostalgia was an essential part of creating an attractive selling 
narrative for their customers. Or as one Perdue marketing proposal explained, “Remembrance is 
vital in telling a selling story. Historical projection will increase recall.”753 Rath Packing did this 
in several different ways. Sometimes the company advertised its use of “old-fashioned” 
processing methods, hoping its emphasis would symbolize old-time quality. In one 1973 
advertising proposal aimed at Safeway Foods, the packer promised a unique hickory flavor to 
their bacon, claiming, “At Rath we still cure our bacon the slow old backwoods way, over 
smoldering hickory.”754 Another television commercial featured a company smokemaster 
standing in a smoky room, noting that the Rath bacon was still smoked the old-fashioned way.755 
Much earlier, Rath sought to sell nostalgia through a series of advertisements in Life Magazine. 
Throughout the summer of 1955, Rath’s Daintees (a canned ham) appeared in full color, 
surrounded by orange slices and different historic objects. Along with these symbols of citric 
freshness, Rath guaranteed that those, “Unique elements such as the old-fashioned mantle clock 
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and apothecaries scales make Rath Advertising different from other meat ads.”756 A year later, 
the company applied the same reasoning to another bacon promotion, asserting, “The use of old-
fashioned articles help attract the reader's eye…the old coffee grinder…mittens…cup and a 
checkerboard table cloth are combined to call attention to the bacon platter and the Black Hawk 
Bacon package.”757  
Not content to leave nostalgia on the pages, Rath even created a storewide event that 
played on longing for the past. Titled, “Old Fashioned Values,” Rath proposed that stores drum 
up excitement by hosting different “historic” in-store activities, including an old fashioned dress 
contest, best beard contest, buggy rides, or square dance. The packer suggested that the grocery 
store create fake, old-fashioned posters (featuring Rath’s products of course) to bring in more 
customers. Ultimately, the event promised an, “Early American Atmosphere spiced with modern 
day food bargains.”758 Unsurprisingly, there was no evidence that Rath’s proposal gained much 
traction among grocery stores. In the end, the use of nostalgia, while seemingly obvious in its 
imagery and wording, was actually quite subtle in its intention. Marketers looked to cultivate 
positive memories and draw association between remembrances of the past with their own brand. 
In this way, the product itself was not necessarily the most important object the customer bought, 
but rather the “feeling” or attribute gained by its consumption. Campaigns built on nostalgia 
therefore promised to achieve both a “soft” sell subtle enough linger and the recall necessary to 
make it work. 
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What was unique about these uses of nostalgia was not just that they sought to recall a 
romanticized past, but also an imagined place as well. Companies sought to harness the public’s 
imagination of rural spaces, driving a link between nostalgia for the past, cultural assumptions 
about the countryside, and their branded products. Retailers used this assumption of place and 
time to sell everything from “old-style” ice cream to home-cured, country hams. Introducing 
their new frozen meat balls, Rath advertised that, “Our Home Economist, Ruth Chambers, 
gleaned the country cookbooks for the finest old-fashioned, home-made style of meat balls.”759 
Another Rath advertisement claimed to be a celebration of old-time picnics, announcing, “For 
we've taken the best of that good farm-wife's recipe, added touches of our own and turned out a 
sausage elegant enough for the most uppity company.”760 Rath’s competitors also played on this 
connection. Roegelein, a meat packer out of Texas, based many of its advertising campaigns on 
the promise that their product recipes were handed down from an older generation, carefully 
preserving “old-country” flavor and freshness.761 This drew on the enduring association between 
rurality and the past. 
It was nostalgia’s connection to the past and romantic agrarianism that gave it such 
strength in the realm of advertising. Companies already attempted to manipulate understandings 
of the past, present, and future to serve their agricultural needs.  It was hardly a stretch then that 
these entities would also seek to use other cultural talismans rooted in historical memory to sell 
their products and conceal their presence. And no talisman was more attractive to agribusinesses 
than the American farmer. At an agribusiness seminar in 1968, Seth Shaw acknowledged that 
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changes were anxiety-producing and that, “the family farm and the simple service trades of the 
town; and the church which was the center of the social as well as the religious life, all loom 
large in our dream. We do not want to see this pass away.”762 Strong, hardy and fundamentally 
good, these rural people were ideal characters in the advertising narrative companies attempted 
to weave. They already held a cultural capital, had a deep connection to America’s sense of place 
and memory, and positive associations with the values of enterprise and decency. The American 
Way of Farming intertwined all three of the themes, the heartland, the family, and nostalgia, to 
create an infinitely marketable trope that rest quite comfortably on the laurels of romantic 
agrarianism.   
Welcome to the American Way of Farming 
 In the winter of 1957, the American Farm Economics Association held their annual 
dinner meeting. Chosen to speak that night was Bushrod Allin, a longtime USDA employee and 
the chairman of the department’s Outlook and Situation Board. As an economist, Allin opened 
his speech by addressing a “the farm problem,” though it was perhaps not one his colleagues 
were keenly aware of. Instead of discussing a sluggish farm economy, the Cold War, or rural 
depopulation, Allin called for something new in the agricultural sector, public relations. He 
argued that the American public lacked a concrete understanding of agriculture, including its 
problems and needs. He stated 
If I know any fact other than those I can see, hear, smell, taste or touch, it is the fact that 
Americans are inclined to regard favorably our free, efficient, individualistic, family 
farmer [his emphasis] who owns, manages, and does manual labor on his farm. Poets and 
philosophers have sung his praises from our earliest times. And many of our farmers do 
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meet these specifications. But even though in very many instances this affection is 
bestowed upon real people, it is largely an affection for an abstract ideal inherited from 
our past when farming was more a way of life than a modern business. This particular 
ideal—this romanticized image—has great public appeal, especially to nonfarm people, 
so much so that the image itself is sometimes a substantive problem in arriving at 
workable solutions to the real-life problems of farmers.763 
Allin’s solution to this problem was public relations, reeducating the inward facing public on the 
reality of farm life. This would, he claimed, help create mutual understanding and respect.  
Allin’s assessment of the American public’s view of agriculture, the glorification of the 
farmer, was also noticed by other agricultural observers of the day. Constitutional scholar 
Charles Hardin commented that no other group, “has been the subject of as much idolatry and 
contempt as the hayseedy son of honest toil and sweat, the noble yokel, the independent and 
thoughtful clodhopper, the bucolic philosopher, the industrious sucker, the indispensable hick, 
and the God-fearing, hell-fire-and-brimstone breathing last stronghold of woolhatted 
democracy.”764 Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman questioned whether or not American 
public fully appreciated farmers and their production, asking for greater understanding of the 
issues facing agriculture.765 While Freeman questioned how much the consumer truly understood 
the agricultural economy, he perhaps should have directed his questions towards himself. After 
all, could he fully appreciate how far public imagination had wandered away from reality in such 
a short amount of time? Did Freeman truly expect the consumer, the individual who engaged in 
agriculture only in the most superficial of ways, to somehow understand the industrialization of 
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the countryside? From that point of view, it was Freeman who had lost touch, not the American 
masses. 
Not all were so easily befuddled by the radical reconstruction and disconnection 
happening in America’s food and fiber system. Morton Rothstein, an agricultural historian and 
longstanding editor for Agricultural History, placed these changes in historical context during his 
presidential address for the society in 1975. He remarked that, “many of the profound changes in 
American agriculture that are a source of pride for some commentators in the abundance 
obtained, and a source of fear and concern for others.” Yet, Rothstein believed that many of 
these changes were just part of a larger and historic transformation of agriculture, that the 
disputes over land, technology, governmental policies, and allocation of resources were infinite 
and constant through our history.766 How typical that it would be an agricultural historian, not a 
farmer, agricultural expert, or policy-maker, that would identify these changes and place them in 
an appropriate line of America’s agriculture past. That Rothstein tried to historicize alterations to 
postwar agriculture is not surprisingly, given his occupation. That he was wrong is also 
unsurprising. Humans often fail to adequately conceive of the vast transformations in their own 
life, especially ones where the consequences were far-flung and obscured by the sheer size of the 
change. That fact of the matter is, both the material reality that Rothstein, Allin, Hardin, and 
Freeman discussed and the ideological simplification evoked by agribusinesses intertwined to 
form a startlingly new period of American agriculture.  
What was new were not the forces of a wider bureaucracy seeking to impose its vision, 
nor the technological and scientific advancements that made it possible. Consumerism, 
convenience, and an emphasis on a business mindset had all been emphasized before in 
                                                          
766 Morton Rothstein, "The Big Farm: Abundance and Scale in American Agriculture," Agricultural History 49, no. 
4 (1975): 583-97. 
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agriculture. And traditional cultural assumptions of farming had long stressed its wholesome 
nature. No, what was truly unique was the inherent contradiction that lay at the heart of postwar 
agriculture. It was the divorce of reality from ideology. The public believed in agriculture’s 
wholesomeness and its timeless nature. Material changes told a different story, one where 
agriculture became more industrial, more capitalistic, and encompassed by corporations. And 
yet, though fundamentally different, both conceptions seemed to exist without great tension. 
Ultimately, this resulted in greater institutional control over not just the physical food chain, but 
also over how Americans thought of their agricultural system. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
 
Let us imagine, somewhere in south-central Iowa, in the mid-summer of 2017, a litter of 
pigs was born. The farm itself was average sized, around 442 acres, and specialized. It primarily 
focused on a farrow to finish hog production, developing the piglet to adult in about six months. 
To support this operation, fields of chemically fertilized hybrid corn and soybeans rounded out 
the outfit. Cloistered in a confinement crate and shielded from their mother’s bulk by metal 
prongs, the litter of nine lived there for three weeks. The litter then moved to the nursing barn. 
They would soon join other piglets in large, temperature-controlled stalls. Feasting on a mixture 
of corn, soy, food additives, and vitamins, the piglets remained confined for another six to eight 
weeks. The growing pigs would watch the human laborers monitor their process: measuring their 
weight gain, vaccinating to guard against disease, and inspecting for possible inflection. Once the 
pigs reacted an ideal weight of fifty to sixty pounds, these same laborers would drive the pigs 
into the finishing building. There the pigs would add muscle quickly, the specifically bred 
biology making it difficult to distinguish one long, lean body from another. By the time they 
weighed two hundred and eighty pounds, the pigs were ready for market. The farmer and the 
other laborers would move the hogs into a waiting semi-truck. The hogs were sold directly to 
Tyson, one of the largest meat packers in the world 
From there, the semi would drive the hogs to Waterloo, Iowa. Located just southeast of a 
massive John Deere factory, the pigs would be unloaded at pork processing plant. Built by Iowa 
Beef Processors in 1990, the plant helped ease the sting of losing Rath in 1985. Tyson bought the 
plant in 2001, and with tax incentives from the city, expanded the operation in 2017. With over 
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2,900 employees, the plant processed 19,500 hogs each day.767 The pigs were moved into a 
holding pen and rested for an hour or so before being directed towards the CO2 chamber. The 
stunned hogs would then be killed by a quick, sharp jab to the neck, causing the carcass to bleed 
profusely. The hanging hogs would next be ducked into a scalding tank. Their softened bristles 
would then be removed by the de-hairing and singed by machine. Workers would next remove 
the head, the entrails, and feet in a series of steps before the most skilled laborer would split the 
carcass in half. Finally, the freshly separated body would be blast chilled and placed in a cooler. 
After twenty-four hours, the disassembly process would begin in earnest. The carcass 
moved onto the cutting floor and the first major section, “the main break.” Here, workers 
separated the carcass into five different parts (ham, picnic, butt, belly, and the trim). While the 
other cuts were bound for different product lines, the conveyor belt tossed pork belly into a 
tumbler. The newly softened cut then traveled through an automated de-skinner and was further 
hand trimmed by workers. After being injected with a brine solution, the belly moved into the 
drench cabinet. The belly would be then baked at a low temperature and then hung in an 
industrial cooler. Frozen into slabs, the bellies were now the ideal firmness for automatic slicing 
into uniform cuts of bacon. Reloaded onto another conveyor belt, the slabs were sliced, 
microwaved, inspected, vacuumed packaged, and sealed for travel. 
Finally, the packaged bacon would be packed onto refrigerated truck units and shipped to 
supermarkets across the country. Arriving at its stop in Ames, Iowa, supermarket employees 
unloaded the truck and stocked the newly arrived bacon in the supermarket’s meat cooler near 
the cheese, milk, and other perishables. There, the bacon would rest nestled next to its Hormel, 
                                                          
767 EMI Analytics, “Estimated Daily U.S. Slaughter Capacity by Plant (head per day),” August 7, 2017, accessed 
online (February 1, 2018), https://www.pork.org/facts/stats/u-s-packing-
sector/#estimatedusdailyhogslaughtercapacitybyplant.  
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Oscar Meyer, and Smithfield competitors. Until at last, a woman, perhaps taken by bright red 
packaging or (more likely) with the price, would choose that particular package, check out her 
groceries, and drive home. There, the woman opened the package and placed the pre-cooked 
bacon on a plate. Though not as tasty as a baked ham or convenient as a drive through sandwich 
from McDonalds, the bacon would make for a suitably quick meal for a hungry family.  
Suppose too that this imagined woman was not the only customer investigating the 
packaged meats that day. I was there, surveying the bacon and looking around at the seemingly 
numerous choices. It is a bounty that almost appears unreal at times. A seemingly infinite 
amount of products offers the customer an endless amount of choice at a convenience my 
grandmother could only dream of and a cost that would cause my great-great grandfather (the 
butcher) to faint. In the seventy-five-plus years since his death, the food chain and the 
agricultural network that supply it have been transformed in immeasurable ways. Everything has 
changed. 
 
While there are many reasons for these changes, the massive expansion of agribusiness 
during the post period undoubtedly influenced the transformation of our food chain. Their ability 
to manipulate how people created, consumed, and conceived of food and fiber was profound. 
Agribusinesses used many different tools and methods to alter the system to their liking. 
Modifying conceptions of the past, present, and future helped them claim ownership over 
progress. Postwar pressures allowed agricultural corporations the opportunity to introduce new 
standards of identity to members of the rural community. Their focus on scientific and 
technological control transferred ownership of knowledge away from the public and toward the 
private. Agribusiness also used the expectations of the postwar middle class to increase 
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consumption of their goods and assure their dominance in retail. In the end, all of these radical 
changes hid behind a banal version of rurality. “The American Way of Farming” made the food 
and fiber system more stratified, industrial, and capitalistic while presenting a different image of 
wholesomeness. Nevertheless the effort succeed by speaking two different languages at the same 
time.  
Agribusinesses undertook these measures with the goal of essentialization. By 
manipulating conceptions of agriculture and the way people (both farming population and the 
public at large) thought about it, agribusinesses helped construct a system that wholly depended 
on private entities to exist. Agribusinesses wanted to make themselves indispensable to the food 
chain’s functionality without provoking mass consternation from the public. They desired to 
incorporate not just their products into agriculture, but their methodology and expertise as well. 
Though individuals might question their presence, agribusinesses wanted to be accepted as an 
elementary part of the rural community. Agribusinesses also hoped to instill new values into 
every societal level of agriculture, from changing the outlook of individual farm children 
involved in a 4-H contest to altering customer habits and taste. Agribusinesses sought to remake 
the material reality of the food chain, all while restructuring the metaphysical conceptions that 
surrounded agricultural production. 
In many ways, these agribusinesses achieved their goal. Agribusiness has become an 
inescapable part of agriculture, consumption, knowledge commodification, and the corporate 
political economy. As private entities, agribusinesses grew smaller in number but more powerful 
in scope. Both economically and politically, these firms often organized together to further their 
interests and crush any threats to their position at the top of the food chain. And even as these 
companies tightened in number, very few of these corporations have actually “died.” Most were 
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merely bought out and incorporated into other firms. This has led to greater integration of 
connected industries by a single corporate institution. For example, at one time or another, the 
chemical giant DuPont has been involved in the production of pharmaceuticals, textiles, and 
fossil fuels. With its merger with Dow chemical, DuPont now holds a stake in nearly every 
application of biotechnology in agriculture. This deal has only recently been surpassed by the 
buyout of Monsanto by Bayer, a move that will combine two of the world’s top three bio-
chemical companies together. The results of these unifications are “mega” corporations that will 
shape the future direction of the world’s food supply. These companies already indirectly control 
much of the agricultural production in North America and Europe. They are now, slowly but 
surely, making inroads in Africa, South America, and Asia. This global expansion challenges 
decolonization efforts, often replacing older forms of state imperialism with equally harmful 
capitalist practices. As agribusinesses conquered western agriculture, they have now turned their 
attention to the world at large. 
Ironically, this development has coincided with disappearance of these companies from 
much of the public eye. As food production became more and more segmented, fewer people 
were aware of the reach of these companies. It is a reticence that was actively encouraged by 
companies, who saw silence about their practices as way to deflect attention and criticism. The 
commodification of knowledge also helped dampen possible resistance from consumers and 
academics alike. The illusion of choice limited organization among consumer activists. As state 
support for colleges and universities decreased, scholars became progressively more dependent 
on funding from corporate sponsors. In the end, these corporate entities have become invisible 
aspects of American life, making it more difficult to separate their desires from our reality. 
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The transformation of the food chain and the full integration of corporate agriculture have 
had a multitude of material consequences in our world. In comparison to 1940, let alone 1900, 
how America produces and eats today is vastly different. The countryside has been altered 
beyond measure. Fewer farms dot the landscape, but of those that do, they are larger, specialized, 
and far more commercialized then in the past.768 Agricultural operations depend more heavily on 
input commodities like hybrid seeds, chemical fertilizer, and pesticide. Machinery has only 
grown larger and more computerized to handle greater acreage and production. Livestock 
operations are now efficiently streamlined and carefully segmented to achieve maximum growth 
in the shortest amount of time. These changes are much more evolutionary than revolutionary. 
As historian Douglas Hurt noted, these changes were built on the achievements of the past, rather 
than a new series of technological innovations.769 In many ways, the current system has achieved 
the goals set by past bureaucrats. Efficient, productive, and controlled by institutional experts, 
the farm seems to have finally, at least to some, reached an industrial ideal. 
However, it is a system that still contains deep rooted problems, particularly with issues 
that beset the farm population. Adoption of the industrial ideal and its scientific methods have 
exacerbated issues of overproduction. Low commodity prices (driven partly by the demands of 
corporate consumers), along with rising operational costs, have caught many farmers in a 
perpetual price squeeze, much like the ones that plagued their parents and grandparents. And like 
their older family members, governmental entities have failed to not only address these 
problems, but have often supported policies and institutions that benefit from overproduction. 
                                                          
768 According to the US Census of Agriculture for 2012, 3.2 million farmers operate 2.1 million farms in the United 
States. For reference, in 1940, there were over six million farms. United States Department of Agriculture, National 
Agricultural Statistics Service, “Farm Demographics,” ACH 12-3, May 2014, accessed online (February 5, 2018), 
https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Highlights/Farm_Demographics/Highlights_F
arm_Demographics.pdf; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, “Sixteenth Census of the 
United States: 1940: Agriculture General Report,” Volume III, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1943), 20-26.  
769 Douglas Hurt, Problems of Plenty, 145-148.  
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Government subsidies overwhelmingly went to large-scale operators. Farm programs have done 
little to combat cycles of farm recessions. Perhaps the most problematic issue is the gradual loss 
of institutional control by farmers themselves. In both practice and knowledge, outside experts 
have commodified the intellectual properties of agriculture. Not only do these experts control the 
flow and price of input and output commodities, they are often the loudest voices involved in 
discussion of the agricultural future. Debt and contract farming threaten possibilities of new 
directions. The once politically powerful farm bloc has dissolved. These problems have driven 
away farmers and sped depopulation of the countryside. 
The consequences of these actions stretch beyond the agribusiness or even the farmer. 
These changes have also had profound effects on rural communities throughout the nation. The 
breakdown of local exchange and the displacement of rural people (especially in the global 
South) constricted economic sustainability of rural spaces. Poverty has always been an ingrained 
part of life in the countryside, a reality that fell substantially as more subsistence farmers left in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, despite the presence of a few well-off operators and the lingering 
promise of integrating rural areas into a national industrial economy, rural poverty rates have 
hovered between fifteen and twenty percent of the population since the late 1960s.770 Lack of 
educational and employment opportunities triggered a brain drain from these spaces. Many local 
stores and businesses have closed because of depopulation. Economic stresses helped fuel drug 
crises. In order to kept their overhead cost low, many farmers and other food production 
businesses came to rely increasingly on migrant labor. The result is an exploitive system of labor 
that depends on injustice and dependence to function.  
                                                          
770 United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Poverty Overview,” October 25, 2017, 
online accessed (February 6, 2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/rural-poverty-well-
being/poverty-overview/.  
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In the larger view, agribusiness was fundamental to the story of consolidation in 
America.  As the twentieth century marched onward, institutional forces attempted to produce a 
consolidated understanding of culture, social values, and normalized behavior. These powers 
sought to integrate values that support bureaucratic and capitalistic structures and expertise. 
Agribusiness helped centralized structures of the state and corporations to rural spaces. By 
undermining older configurations of exchange and rural life, agribusiness forced a new reliance 
on outside forces for economic sustenance. Beyond government subsidies (which are 
substantial), rural areas are now more reliant than ever on the “Walmart Economy.” These areas 
are particularly vulnerable to financial exploitation because they lack the ability to balance the 
power of these external forces. Distance limits the range of choice for rural consumers and 
employees alike. Lack of numbers and the threat of corporate shut-downs leave laborers 
susceptible to misuse. In terms of consumption, agribusinesses have helped solidify the 
disconnection between rurality and many Americans, between the food we produce and the food 
we consume. In this way, we truly are what we eat. 
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